

# **Sectarian Discourse in Pakistan: Case Study of District Jhang (1979-2009)**

**Doctoral Thesis to Fulfil the Requirements of a Doctor of Philosophy  
(Dr. Phil.) from the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Erfurt**

**Supervisor: Prof. Jamal Malik**

**Islamic History and Culture**

**(University of Erfurt)**

**Co-Supervisor: Prof. Hans Harder**

**South Asian Institute**

**(University of Heidelberg)**

**Muhammad Yasir Ali Khan**

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## **Abstract**

Sectarianism involves differences, divisions and ruptures with a supposedly homogenous religious community or group, which often ignites flames of religious violence between sects over doctrinal differences. Pakistani society has been the victim of shia-sunni sectarian violence over the last four decades which has engulfed the peace of the country by appearing in various ways. Its appearance in both violent and non-violent ways, has affected almost the whole country but Jhang, a district of Punjab province, stands prominent. Its central position is due to many reasons which include the influence of Shia feudals in the politics, the foundation of Anjuman Sipāh Şahāba and the demographic proportion of sectarian populations after the establishment of Pakistan. Sectarianism in Jhang attracted the attention of journalistic and academic analysis. The works of Khalid Ahmad, Tahir Kamran, and Mariam Abou Zahab cover the different aspects of the issue. Most of the works discuss historical, political and socio-economic aspects of sectarianism. The present study on the sectarian discourse in Jhang tries to understand the phenomenon by employing the cultural tools of inquiry.

It seeks to investigate sectarianism by exploring those sectarian performances, which, inherently, are culture specific. These performances are the parts of discourse. Every discursive position in the shape of a particular viewpoint involves some practices and performances. These performances, according to the newly emerging theories of cultural performance, seek credibility from the audience to achieve a dominant position in a discourse. This credibility is a relationship between the performance and the audience in a particular culture. It is a subjective relationship which varies with the changing dynamics of time and space. Similar discursive formations have differences of structural building in different sets of cultural conditions. The hegemonic status of a particular viewpoint in a particular discourse depends upon the intensity of relationship between the act and the audience in the performances attached with that viewpoint. This relationship is relative, and this relativity keeps the discursivity alive in a discourse. This relativity rather than the absoluteness keeps the struggle alive and reduces the level of inertia in a society.

Sectarian performances, in this study, include textual, oral and customary

performances. It also includes the concept of cultural script for the examination of cultural sectarian performances. This categorization yearns to explore sectarian texts, sectarian oral traditions and some customary practices. This scheme of research will help to find the cultural roots of sectarianism and will be equally significant for the overall understanding of the issue, which till now, is understood dominantly as religious and to some partially socio-political.

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**Dedicated**

**To my Parents**

**Mubarak Ali Khan Saleem (Late) & Shamim Akhtar**

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## Introduction

Sectarianism has become a significant aspect of the religious development. Sects owe their existence because of difference in opinion regarding the belief structure and the understanding of religion in practice. Sectarianism emerges because of absolute claims of truth by one particular sect rejecting the rest.<sup>1</sup> This phenomenon has been observed in most of the religions across the globe.<sup>2</sup> Sectarianism, being based on the difference of opinion and performance, involves multiple factors in its developments. These divisive factors include theology, political issues, economic conditions and different social and cultural positions. This trend has exhibited itself differently with the variation of time and space. Its relative position inspires examination and investigation of its development under different conditions of time and circumstances by using multiple tools of academic inquiry. Muslim history shows a remarkable trend of fragmentation and sectarian divisions. This phenomenon exhibited just after the demise of the Prophet on the issue of His succession.<sup>3</sup> This issue consolidated some already existing identities besides giving birth to new trends in the religious identity marking. Thaḳīfā Banī Sa'dā intensified the anṣār-muhājir binaries and paved the way for the birth of the Quraish/non-Quraish dichotomy. The question of Quraish further subdivided into the Ahl al-Bait and the rest of Quraish.<sup>4</sup> With the passage of time these divisions and the patterns of divisions diversified to such an extent that it would require volumes of work to be fully comprehended. This gave birth to the prominence of some personalities, institutions, basic beliefs and some philosophical questions which became identity markers in the intra-religion divisions or sects.<sup>5</sup> Geographical and political expansion of Islam added to its divisive

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<sup>1</sup> Roy Mottahedeh, "Pluralism and Islamic Traditions of Sectarian Divisions," in *Diversity and Pluralism in Islam: Historical and Contemporary Discourses amongst Muslims*, ed., Z. Hijri, (London: The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2010), 31-43

<sup>2</sup> Alan Ford, "Living Together, Living apart: Sectarianism in early modern Ireland," in *The Origins of Sectarianism in Early Modern Ireland*, ed., A. Ford, J. McCafferty, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-24

<sup>3</sup> Layla Sein, "Sectarianism in Islam and Muslim Communities," *Journal of Islamic and Muslim Studies*, 1, no. 1 (2016): 106-12

<sup>4</sup> Hugh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of Caliphate*, (London: Pearson Longman, 2004), 51-53

<sup>5</sup> Sein, "Sectarianism in Islam and Muslim Communities," 106-12

phenomenon. In the medieval period these geo-sectarian trends became more prominent and the resonance of these trends can be felt in the historical accounts of that period i.e. Sunnite Central Asia and Shi'ite Iran.<sup>6</sup> Similar trends were transferred to India when the Arabs, Persian and Turks had their encounters with India. The establishment of Muslim rule in India and the question of religious identity gave birth to different divisions.<sup>7</sup> While championing the 'divine essence of unity', Sufism, itself had to fall a prey to certain divisions.<sup>8</sup> Chishtiyya, Suhrawardiyya, Naqshbandiyya and Qādiriyya could not bridge the differences. The Sunnite identity of the Mughal dynasty automatically appears when its downfall is marked and identified as the creation of small Shia states among other reasons.<sup>9</sup> The British period brings some major structural changes in the divisive and sectarian identities in Islam in the sub-continent. The advent of the British with the package of modernity and their encounter with Muslim discourses resembled, to an extent, the advent and encounters of Islam and Greek philosophy in the early period of Islam. This encounter resulted in number of responses including the emergence of new structural formations in the sectarian discourse. The traditions established at Bareilly and Deoband structured themselves in solid sectarian traditions giving birth to Barelwī and Deobandi sects in the subcontinent. Today's Shi'ite Islam also owes much to the religious traditions in Lucknow (India) which resulted in the dominance of Ithnā 'Asharī (Twelvers) tradition. This phenomenon, largely remained in the North India and remained at a distance from the areas comprising today's Pakistan.<sup>10</sup> It does not mean that sectarianism was altogether alien to these areas but will be more appropriate to say that its encounter with these areas was limited. The partition of the Indian Subcontinent resulted in the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim country. This partition also witnessed a large-scale migration of Muslims and Hindus across the borders and

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<sup>6</sup> Douglas E. Streusand, *Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2011), 27-28

See also A.L. Srivastava, *Medieval Indian Culture*, (Agra: Siva Lal Agarwala and Company, 1964), 1-4

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>8</sup> Shuja Alhaq, *A Forgotten Vision*, (Lahore: Vanguard, 1996), 347-55

<sup>9</sup> Jamal Malik, *Islam in South Asia: A Short History*, (Boston: Brill, 2008), 217

See also Justin Jones, *Shia Islam in Colonial India: Religion, Community and Sectarianism*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-2

<sup>10</sup> Jones, *Shia Islam in Colonial India*, 222

gave birth to a new demography.

Pakistan, since its inception, has been encountered with the question of religious identity.<sup>11</sup> This question of religious identity was decisive in the development of a new wave of sectarianism. It generated a new trend of Islamism which stood for the political Islamisation of state.<sup>12</sup> Excommunication of Aḥmadis proved to be the test case in this regard. The extension of this Islamism in the Islamisation of the Zia regime expanded the sectarian reservations and apprehensions.<sup>13</sup> This proved to be a beginning of an altogether new era of religious development and sectarianism. Islamism after passing through the phase of Islamisation ended in religious extremism and violence-based sectarianism. This phenomenon spread all over the country and engulfed the lives of thousands of citizens. The current expressions of this sectarian violence and religious extremism are evident in all the four provinces and Gilgit-Baltistan. Jhang, Dera Ismail Khan, Khairpur, Karachi, Quetta and some other cities have become the centre of sectarian clashes. This new wave of religious extremism started in Jhang after the assassination of Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī which was translated into an act of sectarian violence on the part of Shias.<sup>14</sup> It started an unending sectarian clash and bloodshed which remained at full swing for almost a decade and then this followed expansion into rest of the country. The beginning of this new era of religious extremism can be attached to sectarianism. Although sectarianism has emerged as a national issue and has spread all over the country, it contains some distinctive aspects in different areas. It is difficult to grasp the issue, yet it can be explained in some units. The present research intends to examine the sectarianism in the place from where it emerged. District Jhang has been selected for examining the sectarian phenomenon on the basis of its being a central place as far as sectarianism is concerned. This study intends to examine the situation with socio-cultural academic tools.

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<sup>11</sup> Ishtiaq Ahmad, *The concept of an Islamic State in Pakistan: An analysis of Ideological controversies*, (Lahore: Vaneguard, 1991), 3-15

<sup>12</sup> Muḥammad I. Ahmad, *Quaid-i-A'zam, Naẓariyya Pakistan aur Islāmī Nizām: Abul A'lā Maudūdī kī naẓar main*, (Karachi: Educational Press Pakistan, 1970), 1-5

<sup>13</sup> Ian Talbot, *Pakistan A Modern History*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1998), 245-283 339-342

See also Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History*, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 163-198

<sup>14</sup> Mariam Abou Zahab, "The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Jhang," in *Islam and Society in Pakistan: Anthropological Perspectives*, ed., Magnus Marsden, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 164-176

### 1.1. District Jhang: Present and Past

Jhang is located, geographically, in the heart of Punjab Province. According to 1998 census the total population of District Jhang was 2834545 out of which urban population was 23 percent and rest was the rural. Male population is 48 percent as compared to the 52 per cent of the female population. Muslims comprised most of the population, 98 per cent, followed by the Aḥmadīs 1.5 and 0.5 percent of the Christian population.<sup>15</sup> District Jhang is endowed with some geographical diversity that combines in Jhang, the parts of various natural geographical divisions. It owes its geography by taking shares of land from Sāndal Bār, Kirānā Bār, Thal and Kachhī.<sup>16</sup> All these lands are not only defined different in geographical terms, but they also maintain slight socio-cultural difference as well. They are inhabited with the people, distinguished on the basis of different traits. Sāndal Bār brings the colors of bravery and courage. The people of Kirānā Bār are famous for their modesty and sociability. Kachchī, although a small tract of land, maintains the preservation of folk wisdom and farsightedness. Thal brings the most challenging life. Most of this division is maintained by the two rivers i.e. Chanāb and Jehlam. Both rivers meet at the place of Tarīmū. Owing to its geographical position based on the multi-regional collaboration it is different from various parts of Punjab. Currently, the District is comprised of four Tehsil units namely, Athara Hazari, Ahmadpur Sayyāl, Shorkot and Jhang. Tehsil Chiniot although left the District in 2010 and has attained the status of a separate district, still is the part of this thesis on the basis of selected timespan of the sectarian phenomenon for this research.

This part of land which comprises today's Jhang has been scattered and politically divided for a long time in history. Shorkot and Chiniot had some recognition even before the foundation stone of Jhang was laid by the descendants of Rāy Sayyāl in 1288.<sup>17</sup> The area which Jhang owes from Kirānā Bār had been affiliated with the Bhairā state. Same is the case with Kachhī and Thal that these parts

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<sup>15</sup> Government of Pakistan, *Population Census Organization, 1998 District Census Report*, (Islamabad: Statistic Division, 2000)

<sup>16</sup> Government of Punjab, *Punjab District Gazetteers, Jhang District 1883-84*, (Lahore: Government Printing Punjab, 1885), 2-11

The area between river Chanāb and river Rāwī is called Sāndal Bār. Kirānā Bār lies in between river Jehlam and river Chanāb. Thal is desert and the small tract of land that which occurs between Thal and river Chanāb is called Kachhī.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 27



had been oscillating politically between the Amwānī state of Maikans and Multan.<sup>18</sup> Yet, historians have consensus that Jhang throughout the medieval period till the advent of Britishers maintained its identity as a chieftainship under or for a small period of time independence under Sayyāl chiefs. This identity was ruined by the advent of Sikh rule just to be re-established in British Colonial period.<sup>19</sup> The only identification of Jhang, whatever it was i.e. chieftainship or a tributary state, or an independent position, remained with the Sayyāl chiefs. That is why it is said that “History of Jhang is history of Sayyāl”.<sup>20</sup>

Today’s Jhang was founded by Mal Khān Sayyāl, the first chief of the state and ninth descendent of Rāy Sayyāl.<sup>21</sup> Rāy Sayyāl son of Rāy Shankar belonged to the Panwār Rājput of Jaun Pur. After being defeated from Jaun Pur, Rāy Sayyāl took refuge with Farīd al-Dīn, a Chishtī saint and later also embraced Islam at the perusal of saint.<sup>22</sup> Rāy Sayyāl was awarded a small jāgīr in Kachchī at Kautlī Bāqir Shāh by the Maikan Rulers of Amwānī.<sup>23</sup> They also got benefits from Bahlūl Ladhī, on the recommendation of spiritual leader Shaikh Aḥmad Kabīr Thānī.<sup>24</sup> It was the same period when with the help of Ladhī governor of Lahore Mal Khān defeated Walī Dād, Naul Ruler of Brahman Garh<sup>25</sup> and after defeating him laid the foundations of new city of Jhang.<sup>26</sup> It is also said that he did so on the command of Shair Shāh Jalāl Surkhpaush Bukhārī. The descendants of Rāy Sayyāl enunciated with the Suhrāwardīs of Uch Sharīf on the recommendation of Bābā Farīd.<sup>27</sup> Mal Khān founded the city in 1462 and ruled this region till 1503. He was succeeded by his son Daulat Khān. Mal Khān, according to the lineage list preserved by Maulwī Nūr Muḥammad Chailā, was the paternal cousin of famous Hīr Sayyāl.<sup>28</sup> This lineage record does not contain any

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid

<sup>19</sup> Bilāl Zubairī, *Ta’rīkh-i-Jhang: Tahdhīb wa Thaqāfat kay ā’inay main*, (Jhang: Jhang Adbī Academy, 2002), 19

<sup>20</sup> *Punjab District Gazetteers*, Jhang District 1883-84, 27

<sup>21</sup> Ibid

<sup>22</sup> Shaikh Muḥammad Ikrām, *Āab-i-Kauthar*, (Lahore: Idārā thaqāfat al-Islāmiyya, 2006), 222

<sup>23</sup> Bilāl Zubairī, *Ta’rīkh-i-Jhang: Tahdhīb wa Thaqāfat kay ā’inay main*, 45

<sup>24</sup> Ibid

<sup>25</sup> Ibid

<sup>26</sup> Ibid

<sup>27</sup> Ibid

<sup>28</sup> Ibid

other name that is mentioned in the story constructed around the character of Hīr. Mal Khān was followed by eighteen Sayyāl chiefs among whom Walī Dād Khān was a real exception on the basis of his administrative and political expertise. He enlarged the squeezed geographical territory of Jhang and maintained a well-trained military.

<b>S.no</b>	<b>Name of the Sayyāl Chief</b>	<b>Period</b>
1	<b>Mal Khān</b>	1462-1503
2	<b>Daulat Khān</b>	1503-1551
3	<b>Ghāzī Khān</b>	1551-1607
4	<b>Jalāl Khān</b>	1607-1618
5	<b>Rashīd Khān</b>	1618-1656
6	<b>Firauz Khān</b>	1656-1680
7	<b>Kabīr Khān</b>	1680-1687
8	<b>Jahān Khān</b>	1687-1700
9	<b>Ghāzī Khān II</b>	1700-1717
10	<b>Sultān Muḥammad Khān</b>	1717-1732
11	<b>La'ī Khān</b>	1732-1738
12	<b>Maḥram Khān</b>	1738-1739
13	<b>Walī Dād Khān</b>	1739-1759
14	<b>‘Ināyat Khān and Shahādat Khān</b>	1759-1761
15	<b>‘Ināyat Khān</b>	1771-1797
16	<b>Sultān Maḥmūd Khān</b>	1797-1800
17	<b>Ṣaḥīb Khān</b>	1800-1801
18	<b>Kabīr Khān</b>	1801-1812
19	<b>Aḥmad Khān</b>	1812-1822

**Table No. 1**

Sayyāl chiefs lost their sway at the hands of Sikhs and during whole Sikh period Jhang had been governed from Multan.

After the conquest of Punjab by East India Company in 1849, Jhang assumed the status of district and Shorkot and Chiniot were given the status of its tehsil administrative units.<sup>29</sup> The district, with the passage of time, began to lose its some parts. Near the end of twentieth century an eastern tract of land was detached and included in Lyallpur, currently known as Faisalabad. The biggest loss, District confronted with, in the recent time was the segregation of Chiniot from Jhang and latter's establishment as a new District in 2010. Chiniot also annexed two main towns Bhawāna and Lāliyyān. As this study starts from 1979 so in this work Jhang comprises its pre-2010 geographical shape including Chiniot District. Currently District Jhang is comprised of four tehsils namely Jhang, Shorkot, Athara Hazari and Ahmadpur Sayyāl.

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<sup>29</sup> *Punjab District Gazetteers*, Jhang District 1883-84




Figure 1 District Jhang (Pre 2010)<sup>30</sup>




Figure 2 District Jhang (Post 2010)

<sup>30</sup> These figures of maps of District Jhang before and after the separation of Chiniot are taken from the official records of District Council Jhang.

## 1.2. Religious tradition in jhang: from sufi spirituality to sectarianism

Reconstruction of the history of spirituality, religion and sectarian trends in Jhang is a complex task. Although this region, for a long time, has been regarded as a center of Sufi spirituality, yet it contains many diverse colors wrapped into this Sufi cover. The exploration of the religiosity in this region maintains that although the immediate past is the period of Sufi spirituality but going deep in past shows the flourishing of sectarian trends at the bottom. Professor Samī‘ Ullāh Quraishī narrates the whole story of advent, flourishing and continuity of Islam in the shape of Sufi spirituality in this region. He argues that sufism provided the language to Islam to maximize its approach to common people in this society.<sup>31</sup> Same is the case with rest of the authors who believe in the dominance of mystic tradition in the Punjab. Most of the historical accounts of the region and sufism show the one-sided story in which Sufism appears to be the real hero defeating the socio-cultural inequalities, class-based atrocities and religious biases. No doubt it was the case at many instances but still a considerable part has been missed that narrates the events in different style. To make this picture clearer, below is a chronological list of the sufi saints who came to Jhang.

Period	Name	Affiliation/Identity
1 <sup>st</sup> Century (Hijri)	‘Abd al-Raḥmān Hāshmī alias Pīr ‘Abd al-Raḥmān	Hāshmī
2 <sup>nd</sup> Century (Hijri)	Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad alias Ghāzī Pīr	Came with Muḥammad Bin Qāsim
3 <sup>rd</sup> Century (Hijri)	Fataḥ Aṣḥāb	Came with Muḥammad Bin Qāsim
4 <sup>th</sup> Century (Hijri)	Nūr Aṣḥāb	
6 <sup>th</sup> Century (Hijri)	Makhdūm Naurang Jahāniyyān	Hāshmī/Bukhārī sayyid
7 <sup>th</sup> Century	Makhdūm Burḥān al-Dīn	Suhrāwardī (Multanī)

<sup>31</sup> Samī‘ Ullāh Quraishī, *Sar Zamīn-i-Jhang: āthār wa thaqāfat*, (Lahore: Fiction House, 1998), 32-37

(Hijri)		
8 <sup>th</sup> Century (Hijri)	Shāh Ismā‘īl Bukhārī	Suhrāwardī (Uch)
	Shaikh Jawāhir alias Shaikh Chūhar	Qādirī
	Makhdūm Gul Shair	Qādirī
9 <sup>th</sup> Century (Hijri)	Muḥī al-Dīn	Chishtī
	Shāh Khalīl Shīrāzī	
10 <sup>TH</sup> Century (Hijri)	Allah Dād Shāh Bukhārī	Qādirī
	Jamāl al-Dīn alias Pākhrā Sultān	
	Tāj al-Dīn Sūrī	Sūrī
	Shāh Daulat Bukhārī	Suhrāwardī (Uch)
	Sayyid Maḥbūb ‘Ālam alias Shāh Jīwanā	Qādirī
11 <sup>th</sup> Century (Hijri)	Sultān Bāhū	Qādirī
	Sayyid Maḥbūb ‘ālam	
	Bilāl Shāh alias Bulail Shāh	Suhrāwardī (Multanī)
12 <sup>th</sup> Century (Hijri)	Sayyid ‘Abd al-Qādir Jilānī Thānī	Qādirī
	Sayyid Zulf ‘Alī Shāh (Uch)	Suhrāwardī

**Table No.2**

The unanimity of the opinion about the non-aligned and non-partison behavior of Sufis is being challenged these days. First Sufi is ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, whose shrine is in the South Western part of the District in a town which is named as Pīr ‘Abd al-Raḥmān. He came in this area in the first century after the advent of Islam. Historians have diverse views about his sufi stature. As described by Quraishī that he belonged to the family of Prophet and came to this part of sub-continent to avoid atrocities of Banī Umayya.<sup>32</sup> It simply does not prove that he was a sufi saint. Professor Muḥammad Aslam argued that ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Ḥārith was a traitor and was

<sup>32</sup> Ibid,

involved in holding guerilla activities against the Umayyad Caliphs.<sup>33</sup> Aslam narrates that he was one of the significant personalities after Muḥammad ‘Alwī for whom the Umayyad operations were directed.<sup>34</sup> His stature as a powerful personality is also evident from his role of savior in a local story quoted by Quraishī.<sup>35</sup> ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s controvertial stature does not stop here. A considerable number of local Shia thinks that he was in fact, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān bin Muljim, assassin of ‘Alī.<sup>36</sup> The second issue challenges the sufi stature of some of the saints mentioned above in the list on the basis of their careers. Ghāzī Pīr and Fataḥ Aṣḥāb have been reported as high rank officers in the army of Muḥammad bin Qāsim. Pīr Tāj al-Dīn Athārā Hazārī can also be enumerated in this list on the basis of his career in the military of Maḥdmūd of Ghazna.<sup>37</sup> Besides these two trends the third trend was the clear sectarian positions which different Sufi families acquired. Almost all the Suhrāwardī representatives in the district adopted Shi‘ite identity on the other hand Qādirīs tried to be practicing Sunni. It can be presumed that Sufism, in the absence of some powerful Sufi personality in the last two centuries, expressed itself through certain Sufi symbols like shrine, pīr, ‘urs and gaddī. The absence of some influential Sufi personality in the past two centuries led the pīr and shrine to get prominence at the cost of proper sufi personality.

This period of spirituality overlapped and proceeded with the colonial period which reshaped the sectarian denominations. This period modernized the process of othering on the basis of one’s religious beliefs. This is the period when two distinct new identities got birth in Sunnite Islam i.e. Barelwīsm and Deobandism. Modern discourses and reconceptualization of Islam also gave birth to Aḥmadīs which in the context of Jhang, at first instance, was a significant sectarian emergence. This era of spiritual traditions in Jhang was going to be replaced by the sectarianism after the partition of India.

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<sup>33</sup> Malik, *Islam in South Asia: A Short History*, 52-56

Muḥammad Aslam, *Muḥammad Bin Qāsim aur unkay jānashīn*, (Lahore: Riaz Brothers, 1996), 29

<sup>34</sup> Professor Muḥammad Aslam has been teaching at University of Punjab. He wrote several books related to the early History of Islam and Muslims in India. His works include *Dīn-i-Ilāhī aur Uskā Pas Manzar*, *Ta’rīkhī Maqālāt*, *Sarmāyā-i-‘Umar*, *Salāṭīn Dehli*, *Shāhān-i-Mughliyya kā Dhauq Mausiqī*, *Khaftagān-i-Karachi*, *Malfūzātī adab kī t’arīkhī ahmiyyat* etc.

<sup>35</sup> Quraishī, *Sar Zamīn-i-Jhang: āthār wa thaqāfat*, 58

<sup>36</sup> Interview with Muḥammad ‘Abbās Shāh, September 2013

<sup>37</sup> Quraishī, *Sar Zamīn-i-Jhang: āthār wa thaqāfat*, 53

District Jhang, situated in Punjab, attracted attention as being the center of sectarian clashes. This district witnessed gradually increasing sectarian conflicts just after the creation of Pakistan as an independent state. Initially these conflicts exhibited themselves in speeches and polemics but with the passage of time it acquired a violent shape and it was end of 1980s that this violent aspect became dominant over the rest of discursive aspects.<sup>38</sup> Target killing on sectarian basis became the order of day and large number of people got massacred. The land that was, yet, regarded as the soil of peace turned into a battlefield. Jhang had a considerable number of Hindu populations before the partition and was considered to be a peaceful district as far as its comparison with the rest of Punjab was concerned. Hindus and Muslims enjoyed neighborhoods and contributed in the maintenance of peace and harmony.<sup>39</sup> Muslims, being majority of the population, showed significant tolerance not only towards non-Muslims but also had a reasonable level of co-existence among the different sects in their own community.<sup>40</sup> In some parts of the district there was no clear distinction between Sunnis and Shias being a part of combined rituals and religious performances.<sup>41</sup> Muslims were divided mostly on the mystic lines, they were following.

The divisive factor was the Sufi shrine with which people had their allegiance. Spiritual centers like Sultān Bāhū, Shāh Jīwanā, Sayyāl Sharīf, Qādir Baksh and Shair Shāh had significant followings irrespective of the sectarian affiliation of the followers. Shāh Jīwanā and Shair Shāh, Shia gaddīs (spiritual space), possessed a large number of Sunni followers and rest of the Sunni gaddī, even if they had a nominal affiliation of Shia murīds (follower), had been revered and respected by the Shia community.<sup>42</sup> In this environment, emerged the sectarianism which seems surprising. It is necessary to locate the starting point and explain the sequence of sectarianism before going to analyse it. On behalf of available literature on the history of sectarianism in Jhang, it is difficult to decide its exact starting time, yet it can be understood with the existence of different events quoted by different writers. Below is the list of events which can help to understand the history of sectarianism in district

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<sup>38</sup> Abou Zahab, "The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Jhang," 164-176

<sup>39</sup> Quraishī, *Sar Zamīn-i-Jhang: āthār wa thaqāfat*, 102

<sup>40</sup> Bilāl Zubairī, *Ta'rīkh-i-Jhang: Tahdhīb wa Thaqāfat kay ā'inay main*, 23

<sup>41</sup> Abou Zahab, "The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Jhang," 164-176

<sup>42</sup> Interview with Makhdūm Hāmid Raḍā, August 2014



Jhang.

### 1.2.1. Elections 1951

The elections for the provincial assembly in 1951 are regarded as a start of sectarian rifts in Jhang.<sup>43</sup> This election, in District Jhang, was contested between two groups, Sādāt group (Shāh Jīwanā and Rajū‘a) and Āzād ‘Awāmī Maḥāz (Independent people’s front). Shāh Jīwanā group won 7 tickets out of 9 tickets from Muslim League for its candidates.<sup>44</sup> This group has been identified as a Shia group on the other hand ‘Awāmī Maḥāz as a Sunni resistant group.<sup>45</sup> Nuṣrat ‘Alī Athīr stated,

“Muslim League kī tiktaun kī taqṣīm main hadd darjā nā inṣāfī bartī gāī. Shia Maktaba-i-fikr kau sāt aur sunnī jau kay akthariyyat main thay sirf 2 tikkat diay gay”.<sup>46</sup>

Translation: Justice was not maintained in the distribution of tickets of Muslim League. Shia school of thought was given seven seats on the other hand; Sunni majority was given only two tickets.

‘Awāmī Maḥāz won five out of nine seats and showed its electoral worth over the Shāh Jīwanā group. This victory of ‘Awāmī Maḥāz has been translated as the victory of Sunni majority and from then onward Maulānā Muḥammad Dhākir became the symbol of Sunni resistance against the hegemony of Shia feudals in socio-political realm of Jhang.<sup>47</sup>

### 1.2.2. Ḥasū Bulail incident 1957

Ḥasū Bulail is a town, currently situated in Tehsil Aḥmadpur Sayyāl. It is inhabited by Quraishī clan who are the descendant of Bulail Shāh. Shia feudals are allegedly blamed for their involvement in the sectarian settlement of the migrants from India. It was told by a respondent that their forefathers were contacted by the servants of a feudal to invite them for settling in his area on the basis of sectarian

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<sup>43</sup> Nuṣrat A. Athīr, *Dhikr al-Dhākir*, (Jhang: Dhākir Academy, 1997), 201

<sup>44</sup> Ibid

<sup>45</sup> Ibid

<sup>46</sup> Ibid

<sup>47</sup> Qudrat Ullāh Shahāb maintains in his auto biography ‘Shahāb Nāmā’.

affiliations.<sup>48</sup> Similar things happened in Ḥasū Bulail. It attracted a large number of Shia migrants due to the proximity of Shia Quraishī feudal of Jā'i wain and Ḥasū Bulail. A migrant Shia was blamed that he burned a statue of a companion of Prophet and then had led a procession in a blasphemous way. This incident took place on 14 October 1957.<sup>49</sup> It created furry in the Sunni community and they started a movement, against this blasphemy, under the leadership of Maulwī Ghulām Ḥussain, Khaṭīb Dhajjī Masjid and Maulānā Muḥammad Dhākīr.<sup>50</sup>

This Sunni movement blamed Sayyid 'Ābid Ḥussain and Makhdūm Nazar Ḥussain of their personal involvement in the facilitation of accused.<sup>51</sup> This incident added to the political distances between the Shia and Sunni segments of the society. It also allowed Maulwī Ghulām Ḥussain, a Deobandi cleric to become the part of sectarian discourse. He held this position for a long time and was famous for his oratory and attitude against the Shias.

### 1.2.3. Sectarian victimizations in 1960s

Three different incidents have been quoted by Tahir Kamran and Nuṣrat 'Alī Athīr. The first incident took place in Kakkī Nau, Tehsil Shorkot, in which, Maulwī Khudā Baksh Gill was gunned down by Muḥammad Nawāz Kāthiyya in 1964.<sup>52</sup> Kāthiyya family has been among the prominent feudal families and till now their socio-political stature is significant. This incident was followed by another incident in Mauḍa' Shāh Ṣādiq Nihang, tahsil Shorkot in which Sunni congregation of prayers was dispersed and harassed at the gun point by local Shia landlord Faqīr Muḥammad Khurshīd.<sup>53</sup> Sunnis were asked to adopt Shi'ite way of performing prayers or to abstain from doing such Sunni performances. This incident took place on April 1, 1966. The third incident took place in Raudū Sulṭān in the shape of murder of Maulānā

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<sup>48</sup> Interview with Qaisar A'wān, Garh Mahārājā, August 2013

<sup>49</sup> Tahir Kamran, "Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan: A Case Study of Jhang," *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 20, no.1 (2009): 55-85

<sup>50</sup> Muḥammad Sa'ad Ullāh, *Tadhkirah Muḥammad Dhākīr*, (Chiniot, Muḥammad Dhākīr Academy, 2010), 35

<sup>51</sup> Ibid

<sup>52</sup> Kamran, "Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan," 55-85

<sup>53</sup> Athīr, *Dhikr al-Dhākīr*, 185

Daust Muḥammad, a Deobandi cleric, and ‘known for his oratory condemning Shia landlords’.<sup>54</sup>

#### **1.2.4. Bāb al-‘Umar incident 1969**

This incident is reported as one of the most significant incidents in the history of Shia-Sunni conflict which resulted in the pitched fight and six killings. It happened in the most popular procession of seventh Muḥarram in Jhang city. Like most of the Shia processions this main procession also passes through dominantly Sunni localities. Bāb al-‘Umar, formerly Khīwā gate, also comes in the route. There are two Deobandi mosques near the Bāb al-‘Umar. Custodians of these mosques have been reluctant to the passage of Shia procession.<sup>55</sup> In this area the procession becomes ‘Chup Jalūs’, which means a silent procession.<sup>56</sup> In 1969, a Shia participant of Jalūs, identified as Ashraf Balauch soaked his shirt with the filth and threw it at the names of companions of Prophet. Tahir Kamran mentions the involvement of local Shia Sayyāl feudal; Nawwāb Ḥabīb Ullāh Khān on the basis that the person involved in the incident was the personal servant of the Nawwāb Ḥabīb Ullāh Khān.<sup>57</sup> This incident added to the Sunnite furry against the Shias and it resulted in its electoral translation in the coming election, which according to many was the purpose of Nawwāb Ḥabīb Ullāh Khān, defeat of Sayyids of Shāh Jīwanā.

This incident played a decisive role in the coming elections and all the Shia feudals, especially Sayyid ‘Ābid Ḥussain had to face defeat at the hands of Barelwī candiadtes.<sup>58</sup>

#### **1.2.5. Foundation of Anjuman Sipāh Ṣaḥāba**

According to many writers foundation of Anjuman Sipāh Ṣaḥāba was a decisive step in the history of sectarianism in Jhang. This group was established by Ḥaq

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<sup>54</sup> Kamran, “Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” 55-85

<sup>55</sup> Ibid

<sup>56</sup> Ibid

<sup>57</sup> Ibid

<sup>58</sup> Athīr, *Dhikr al-Dhākir*, 209-13

Nawāz Jhangwī in 1985.<sup>59</sup> It has been established that this party was founded under the auspices of Zia regime to counter Shi'ite influence and expansionist vision of Iranian revolution. Maulānā Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī, a Deobandi cleric was the founder of this group after he left Jamī'at 'Ulamā al-Islam. He was famous for his hatred towards Shia and he was the first who demanded the constitutional excommunication of Shias.<sup>60</sup> He left his legacy in the shape of Sipāh Ṣaḥāba and Lashkar-i-Jhangwī. He was assassinated in February 1990 outside his home. This incident is established as the beginning of violent phase of sectarianism in Jhang that onward spread in the whole country.

Certain trends emerge out of these events and their narration by the authors who wrote on sectarianism in Jhang. This leads to the evaluation of the history of the phenomenon in Jhang. The first trend that emerges out of these discussions is the characterization of the different sectarian actors or performers. In most cases it has been narrated as a class struggle in which oppressor, Shia feudal, oppressed the Sunni voices raised against the feudal lords and system. In the second category the 'haves' intrigued to monopolies the electoral translation of sectarianism. Here the Sunni counterpart of the clashes seems to be resisting the socio-political and economic oppressions of Shia feudal. The other trend that was maintained by the historians of sectarianism in Jhang in their accounts is that every sectarian clash or act was followed by an election. So, in this way, the whole issue appears to be a political one and had less to do with rest of the spheres of human life. At third, it divides the Sunni resistance in two phases i.e. pre and post 1979. Pre 1979 Sunni resistance against the Shia landlords was being led by the Barelwī scholars and pirs who were replaced by the Deobandi leadership in post 1979 scenario. It also changes the characterization of the performers involved in this phenomenon. The pre 1979 aggressors become victims in post 1979 and Deobandi appear to be the only aggressors in the onward and recent scenario.

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<sup>59</sup> Hamza Ḥassan, "From the Pulpit to Ak-47: Sectarian Conflict in Jhang, Pakistan," *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, xxxii, no.2 (2011): 67-87

<sup>60</sup> Muḥammad Ilyās, *Amīr-i- 'Azīmat: Maulānā Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī*, (Jhang: Maktab al-Ḥaq), 1995 186-188

### 1.3. Literature review

Sectarianism in Pakistan, as a part or as a product of religious extremism, as an agent for terrorism and violence, has been a much-talked issue. It also created an independent discourse besides its link with religious extremism and terrorism. This discourse resulted in the emergence of various patterns of understandings about sectarianism. Varieties of discursivities were built regarding the nature format, causes, effects, and impacts of this phenomenon. Availability of variety of versions regarding its different aspects made it a complex phenomenon besides signifying it as one of the most significant problems of the country. Its complexity is based on existence of multiple orientations and interpretations i.e. historical, political, social and economic. This section is going to observe how these interpretations are achieved and how they can be categorized. Following trends emerged as a result of reviewing the available literature on the sectarianism in Pakistan and particularly in Jhang.

#### 1.3.1. Doctrinal aspects

The most apparent and popular orientation of sectarianism is defined as doctrinal. It is held by most of the religious scholars that sectarianism is based on the doctrinal issues that exist between the Shias and Sunnis.<sup>61</sup> Doctrinally, both sects stand apart from each other and at some point's co-existence becomes impossible. As described this view is dominantly held by the religious scholarship that does not mean the absolute absence of academic and journalistic material. Presence of the events like, Ḥasū Bulail, Khīwā gate, zakāt ordinance, in their immediate appearance are doctrinal. Although these have been mentioned by most of the studies referred here but only Khaled Ahmad took it more seriously. He argued in the light of emergence of rise in Sunnite sense of doctrinal superiority and efforts building and historicizing the states ideology on this basis.<sup>62</sup> This issue was ignored by the Shias and even during recent time, he argued, Shias could not make a common cause with their doctrinal basis in Najaf and Qum. He also gave a considerable account for the presence of

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<sup>61</sup> Sarfraz Khan and H.R. Chaudhary, "Determinants of Sectarianism in Pakistan: A Case Study of District Jhang," *Middle East Journal of Scientific Research*, 8, no.1 (2011): 237-243

<sup>62</sup> Khalid Ahmad, *Sectarian War: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia violence and its link to the Middle East*, (Karachi: Oxford, 2012), xi

‘takfīr’ in the Shia Sunni discourse and linked back its historicity with colonial period.<sup>63</sup>

Kamran also narrates the doctrinal inspiration of Ḥaḡ Nawāz Jhangwī from ‘Atā Ullāh Shāh Bukhārī and Aḡrārs who fought for the excommunication of Aḡmadīs. He argues that Ḥaḡ Nawāz borrowed the model from Aḡrārs and applied it to Shias for their excommunication.<sup>64</sup>

### 1.3.2. Constitutional issue

Some writers link this issue also with the religious and sectarian orientation of the constitution of Paksitan.<sup>65</sup> The religious nature and ideological constitutional divide is criticized for its worse role in the society. The adherents of this point of view admit the presence of sectarian tendencies among the people throughout the history but are of the view that it had been managed constitutionally in the past and the recent worse situation is remarkably based on some constitutional weaknesses. Ahmad opines that doctrinal differences were present in the colonial period but they were denied any place in the constitutions of the colonial administration but it got place immediately after the partition of India.<sup>66</sup> Newly born Pakistani state could not resist this element that resulted in the excommunication of Aḡmadīs. This constitutional excommunication marginalizes the victim community in many realms of life, besides just throwing outside the fold of Islam.<sup>67</sup>

The second issue which is raised by this aspect deals with the problematics of ‘Islamization’ and the orientation of Sharī‘a. Islam and Sharī‘a, as perceived by the constitution and state of Pakistan are decisively based on Sunni vision of Islam which if applied in some existential manner results automatically in the exclusion of Shias and Sufis outside the fold of Islam.<sup>68</sup> The adherents of this view exemplify this with the reluctance of state to resolve the sectarian issues in the premises of courts.

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid

<sup>64</sup> Kamran, “Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” 55-85

<sup>65</sup> Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 2009), 46-56

<sup>66</sup> Ahmad, *Sectarian War: Pakistan’s Sunni-Shia violence and its link to the Middle East*, 12

<sup>67</sup> Ibid

<sup>68</sup> L. Bokhari, “Radicalization, Political Violence, and Militancy,” in *The Future of Pakistan*, S. Cohen, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 82-91

State fears that judicial application of its constitutional and legal position will create certain divides. This is also regarded as an attempt of state to avoid the ethnic conflict and to marginalize the separatist tendencies in the name of provincialism. This aspect has been criticised by many that sectarianism is maintained by state itself.

### **1.3.3. Extra-territorial aspects**

One rationale for the existence of sectarianism in Pakistan and Jhang is that it has been imported from the other countries. This aspect can be further divided into three parts. At one end this import of divisive ideology from outside world relates to 'historicisation' of the separate identity of Muslims in the Sub-continent. This view blames that while constructing the separate Muslim identity the history of Muslims in India was erroneously detached from their immediate geographical, social and cultural aspects and was connected with multiple traditions borrowed from the Arabs, Persians and Turks.<sup>69</sup> It allowed and paved way for the further foreign involvement in the future as well.

The second aspect is linked with the ideological expansionism of the Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran. The followers of Deobandi and Wahhābī sects are supposed to have their ideological and doctrinal ties with the Saudi Arabia and rest of Arab countries with salafī inclinations. There exist several studies which demarcate 1979 as the beginning of this current sectarianism in the Pakistani society. This is the year of so-called Islamic revolution in Iran. The rise of Taḥrīk Nifādh Fiqh Ja'fariyya and creation of Anjuman Sipāh Ṣaḥāba is seen under this spectrum in which TNJF's intention of import of Iranian model of revolution was countered by the ASSP.

Thirdly, the sectarianism is not only something that unconsciously is imported from the foreign land, but its presence is also based on some deliberate expansionist moves of Saudi Arabia and Iran. This view also links it with the regional politics and mutual involvement of neighboring countries in the internal affairs to disrupt the normal life.

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<sup>69</sup> Ahmad, *Sectarian War: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia violence and its link to the Middle East*,

#### 1.3.4. Socio-political

This view observes the whole situation regarding sectarianism in Jhang from the framework of communal *birādarī* (caste brotherhood) based politics. This, politically, divides the whole scenario at different levels. At first, this sectarianism is observed coming out of the political rivalries between Sayyid and Sayyāl feudals<sup>70</sup>, especially Bharwāna Sayyāls of tehsil Jhang. At second this observes the emergence of rural Sunni landlords and feudal against the political rule of Shia feudals. And thirdly, it argues for the emergence of urban middle classes as a major shift in political domain which also appeared itself in sectarianism as well. Most of the authors on sectarianism in Jhang have quoted the victory of Sunni candidates in the elections of 1970 against the Shia feudal candidates.<sup>71</sup> Interestingly this was dominantly a Barelwīs victory led by the alliance of Maulānā Muḥammad Dhākir and Ṣāhibzādā Nadhīr Sulṭān which was replaced with Deobandis under the leadership of Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī.

#### 1.3.5. Socio-cultural

Writers like Abou Zahab relate the emergence of sectarianism with the demographic changes occurring in the society with the arrival of muhājirs from India, mostly from Panī Patt and East Punjab.<sup>72</sup> This aspect views the difference of level of understanding between the local community and muhājirs as a significant cause for the rise of sectarianism.<sup>73</sup> They argue that most of these muhājirs were sophisticatedly trained in the new movements and political groups for the political and social expression of their religious belief on the other hand local tradition was more attached with the indigenous Sufi traditions.<sup>74</sup>

These aspects which are filtered from various studies conducted on sectarianism in Pakistan and particularly Jhang surface certain further trends regarding the nature of studies.

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<sup>70</sup> Kamran, "Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan," 55-85

<sup>71</sup> *ibid*

<sup>72</sup> Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan*, 46-56

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*



They are based on external interventions and ignore sectarianism at its nucleus. They argue for the presence of doctrinal differences but do not go in detail examination of these doctrinal differences. They argue against the religious orientation of constitution which seems to be monopolized by an ideological minority but are unable to locate that minority which is strong enough to lead the state. Some of them hint the involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran and generalize this influence. Socio-political orientation almost ignores the religious content. Similar is the case with the socio-cultural studies that they also link it with some factors that are external to individual human will and the matters of pure belief.

Another emerging trend in these studies is the construction of binaries and generalization of the sectarian structure. Most of the studies blame deobandi sect to be the more violent and aggressive in this regard. All these studies generalise the existence of sectarian groups as Shias, Barelwīs, Deobandis and Wahhābīs. This generalization is also accompanied with reducing the statements of the issue only to violent and divisive aspects.

#### **1.4. Description of research**

The above discussion regarding the history of sectarianism and the findings after literature review suggests certain trends and overall opinion of these discussions construct some narrow binaries in which the phenomenon of sectarianism is situated. These binaries are playing a crucial role in the understanding of the sectarianism in the recent times. This situation requires a reorientation of the understandings regarding sectarian development. These discussions, for example, create a chronological divide of Sunni sectarianism in pre and post-1979 era. The pre-1979 era, according to the literature is marked with Barelwī social resistance. The post 1979 period experiences the Sunnite transition from the Barelwī resistance to Deobandi extremism. The political career of Muḥammad Dhākir and Barelwī landlords is narrated as a struggle for the rights of majority of the population. On the other hand, post 1979 Sunnite tradition is identified in the extremism of Deobandis by generalizing the manifestoes and activities of Anjuman Sipāh Ṣaḥāba as an overall Deobandi phenomenon. Shi'ism, in these discussions appears in the guise of a politically ambitious feudal lord who has no sympathy for the ideals of his sect but

only wants to instrumentalise religion for the maintenance of his social and political capital. The narration of khīwā gate incident and the rest of incidents in Shorkot and Jhang are altogetherly assigned to the Shia feudals. Spirituality is confined to the space of shrines at the disposal of feudal Sajādā Nashīn by ignoring the emergence of neo-spiritual trends in which some non-traditional personalities are striving to bring back the traditional position of Sufī, instead of pīr and shrine. Same is the case with the sectarian boundaries which are supposed to be generalised while identifying Barelwīs, Deobandis and Shias as uniform sectarian entities. Every inquiry holds a deterministic account of the story in which majority of the individuals in that society are following the socio-political and socio-economic scripts imposed upon them by a political situation, an economic interest or it is infused as a part of some foreign intrigue or expansionist agenda. Two important aspects, in my view, have been ignored by the researches already held for the explanation of sectarianism in District Jhang which are role of religio-sectarian narratives and sectarian development as real socio-cultural phenomenon. This research intends to reconstruct the sectarian episode in Jhang by avoiding these deterministic and reductionist approaches. This research accepts the fragmented opinion of all of studies discussed above but it yearns to show an overall picture and at second to locate the places which invite and give room to the political and economic determinism, foreign involvement and doctrinal identities to be the part of game. This leads towards the socio-cultural field of study and gives birth to following questions,

1. How religio-sectarian narratives and socio-cultural patterns interact in sectarian development?
2. How these socio-cultural realities affect the structural orientation of the religio-sectarian denominations?
3. What results, in this two-way relationship between the religio-sectarian narratives and socio-cultural patterns, as an end product?

The current research intends to answer these questions. While searching for the answers of these questions this thesis argues that sectarian discourse in a plural society reflects to the complex socio-cultural realities by de-forming and re-forming the existing sectarian boundaries and also gives birth to certain new discursive

consensuses which result in the emergence of neo-sectarian developments. This argument is based on the identification of two major social developments in District Jhang namely migration after the partition of India and emergence of middle classes in the wake of two successive land reforms. This clues not only for the better understanding of the sectarian issue but also to bring in light some progressive and constructive ends of sectarian development.

Combining the questions with the argument, three major trends emerge which direct the construction of basic hypothesis at this initial stage to extend the study onwards. The first hypothesis comes out of the first question and the first part of the argument. It states that there exists a reflexive relation between the religious development and socio-cultural patterns in a society. This reflexivity brings religion and society at relative ends and this relativity is evident in the marking and re-marking of sectarian boundaries. This hypothesis will be tested in the second chapter of this thesis. This chapter will start with the theoretical understanding of culture and then will be extending towards the location and identification of socio-cultural realities in the society in District Jhang. A sample from the linguistic corpus, customary traditions, social stratification and emerging social trends will be explained to have a brief but reasonable knowledge of the socio-cultural trends. This comprises the bulk of this chapter. The coming part will describe the relation among these socio-cultural realities and religious development. It will focus on the identification of spaces and institutions where both factors interact. The third and the final part of the chapter will discuss the emerging sectarian patterns under the light of the hypothesis of reflexive and relative nature of the interaction.

At second this research presumes that the reflexive aspect of the relationship between religio-sectarian and socio-cultural patterns gives birth to certain structural transformations in the existing sectarian structures. To keep the precision intact, this hypothesis will be tested in the third chapter and will be restricted only to the evaluation of the oral sectarian traditions. It will try to answer that whether the reflexive relation of religio-sectarian development and socio-cultural patterns is strong enough to bring some structural changes or not. Three speeches by the renowned religious scholars from Barelwī, Deobandi and Shia sects will be analysed on socio-cultural tools to rectify the hypothesis and answer the second question. The

rectification of the hypothesis of this part will not only seam this discussion with the previous discussion but also will extend it to the third question with more confidence.

The fourth chapter will evaluate the textual tradition in the sectarian discourse in Jhang by presuming that as a result of sectarian development in a multi-society certain new sectarian development occur. It will be focusing on the examination of sectarian polemical texts and will try to locate some distinctive aspects in the light of third question of the research. It will try to first evaluate the structural position of these sectarian texts in their relative intra sectarian discourse and then will examine them in detail to find whether there exist some solid new trends in the sectarianism or not. For this purpose, two polemical texts are selected about ‘Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain’. The socio-cultural orientation of these two textual sources will be explained that will ensure the combination of idea and practice which this research wants to blend.

This pattern of questions, position of argument and orientation of questions will fill the gaps left by the existing work on this issue of sectarianism. By following this scheme, this thesis will take both the idea and practice integrated with each other that will help to present a clear and wholesome picture of the whole sectarian scenario. Although the specification of place and time restricts this thesis to have a general outlook of sectarianism, yet it will be significantly helpful by devising some new patterns of research in the study of sectarianism. This study as per the model seems hopeful to bring some innovative and constructive aspects of sectarian development which have been ignored yet. This will help to evade the clouds of distress and hopelessness attached with the term ‘sectarian’. The most important aspect of this research is that it brings sectarianism outside the mere narration of bloodshed and socio-political blame games. It bestows a confidence in the personality of a sectarian individual who is not subject to certain determinism but by blending idea with practice himself enjoys a freedom.

## **1.5. Theoretical framework**

After going through the historiography and literature review of the phenomenon of sectarianism in Jhang, some dominant trends in the understanding of sectarianism as a social reality emerge. Keeping in mind the argument of this study the available interpretations of the sectarian phenomenon can be divided into two theoretical blocks. At one end are the doctrinal and constitutional interpretations which argue that

sectarianism comes out of these established systems of meanings and the sectarian individuals are subjected to follow them. Although they do not reject the socio-cultural influences, yet they regard the dominance of the doctrinal and constitutional position. Even the studies or the approaches advocating the doctrinal aspect of sectarianism do not assign a considerable role or place to authorised religio-sectarian contents. Socio-political and socio-cultural aspects of the interpretation dominantly interpret the phenomenon on pragmatic basis and fix it only based on human practice. In simple words, one group of interpretations reject the socio-cultural nature of reality and the second marginalize the chances of involvement of ideological differences.

Present study does not want to be decisively structuralist or pragmatic in defining the sectarian phenomenon. It wants to maintain the religious content of the sectarianism and the role of social participation in religious development at equal levels. For this purpose, this research intends to enter into some religious texts and speeches with sectarian contents to find out the socio-cultural patterns in that. It tends to discover the pattern of relationship between idea and practice. It also intends to avoid the rationalisation of the social reality which, in researcher's view, pushes the research towards ideal ends by rejecting some pragmatic realities. A social reality is real even if it is not rational and it will be reality as far as it maintains its performativity in the society. To pursue this work, at first, came the theory of social practice which combined the both idea and practice in its epistemological approach. It constitutes the social reality by dividing agency among mind, body, objects and a physical world to combine all. But in this approach dominance remains with the materiality of practice.<sup>75</sup> Although what is termed as materiality of practice apparently seems to be dominant and construction of mind is also regarded as social, yet it allows this construction or structure to persist for a long time after establishing itself as background representation. It means that it affects the materiality and dominates as a result.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Andreas Reckwitz, "Towards a Theory of Social Practice: A Development in Culturist Theorizing," *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5, no.2 (2002): 243-263

<sup>76</sup> Holland, D. Lave, J., "Social Practice Theory and Historical Production of Persons," *An International Journal of Human Activity Theory*, no.2 (2009): 1-15

More appropriate model that came to fore for theorizing the research is ‘Social Performance’. Jeffrey Alexander, author of this idea introduces this theoretical concept in the following words.

I present a theory of cultural pragmatics that transcends this division, bringing meaning structures, contingency, power, and materiality together in a new way. My argument is that the materiality of practices should be replaced by the more multidimensional concept of performances.<sup>77</sup>

This theoretical approach not only negates some epistemological aspects of the ‘practice’ but adds and edits to its constituting factors. ‘Social practice’ insists that social reality is practiced as ‘a routinized way’ of doing the things, handling the objects and subjects are treated.<sup>78</sup> Social performance negates this idea and establishes that social reality is performed like a theatre performance. This theory focusses more on the generation of meaning as a result of performance. It argues that social meanings are performed instead of being practiced. Jeffrey defines the cultural performance in these words,

Cultural performance is the social process by which actors, individually or in concert, display for others the meaning of their social situation. This meaning may or may not be one to which they themselves subjectively adhere; it is the meaning that they, as social actors, consciously or unconsciously wish to have others believe.<sup>79</sup>

So, it speaks for the centrality of the meaning. At second comes the social situation which becomes secondary on the basis that, according to above definition, performers may convey something other than they actually feel. For them the

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<sup>77</sup> Jeffrey C. Alexander, “Cultural pragmatics: social performance between ritual and strategy,” in *Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual*, edited by Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen and Jason L. Mast, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 29-91

<sup>78</sup> Reckwitz, “Towards a Theory of Social Practice: A Development in Culturist Theorizing,” 243-268

<sup>79</sup> Alexander, “Cultural pragmatics: social performance between ritual and strategy,” 29-91

conveyance of meaning is more important than the expression of real situation. This expression and conveyance of meaning borrow certain things from the background knowledge, its immediate scene and also an acceptance from the audiences to which his performance is directed or to which one intends to convey a particular meaning to inform them about one's situation. With having a definition of a social performance in hand, one thinks about the issue of credibility to have a clear vision of a performance in a context. How, does a cultural performance achieve a reasonable amount of credibility to strengthen the discursive position, of which it is the part of, depends on the fusion and de-fusion of its components. A cultural performance is composed of background knowledge, actors, audience or observers, means of symbolic production, and social power.<sup>80</sup> A successful performance contains a fusion of all the elements detailed above. He further describes that the fusion of the elements of performance allow not only the actors but also audiences to experience flow, which means they focus their attention on the performed text to the exclusion of any other interpretative reference.

Following is a brief detail of the components of the social performance. This will help to understand the concept of social performance and will also facilitate the understanding of its application in the present research. A cultural performance is composed of the following constituent elements.

### **1.5.1. Systems of collective representation**

Cultural performance tells that social reality that born out of an action in the shape of a meaning conveyed through that action is highly contextualized. This is embedded in the background representations and the foreground scripts. The background representation is borrowed from the textual understanding of the structures in the shape of narratives and historical collectivities. Foreground scripts can both be consulted from the history and the recent environment. The historical aspect of the background representations and foreground scripts equate them with 'Culture' or in some cases high culture. The recent content of the foreground scripts brings it close to the definitions of popular culture. It is the part where shared meanings of the past or present are consulted and applied. This aspect covers the

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid

discussions in the second chapter of this thesis which not only identify and define the background and foreground representations of the sectarian performances in District Jhang but also evaluate their immediate influence on the sectarian scripts as well.

### **1.5.2. Actor**

The definition of the cultural performance points out that a cultural performance is carried out by an actor or a group of actors who perform the conveyance of particular meanings. It is the actor who symbolizes the materiality of his available objects in the light of background representation and the cultural script, he possesses. His purpose is to extend the meaning to the audiences or his observers. This research work involves particular individual actors who perform some sectarian performances either in the shape of oral speeches or in the shape of written texts. An important segment of this research is the elaboration of the role and status of a sectarian actor in the performance of sectarianism.

### **1.5.3. Observer/Audience**

Every performance is directed towards certain observers to whom is required the conveyance of a social meaning. This concept may or may not work in a pure theatrical or dramaturgical manner in the case of a cultural performance. In case of sectarian performance an active audience can be present before the actor when one orally performs some act. Even then, in the presence of the audio-video recording of the religious performance the performance is detached from its immediate context. On the other hand, textual performance maintains the particularities of the observers and audience. It depends upon the text whether it remains in the scholarly discursive circle of audiences or becomes public allowing all to get along with it.

### **1.5.4. Means of symbolic production**

“This material ranges from clothing to every other sort of “standardized expressive equipment”, quotes Alexander.<sup>81</sup> These are the material objects which the

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid



actors utilize to symbolize his or her performance. It creates a visual impact which attracts the audiences and many things relate to the audience automatically. “Means of symbolic Production” are heavily utilized in the religio-sectarian performances in Pakistan. As narrated above they include material ranging from clothing to every sort of ‘standardized expressive equipment’, same is the case with sectarian performance. Shia and Sunni performers maintain certain differences in clothes and certain other material objects. Shia performances utilize the imitation of funeral of Imāms to symbolize the real event. Similarly, the use of dhuljinnāh and rest of *zīārāt* is highly symbolic.

#### **1.5.5. Mise-en- scène**

Alexander write, “With texts and means in hand, and audience(s) before them, social actors engage in dramatic social action, entering into and projecting the ensemble of physical and verbal gestures that constitutes performance”.<sup>82</sup> All this needs the temporality of time and space and combine constitute a scene. It is not just a scene as a physical space but a scene where symbolism and textual directions are being actually performed. It can be easily applied to the enchanting of slogans in the Deobandi bayān, where, a slogan symbolizes the whole belief. It also takes an example from the Barelwī performances in which green color is symbolically performed along with oral performances to realize the impact of Prophetic days ‘*madni*’ environment.

#### **1.5.6. Social power**

This theoretical model takes social power as last but important element of a cultural performance. It also identifies this social power embedded in economic and political institutions working in society. The role of power can be understood in the words that, “Power establishes an external boundary for cultural pragmatics that parallels the internal boundary established by a performance’s background representations”.<sup>83</sup> It means that it can negotiate the influence of the background

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid

<sup>83</sup> Ibid

representations and also share the agency of accreditation of a certain act as a cultural performance. It can also be assumed that it allows the popular trends to get entrance in the realm of constituency of meaning production or construction of social reality.

The success of a social performance depends upon the blending of the above elements in a performance. If it is blended well, it will be conveying the required meaning and if it will be too loose to be connected then it will be a failure. Alexander also gives a standard that this credibility is achieved with the simplification of the process in a society and it is only possible in less complex societies. On the other hand, it is hard to re-fuse the elements in a complex society. He adds,

The gist of my argument can be stated simply. The simpler the collective organization, the less its social and cultural parts are segmented and differentiated, the more the elements of social performances are fused. The more complex, segmented, and differentiated the collectivity, the more these elements of social performance become de-fused.<sup>84</sup>

This statement provides an initial strength to the basic argument of this study. It shows that theoretical understanding match with the argument of the study. This thing validates the selection of this theory for the examination of sectarian discourse in a plural society. In this research design “concept of social performance” is complimented with some more concepts which works either to initiate the debate or work to strengthen the theoretical understanding of the performance. These concepts are Culture, Culture script, Popular Culture, Oral performance and Textual performance. The preceding chapters contain a detailed account of these theoretical concepts during the examination of socio-culture patterns and sectarian discourse, oral sectarian traditions and textual sectarian performances. It will help to elaborate the research along with the argument and find the validity of the argument as a result.

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid

## **1.6. Research methodology**

Sectarianism in a multi-society is a multifaceted phenomenon. In a complex society, the location of religious development and identification of sectarian trends is not an easy task, as it apparently seems to be. Existence of the multi-layered expressions of sectarianism leaves a complex fragmentation of the sectarian denominations. This complexity often deprives the issue of the attention it deserves. Those who pay attention to it also explore the surface instead prying deeper. It is also because certain layers require a particular legitimacy requisite for their exploration. This is the situation with the sectarianism in Pakistan, in that it mostly allows the researcher to work only at surface and study it only as a practice. The textual part of sectarianism has seldom been touched owing to the existence of some prerogatives. The main hurdle that is established to maintain these prerogatives is regarding methodological incapacity of most researchers. This also involves certain theoretical shortcomings as well. That is why most studies have restricted themselves to the socio-cultural, socio-political, historical and economical aspects of sectarianism by the examination of available 'sectarian practices' i.e. sectarian political groups, voting behaviours, market trends, and foreign involvement. Another methodological weakness is also traced to the fact that, still, many practices cannot be detached by the researchers from the text or idea. This untouchability is also because of the fear of involvement of certain biases and the socio-cultural non-acceptance on these issues to be explored academically. The element of fear of inclusion of biases and restrictions is also because most studies have focused their narration on the negative sides of sectarian development and discourse. It is obvious, in this sense, that a phenomenon that is perceived as a source of social instability will be treated in a negative manner.

This research is going to cross the limit of observation of practice and intends to include the idea as well for a socio-cultural analysis. The inclusion of idea is still taken from the practicing 'end' where the idea is being performed by individuals in the shape of traditions, customs, orality and texts. However, it does not negate the role of the idea as background representation, which in most of the cases is virtually detached from the performance's scene. This detachment can also be understood as the impossibility of its translation in real existence. It remains surrounded by the interpretations. Each interpretation justifies itself as an idea but could not resist the socio-cultural objectivities. Each performance and the outcome of performance strive

to be a text but only few persist. This aspect of the interpretative nature of some 'ideas' allow themselves to be included in the domain of this research project for their academic examination mainly under the theoretical line of the idea of social performance. Social performance as a theoretical frame provides certain methodological tools as well. It allows the textualism and hermeneutics in its basic methodological tools. The most interesting feature of these theoretical models is not only the collection of multiple theoretical insights but it also, by dividing itself in constituting elements, allows the inclusion of multiple methodologies to work at different levels of its working elements. Four different techniques have been analysed in this thesis to meet the methodological needs. Initially these research designs utilises the cultural semiotics to understand the relations between the sectarian development and the rest of the socio-cultural patterns in the society. These aspects were collected by the consecutive annual field visits and inclusion of socio-cultural reprehensive patterns which is also based on the researcher's position as a cultural insider. This step involves the division of sectarian and the rest of socio-cultural aspects in two semiospheres. It then examines the fact how these two semiospheres interact in a complex society. The qualitative content analysis of the findings from this interaction allowed the demarcation of certain emerging trends and results.

The second step of the research, which involves the performative description and analysis of oral traditions in the sectarian discourse, also applies multiple methodological foundations. The first issue encountered was the selection of some oral material from the heaps of oralities and performances. This aspect was met by the inclusion of three speeches by three religious' scholars from Shia, Barelwī and Deobandi sects. Their selection is justified on the basis that all these three performers belong to Jhang and these speeches were held in the District Jhang. Two of these performers, Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī and Ṭāhir al-Qādirī, are very well-known inside and outside Pakistan. The third scholar from Shia sect also is well known in the Shia Sunni discourse in Pakistan. The hermeneutical analysis of the oral performances explained by the meaning systems involved in the interpretation of the background representations. The explored meanings, then, were discursively analysed by the examination of existing discursivities around these meanings. A conceptual problem that arises in this regard is the availability and use of the recorded audio-video dvds and YouTube links. Although these recordings bring these oral speeches near to the

category of text there still exists reasonable ground to utilise these speeches as oral performances. These oral distinctions lie in the constituent structure, style and contents of these performances which are enough to maintain their oral claims.

The third step which is built on the conceptual findings of the second step is designed on the issue of reconstruction of certain ideas in the current time. It utilises the methodological facilities of the mixed implementation of social and textual performances. In addition, this step borrows help from qualitative content analysis in the division of two polemical texts into different parts and for the denomination of these parts. The intra-parts debate also involved content analysis for the categorisation of the available polemical material. Four major methodologies cultural semiotics, hermeneutics, discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis are utilised in way that could support the arguments and the theoretical proceedings of the research. Utmost care has been taken into consideration to avoid methodological disconnectivity and clashes.

As this research involves the use of multi-lingual oral and textual material, a proper transliteration model is necessary to be applied for drafting the Arabic, Persian and Urdu terms. I have applied ijmes model of transliteration with some alterations. The names of Cities in Pakistan, famous personalities, religions and sects are spelled according to their spellings in the official records of Government of Pakistan.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Sectarian Discourse in Socio-Cultural Contexts**

#### **2.1. Introduction**

This chapter examines the ontological and epistemological undulations in sectarian development based on semiotics of cultural patterns and ‘sectarianism’. It does not imply that religion or sectarianism is something external to the culture but in this study, it connotes to the signs and symbols which are characterised as ‘religious’ symbols against the so-called ‘worldly’ symbols. Same is the case with cultural patterns in that these will be comprised of socio-cultural linguistics, customary, social and popular aspects of society which, to a significant extent, are considered ‘worldly’ or antonym to the religion. As the broad spectrum of the study is the social performance, it is therefore important to explain the ontological and epistemological standards of the society. It will help to extend the performative models by understanding the peoples’ understanding of a social performance. In addition, it also brings to fore the performance of a ‘sign’. This chapter deals with certain basic issues regarding the research. At first, it establishes the socio-cultural status of sectarian divisions and points out their possible socio-communal articulations based on comparative analysis of religious and social development. Secondly, it lays strong basis in favour of the basic argument of this research. The basic argument puts stress on the socio-cultural orientation of sectarianism. Thirdly, this chapter indicates and provides the material before the description and examination of sectarian development through the mediums of oral and textual tradition. This is necessary and helpful in the discursive and hermeneutical analysis of oral and textual traditions.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part of the chapter will discuss the thematic concepts of culture, cultural script and the internalisation and externalisation of cultural script. It starts by defining the culture and cultural script and then extends and links the debate with popular culture. These definitions are

explored through the investigation of academic sources. In this way, it lays the conceptual basis for the semiotic study of the socio-cultural patterns. The second part describes the depositories of socio-cultural patterns in district Jhang. These socio-cultural patterns are collected and narrated here based on some basic oral and textual sources. A dominant part of it is ethnographically designed. Firstly, it elaborates the traditional lingual part of the culture which is comprised of the proverbs and some literary aspects like poetry and then the oral aspects like songs and their sub genres. After describing the lingual part, it narrates the customary cultural traditions like marriages and ceremonies at death. Furthermore, it gives an analytical description of the socio-communal binaries of which ethnicity and castes are categorised. This section concludes with the excavation of cultural signs and symbols which help to properly understand the ontological and epistemological standards of the society. The second part describes how sectarian development and socio-cultural patterns come in contact and interact with each other. This part is mostly concerned with internalisation process. It elaborates the relationship by mentioning some places where the religious and cultural signs coincide and try to negotiate with each other. It lays the basis for the third part by establishing that a symbolic interchange takes place between the religious and socio-cultural spheres. Thus, showing interchange affects the patterns of social understanding. The third part describes the externalisation of the religio-cultural interaction and locates the creation of new ontological and epistemological spaces and shifts in the sectarian discourse.

### **2.1.1. Conceptualising culture**

Paul Willis narrates, “Culture is strange and capacious category”. Therefore, defining culture has not been an easy task. It contains various definitions, which denote to different aspects. Allan Patten defines culture as, “Culture, I propose, is what people share when they have shared subjection to a common formative context”.<sup>85</sup> It has been defined both as the understanding and daily experience of learned, of the ordinary and diverse and stratified system of meanings. The understanding of the term culture, in the present study, is derived from the discussion of Chris Barker in his work “Cultural Studies”.

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<sup>85</sup> Allen Patten, “Rethinking Culture: The Social Lineage Account,” *The American Political Science Review*, 105, no. 4 (2011): 735-749

Culture is concerned with questions of shared social meanings, that is, the various ways we make sense of the world. However, meanings are not simply floating ‘out-there’; rather, they are generated through signs, most notably those of language.<sup>86</sup>

While defining culture, he gives a glimpse into the elitist and ordinary basis of defining the ‘cultural’. He excavates then the conception of *Culture* by an analysis of the definitions of British pioneers of Cultural Studies, Raymond Williams and Hall. He takes an anthropological aspect of the Williams that finds culture in everyday meanings embedded in values and norms and concludes culture refers to shared meanings. Hall identifies the culture as the shared understandings of the people regarding what is happening around them. Therefore, in his view participant’s consensus defines the culture. Barker also finds that culture contains traditional and creative aspects. This feature enables it to sustain its past identity and, at the same time, accommodate changes in it.<sup>87</sup>

While defining the culture, Baxter also implies and defines the concept of power. Shared meanings owe significantly to the power which they need for being enforced. Here Baxter adds another aspect of power which is not only based on coercive and enforcing aspects but also includes an aiding aspect of power. It is significant about popular culture. Popular culture has been defined differently. Some scholars define it by dividing the culture into high and low or into elite and mass culture. In some views, popular culture is an antonym of the high culture. In high culture, meaning is shared on traditional and ideological basis. In the case of popular culture, meaning is abstracted without traditional and ideological contextualisation. Baxter also defines the popular culture with respect to the concept of power he gives. He is of the view that popular culture can be found at the spaces or places where the ‘cultural power’ behind a social action is negotiated by challenging or enforcing the tradition while consumption.<sup>88</sup> Toby Miller defines it as,

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<sup>86</sup> Chris Barker, *Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice*, (London: Sage Publishers, 2005), 7

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, 58-60

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, 10



The political significance of popular cultural practices is perhaps best exemplified in subcultures. Subcultures signify a space under culture, simultaneously opposed to, derivative of, and informing official, dominant, governmental, commercial, bureaucratically organized forms of life ~ a shift away from culture as a tool of domination and towards culture as a tool of empowerment.<sup>89</sup>

Unlike high culture, it is not deeply embedded in linguistic and customary corpus but instead builds itself based on immediacy and lived necessity. Contemporary scholarship links the popular culture with mediatisation, particularly and generally, with anything which is not traditional like modern education, relations and facilities like health.

The above discussion defines the culture, and describes some aspects that are, by definition, the integral part of culture. Some of these aspects need more elaboration before going to the real cultural matrix. The basic definition which denotes culture as a 'system of shared meanings' further explains these shared meanings as 'ways' with which we make sense of the world. The other aspect is 'power' which needs more investigation. It also confesses that meanings are generated through 'signs. To make a clear sense of relationship between the 'ways' and 'signs' and to understand the role and position of power, this study proceeds towards the investigation of the term 'cultural script'. The 'cultural script' will describe the above discussion in detail and then it will be easy to define and locate a proper methodological approach for the study of so called 'cultural' and 'sectarian data'.

### **2.1.2. Cultural script**

Cliff Goddard and Anna Wienzbicka define the cultural script as, "a new technique for articulating cultural norms; values and practices in terms which are clear, precise and accessible to cultural insiders and to cultural outsiders alike".<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Toby Miller, ed., *A Companion to Cultural Studies*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 2

<sup>90</sup> Cliff Goddard & Anna Wierzbicka, "Cultural scripts: What are they and what are they good for?", *Intercultural Pragmatics*, 1, no.2 (2004): 153–166

Both further argue that the cultural scripts are further formulated in “tightly constrained, expressively flexible, meta language consisting of simple words and grammatical patterns which have equivalents in all languages”.<sup>91</sup> It is this meta-language that enables a culture to be read by insiders and outsiders alike. Every culture contains behavioural guidelines which are incorporated by the individuals in their performance in particular situations. Generally human beings are supposed to perform some acts in certain situations like the acts of celebrating joy, greeting fellows or expressing grief on a sad incident. They do not have some written commands to consult each time in these kinds of situations. It seems that they know how to behave in different conditions. The conditions that they do not need to remember. However, the question arises how they come to know these popularly accepted acts. Whether it is innate or an acquired capability? What they follow is called cultural script. Sociological and anthropological views about the social or cultural script reveal that social scripting is a social process and like culture it is a social product. This scripting is a process through which ‘shared meanings’ are coined or decided. It further elaborates the way in which this script is concluded. It is acquired and its appropriate acquisition depends upon the sociability.<sup>92</sup> “Social scripts are not innate, i.e., they are not instinctive, but something one acquires and learns from daily activities, from interactions with other people” Hongdang Meng adds.

Social script is learnt through social interaction. Human interaction and repetition of the same acts teach the younger members what should be acquired and what should be avoided or abandoned.<sup>93</sup> It not only contains the acquisitions but at the same time also tells about the admonished things as well.<sup>94</sup> It is through human interaction that a social script is acquired. It is always specific within a particular culture and is not universal as its application is specific. Even in a culture, Goddard states, “cultural scripts exist at different levels of generality, and may relate to different aspects of thinking, speaking and behaviour”.<sup>95</sup> The above statement is

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid

<sup>92</sup> Hongdang Meng, “Social Script Theory and Cross-Cultural Communication,” *Intercultural Communication Studies*, XVII, no.1(2008): 132-138

<sup>93</sup> Ibid

<sup>94</sup> Felix K. Ameka & Anneke Breedveld, “Areal cultural scripts for social interaction in West African communities,” *Intercultural Pragmatics*, 1, no. 2 (2004): 167-187

<sup>95</sup> Goddard & Wierzbicka, “Cultural scripts,” 153-166

natural in the sense that all the members in that culture are not able to be socialised on an equal level. Every society contains diversity as far as the opportunities of social interaction to its members are concerned. Therefore, the acquisition of social script is also different but still this difference remains minute, within that culture, and is comprehensible for all the strata inside.<sup>96</sup> This difference can also be learnt by analogising the situation of cross-cultural communication, where the problem of externalisation, according to Hongdang Meng, emerges.<sup>97</sup> Here it is solved by the inter-cultural experience that enables the proper externalisation. Cultural script can also be understood by its own mechanism that is divided into two levels and these levels are,

(i) Internalisation

(ii) Externalisation

“Social scripts are internalised through actions and reactions and they require a situation to externalize the concepts in mind”.<sup>98</sup> First level is internalisation which enables an individual to acquire social norms and values by going through repeated interaction within a social group. Internalisation involves observation and experience. The second level of the script is the externalisation of which one has acquired through experience and observation. Externalisation exhibits how much an individual is acquainted with his or her culture. It embodies both simple and complex practices while dealing with different situations. Ameka and Breedveld present a power-based aspect of the internalisation and externalisation of the cultural script, which demonstrate that a human being goes through these processes to avoid punitive measures from the rest of group members along with other factors.<sup>99</sup> As it is a social process and fundamentally deals with the human interaction, it also undergoes changes. Any change in social script means either it adapts to the present situation or gives birth to some cultural problems. Its problematic position occurs, mostly, in

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<sup>96</sup> Stuart H. also points out to the same phenomenon in an article related to the Tāmil oral traditions. He uses the term ‘cultural model’ instead of cultural script. According to him a performance needs to repeat itself with some alteration, each time. These alterations are due to change in entextualizing processes instead of difference of level of sociability in a particular society.

<sup>97</sup> Meng, “Social Script Theory and Cross-Cultural Communication,” 132-138

<sup>98</sup> Ibid

<sup>99</sup> Ameka & Breedveld, “A real cultural scripts for social interaction in West African communities,” 167-187

stratified societies. These changes are not abrupt and do not occur suddenly but are gradual and take a reasonable span of time. Cultural scripts contain both speech and non-speech acts. These are both verbal and non-verbal. Non-verbal includes body language and non-speech acts.

Cultural script not only explains the preceding debate on culture but at the same time brings some new aspects into the circle of study. It explains the former by maintaining that the 'shared meanings' are articulated in social norms, values and practices. It also maintains that these are not innate but are generated by the social interaction. It accepts the role of power in the coinage of social meanings or culture but at the same time avoids reductionism by claiming the scriptural diversity reflecting the divisive and diverse aspects of social power. The next part deals, at first, with the excavation of socio-cultural script and abstraction of visible socio-cultural signs and symbols that generate these scripts or the shared meanings or in other words define social realities/ontological and epistemological position. After excavation of socio-cultural syntax, it will proceed to understand the interaction of these abstracted socio-cultural patterns and the religious symbolism. As mentioned in the introductory lines in this study of interaction, both religion and socio-cultural patterns are taken as two signs systems working in a society. This interaction will be held by applying both the theoretical and methodological tools of cultural semiotics.

## **2.2. Socio-cultural patterns: Depositories of shared meaning**

Location of culture in a socially developed language is not an easy task. As discussed previously, the scripts containing the cultural meaning are not only diverse on the basis of structure but also on their understanding. They are not codified as law but are scattered everywhere in society. They are embedded in some depositories, and so to understand the script of a particular region or an area, the knowledge and examination of such depositories is necessary. This part deals with the traditional and non-traditional depositories of socio-cultural knowledge in district Jhang. This helps in understanding the real social ontological and epistemological standards in society. This part also gives hint to the internal processes of change within both the traditional and non-traditional social meanings. At first it explains the most traditional and linguistic bases of culture by examining the proverbs, poetry and folk songs in district

Jhang. Second depository, which bridges both the traditional and creative aspects, is the customary traditions. This will help to understand the prerservation of shared meanings in the traditions. It also shows how, through customs and social development, culture is negotiating the emerging social realities. Thirdly, the description of social stratification and the identification of cultural compromises is described. This part also justifies the distinctive position of district Jhang for the selection of this research. It also attempts to locate and define the popular culture by narrating the most recent social developments and its impacts on the sectarian discourse. At the end, it summarises the whole discussion by a clear identification and excavation of socio-cultural language to be used in the study of sectarian development.

### **2.2.1. Lingual depositories**

Cultural studies has argued that language is not a neutral medium for the formation of meaning and knowledge about an independent object world ‘existing’ outside of language. Rather it is constitutive of those very meanings and knowledge.<sup>100</sup>

The above quotation strengthens the position of lingual depositories of culture to be studied for a proper understanding of the social developments. It tells us that this language does not exist in space but is as much real as the social realities. By following this trend, the proceeding section is going to analyse the proverbs and some literary aspects of language as depositories of traditional culture. To meet the purpose, the literary aspects will be strictly analysed based on the subject they deliver rather than focusing their poetical or literary structures.

#### **2.2.1.1. Proverbs (Akhānr)**

“Proverbs are the oil with which words are eaten”.<sup>101</sup> Akhānr is the local term which represents the proverbs. They are the sphere in which the real folk wisdom exists. They are based on the cultural memory of generations which survives

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<sup>100</sup> Barker, *Cultural Studies*, 7

<sup>101</sup> Phrase from Things fall Apart

collective experiences and observation.<sup>102</sup> Whiting described the proverb as a short saying of philosophic nature, of great antiquity, the product of the masses rather than of classes, constantly applicable, and appealing because it bears a semblance of universal truth.<sup>103</sup> In the present study, proverbs are explained to understand the traditional boundaries and standards of social knowledge. It will help to understand the cultural position of society in district Jhang before the advent of main social changes i.e. post-colonial and post-feudal changes. The only story they tell is the tradition. Nothing can be more suitable than the proverbs to know the traditional socio-cultural patterns in Jhang. Following is a brief explanation of some proverbs to infer cultural position of the society whose sectarian development must be explored.

I. Our ancestors did these excesses. (ay raīsiyyān sādāy wadkiyyān kītiyyān)<sup>104</sup>

II. Of what use is the bath, if person driving the well is unaware. (Nātā kaihray laikhay jay gādhī ālā nā waikhay)<sup>105</sup>

III. Parents are herbs of forest and son is root of Saffron. (Mawn akrūrī pīū tāndlā putr Kaisrī jarh)<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Hiroko Storm, "Women in Japanese Proverbs," *Asian Folklore Studies*, 51, no.2 (1992): 167-182

<sup>103</sup> Wolfgang Meider and Alen Dundes, *The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb*, (Winconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1994), 62

<sup>104</sup> Zubairī, *Ta`rīkh-i-Jhang*, 23

This proverb is normally used to justify one's act of lavish expenditure and show that this phenomenon of spending more is not new but is usual in one's family background. It is also used while criticizing someone's act that if someone else is doing it he is not justified to use this elite prerogative. It means that socially people demand strong justifications for anything that is extra-ordinary. Absence of proper contextualization can lead the performance towards criticism or failure.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, This refers to the old tradition of bathing at the wells, when well had been the main source of water. Women, in villages, used to go to well to bath and collect water. This proverb denotes to the event of a woman having bath and in love with the person driving the well. She in the proverb tries to say that her bath is of no use if she could not attract the attention of his beloved who is very close to her. This proverb is used when one is unable to attract even one's immediate and focused audiences. It also depicts that even a normal act like having bath is always very much contextualized. Every social act is intended towards ends.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid

This proverb deals with both the identity and contextualization. One always builds his or hers identity by justifying it historically. A lowborn cannot identify him as noble.

IV. First beat can tell about the symphony. (kang wajiyyā tay rāg bujhiyyā)<sup>107</sup>

V. Wealth decides wisdom. (Jis day ghar dānay ūs day kamlay wī siyānay)<sup>108</sup>

VI. Doing extortion but reciting poran bhagat's poetry (Karniyyān badma'āshiyyān tay bait pūran bhagat day parhanay)<sup>109</sup>

VII. Birth of Virtue from vice and evil from virtue (changiyyan ichūn bhairay tay bhairiyyān ichūn changay)<sup>110</sup>

VIII. A lowborn claiming nobility. (Mawn mirāthan putar Muḥammad bin Qāsim)<sup>111</sup>

IX. Experience has no alternative. (Rāh piyyān patā lagdā hay yā wāh piyyān)<sup>112</sup>

X. All honour virtue. (Rānjhā sab dā sānjhā)<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid

It explains that the first step of any performance shows the structure of the whole performance.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid

This proverb narrates the people's belief in the authority of wealth. Wealth contains social authority. On the other hand, poverty bears no wisdom.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid

This proverb is very interesting in its contents. First, it criticizes the clash in acts and words. Secondly, it depicts that social good can also be contextualized irrespective of religious affiliation.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid

It narrates that virtue and vice are quite subjective in their social capacity. A performance can lead to unimagined results as well.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid

This narration criticizes the noble claims of a lowborn. It means society is very much conscious of the lineage and many traits are assigned to particular tribes and family unit. If someone from lowborn family will try to use so-called noble prerogative, he will not be allowed to do so and will be strongly criticized.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid

Experience is very much important to know about some social act or reality. Nothing can be understood properly without experiencing one's self.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid

A good character is something that attracts love and honor from all and sundry.

XI. Personal interest changes the religious commands (accepting the relative aspects of religious development). (wīch Bachrā Jalāl, Khautī kanā taīn ḥalāl)<sup>114</sup>

XII. River changes its path. (Sadā daryā hikkay kadhī nahī wāhanday)<sup>115</sup>

XIII. Flowers grow only in spring season. (Nit Phulāntawriyyān nit nā sāwan hau)<sup>116</sup>

XIV. Blind man is the custodian of Mosque. (Anhay nau mawn masīt ich bahā gaī)<sup>117</sup>

XV. Blind woman is named as light. (Akhūn anhī nā nūr bharī)<sup>118</sup>

Proverbs, as described above, are purely composed of the traditional cultural matrix. Folk wisdom predicts the emergence of possible popular cultural trends as well. A brief examination of the above-narrated proverbs provides certain cultural trends that help in understanding the composition of social reality in the region. These provide a clear glimpse of the social divides and presence of social ranks. This social stratification is well described in the proverbial language and this description plays important role in social mechanism. For example, the first proverb states that, “these excesses were done by our forefathers”, thus describes two things. Firstly, it narrates that there exists a social rank, which shows excesses. Second, it extends the prerogative of these excesses to this class. They do not allow emerging middle classes, to use this prerogative. Proverbs also tell how these higher ranks are achieved. Proverb, narrated at number five, “wealth decides wisdom”, maintains that social rank

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid

This proverb criticizes the character of the religious scholars. It blames that religious scholars keep their benefits in mind while interpreting the religious commands.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid

It narrates that social trends including the political and economic power are not absolute and are subject to change. It seems that social reality is not absolute but relative and subjective.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid

Everything is bound to particularities of time and space.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid

This proverb bores many explanations. The famous one is that people donate their disable children to serve religion. That is why the religion is deteriorating.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid

It again describes the issue that sometimes people perform or claim such attributes that are not the part of their personality.



accompanied with wealth decides the nature of social realities. People, while evaluating a social act, only confer upon it the status of social reality if it is deeply contextualized in the class-based justifications.

Another aspect of the proverbial tradition is the positivistic and rational models of social reality. They deny the superficial justifications behind the construction of a fact. They maintain the deep observation and repeated experience as the main justification to believe in the truthfulness of a phenomenon. Proverbs xiii and xv describe that anything that contradicts observation and experience is discarded. They deny the meta-physical justifications of social development. This is an interesting feature in as; the oriental society has been blamed of being governed by some supernatural laws and beliefs. This proverbial examination rejects that established conception of unreal eastern societies. It also accommodates the changing nature of social development. To say, “river changes its path”, indicates that social realities differ with the difference of time and space. This aspect is very much important for the proper understanding of the socio-cultural patterns amid religion and modernity.

The third and, to an extent, most significant, especially regarding to the current research, proverbial depository contains much about the religious and sectarian development. Folk wisdom does not directly criticise the religion but shows disrespect for the personalities and methods with which religion is defined. Proverbs viii, xi and xiv throw light on the role of religious scholars who define religion. The first in the list criticises the religious scholarship on the basis of their poor family backgrounds. It also connotes that to avoid his disrespect as lowborn, he guises to be a scholar. Secondly, it tells that a religious scholar always designs religion as per his or her own material benefits. Thirdly, the dullest child is spared or donated to the religion by the society. Therefore, religious scholarship is not only unreliable but lacks such requisite capacities to interpret religion.

After this analysis, the study moves ahead towards the literary ends of the lingual traditions.

#### **2.2.1.2. Local songs**

The second category of the lingual depository of language is the literary linguistics. Proverbs give us an insight into folk wisdom; songs, māhiyya and Laurī

express folk ways of expression of sentiments for love and pain. It contains various issues inside it, which express love by cherishing the joys of a meeting with your beloved or by cursing the separation, which mostly is created by the society. To an extent, a resistance is preserved in these songs. They give voice to certain issues which cannot be expressed in proverbial language. For example, there is no place for a woman to express her love for her lover in folk wisdom and same is the case with the customary tradition where for a long-time love marriage has been remained an immoral act but, in this genre, she expresses herself and her words get recognition. The woman's voice is very blunt in the songs and tells all that what formally is forbidden to be discussed. For example, a song depicts a 'date' and the beloved (woman) is depicting the situation in the following words.

Uchiyyān lamiyyān taliyyān way thalay mairī bānh cha Nappī haī zālmā

(We are beneath a bunch of tall trees and you have hold me by my arms)

Mairā chūrā way charakdā chūr day, mairī bānh chā napī haī zālmā<sup>119</sup>

(My bangles are just to be ringing, release me out of your hold. O you have hold me by my arms)

The other song, which can be stated as the most famous song in the people, is

Khān gharā day band way khānā

(My respected lover: gift me a ring)

Main dhaulay dī mang way khānā

(I am your fiancée)

Tairay pichay kaut shākir chadyā

(I have left my home (Kaut Shākir) for you)

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<sup>119</sup> Saleem, Ibbad, "Talib Hussain Dard Jūg(uchian lambian tahlia....)part 1", You Tube video 09:36, Posted (August 2012) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvEo50u5s5M>

See also Channar, M.D, "Allah Ditta Lonay Wala Uchiyan Lamiyan Taaliyan", You Tube video, 09:16, Posted (November 2010) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io6yAAZHdfk>

Above are the links of this song. The first is performed by Tālib Hussain Dard and the second is performed by Allah Dittā of Lonewala. Both are very much famous folk singers.

āp chā malyā i Jhang way khānā

(Why you have got settled at a distance, Jhang)

Mairī nā sukdī hanj way khānā<sup>120</sup>

(I am weeping in your absence continuously)

Thus, songs give voice to marginalised topics and in a way that contains the tone of resistance in them. They give room to the feministic expressions of love contrary to the socio-cultural moralities of the region.

On the other hand, if a male is expressing his love in a song or poetry, he will use a platonic tone and would be shy in addressing his female beloved. He will be using the ‘male’ lingual terms to express his love. Mazhar Bukhārī wrote,

Lah bulandī tūn ay Shahanshāh-i-Jamāl

(O the king of beauty (moon), step down to earth)

Mairā mitī tay mitī dā chan waikh wanj

(Come and see my earthly moon, my beloved)

Usdī mithrī jāi guftagau ā kay sunr

(Come and listen his sweet voice)

Usdā bhulā jīyyā bānkpan waikh wanj

(Come and see his innocent youth)

Tūn faqat rāt kālī dā hain Shahanshāh

(You are only the king of night)

Usdā dīn rāt dauna utay rāj hay

(He, my beloved is ruling day and night)

au tāun mittī dā hau kay wī baidāgh hay

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<sup>120</sup> Pak Satuation, “Khan Ghara Day, Mansoor Malangi, Pakistani Punjabi, Cultural Song, Complete”, You Tube video, Posted (May 2014) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ruDB49Bwdps>

This song is in the voice of Manşūr ‘Alī Malangī (late).

(He bears no ugly appearance, like you)

Āa kay Mazhar haurān dā sajanṛ waikh wanj

(Come and see the beloved of Mazhar)<sup>121</sup>

The content and style of the songs and the subjects they discuss speak for the significance of this genre. As discussed above the local songs give voice to the marginalized subjects. A resistance can be expressed here in a light mode. They not only give voice to the silenced aspects but sometimes they themselves use indirect terminology for the expression as is evident in the case of second example, the verses of poet Sayyid Mazhar Bukhārī.

### 2.2.1.3. Māhiyya

Māhiyya is a popular genre in Punjab, particularly in Jhang. Its structure resembles heiko and its content resembles with the proverbs. The most interesting aspect regarding māhiyya is that it contains an argument. The first line describes a known reality which, as far as the meanings are concerned, does not have any connection with the rest of two lines. However, it establishes the level of authenticity for the meanings of the middle and the last line. The second and third lines are well connected based on meaning. Some māhiyya are

Sāwī juwār hawndī

(Juwār is green)

Nā dīl daiwān hā

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<sup>121</sup> Interview with Mazhar Bukhārī, September 2015

He was of the view that expression of love with beloved by addressing in a mannish terminology does not connote to the platonic love, but it is due to the social modesty and respect for woman (as honor) that we use an indirect manner. He also said that in fact love in this part of Punjab is free from all gender biases. We use the language that can be generalized by all. My ‘*Chan*’ in the above *band* can be a son, a brother and a beloved. So here, this technic is non-reductionist in its nature.

See also, Sada Dil Punjab, “Mansoor Malangi With Farah Khan On Her Morning show GupSup”, YouTube video, 33:40, Posted (July 2016), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMxyMEw8f7M>

Manşūr ‘Alī Malangī expressed the similar thing that folk voices are general in their address and are not just confined to a form of love.

(If I could have abstained from love)

Nā zindagī khuwār haundī

(I could have saved my life of annihilation)<sup>122</sup>

Panchī udyā qarīb hau kay

(A bird flew near)

uchā piyyā wasnā hain

(You are living a wealthy life)

Nīhūn dithā gharīb hau kay

(You have not seen poverty, yet)<sup>123</sup>

Kālay kawn māhiyya

(Crow is black)

Sajanṛ marainday hin

(Friends bestow pains)

injay maut dā nāwn māhiyya

(Death is when friends desert you)<sup>124</sup>

Māhiyya can be used as credible source to locate the theorisation of social reality. This aspect links māhiyya with the proverbial standards, furthermore, defining the methodology as well. The known reality of the first line is taken as a standard to equate the extent of reality being described in the second and third line. The known realities are taken from the everyday world around. Juwār is a plant, the standard of reality in the second and third māhiyya are birds. Realities are constructed by analysing them on solid positive grounds rather than because of supernatural

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<sup>122</sup> Zubairī, This *Māhiyya* describes that love destructs the life.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid, expresses while addressing a wealthy fellow that you have not seen poverty yet so you cannot understand my pains)

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, it narrates that a man dies due to the separation of friends and relatives.

phenomenon. The subject described in the concluding lines is the agenda which is strategically linked with a universal truth.

A dominant part of the linguistic depositories of culture speaks the traditional language. The traditional culture that can be excavated from this part contains both progressive and retrogressive aspects. It is retrogressive as far as the strict separation of social classes is concerned but at the same time is progressive for many of its aspects. As described in summarising the proverbs, they present a positivist and experiential ontology and avoid superstitions. Proverbs also speak in optimistic way. Its religious outlook is dual. Culturally religion is respected but the interpreters and the interpretations are criticised for their worldly inclinations in the process of religious interpretations. The literary language considers the issues and topics, which are ignored by the proverbs, and so it accommodates plethora of issues. All this diversity and apparent division exists under the same umbrella. Diversity does not exist in parallel and an antagonistic manner, but discursivities run parallel to one another. The next section describes the customary traditions and their contribution in the socio-cultural understanding.

### **2.2.2. Social customs**

Social customs, traditions and rituals are the functional depositories of cultural knowledge. They represent both the tradition and recent developments. They represent tradition in structures and accommodate the current developments in practice as well. There are many customary traditions which are observed in the District Jhang. This part includes cultural description and analysis of ceremonies related to the marriages and death. The commencement of these ceremonies is very common. One can summarise the sentimental aspects of the culture from the analysis of the observance of these ceremonies.

#### **2.2.2.1. Marriage**

Marriage is the most celebrated event. In District Jhang, commencement of marriage is more diverse as compared to *nikāh* (Islamic marriage). Marriage in Jhang includes various customary and traditional celebrations. It contains many events that involve a considerable time span. These events individually have different ritualistic

traditions. The events are *gaddh* (tie), *maidhī*, *mihindī* (myrtle), *gharaulī* (pitcher), *satūwārā* (seventh day). *Gaddh* is the ceremony whose literal meanings are to tie. Both families, of male and female, gather to fix the date of marriage and related events. Then, marriage ceremonies are started with *maidhī*. Female family members of the groom visit the house of bride and present specific food articles. Folk music and dance are the integral part of the event. Participants are served with tea or food per the financial affordability of the families. Afterwards till the day of marriage bride must confine herself within the boundaries of her house. In some cases, she does not come out of her room. This confinement is preserved just like the '*idat*'.<sup>125</sup> The next is a ritual, *gharaulī*, performed by the sister of the groom at the time of *bārāt*. There are also certain other rituals like, *mūwn vikhā'i* (Show your face: a ritual), *palū badhā'i* (tie a knot), *muhatinr* (Door frame).<sup>126</sup> All these rituals and events are the integral parts of the marriages in Jhang. After the completion of marriage, family members of the bride visit her on the 7<sup>th</sup> day of marriage and bring her back to home for a few days. This is called *satūwārā*. The celebration of all these rituals cannot be generalised. It depends upon financial affordability and involves some ideological issues. The migrated social groups are also exceptions in this regard. Another significant aspect is the place of music and dance in the celebration of marriages. Both have been part of the event. *Āgā* (prior) is term used for the commencement of musical gathering before the formal start of marriage ceremonies. In these gatherings, most of the neighbourhood comes together. The peak of celebration with music is termed as *mujrā* (dance party). It has been popular in the rural society where it symbolises the social status and artistic taste. Female dancers are invited from Chiniot, Tulambā, Lahore and Kahrūr Pakkā, which are the centres known for their '*Shāhī Maḥalla*'<sup>127</sup>. Female dancers are mostly hired by the wealthy. The lower

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<sup>125</sup> This preserves the female from bad spirits and protects her honor.

<sup>126</sup> Zubairī, *Ta'rīkh-i-Jhang*, 280-283

All these three are the cash gifts; *mūwn vikhā'i* is a cash gift that relatives give to bride. *Palū badhā'i* is a cash gift from groom to his sister when she ties a knot with her brother's shirt. *Muhatinr* is a cash gift which bride receives at the entrance of house of groom.

<sup>127</sup> '*Kanjars*' a local word for the '*Tawā'if*' and the people linked with this profession. As far as this region is concerned, they live in specific places in Chiniot, Tulambā, Kahrūr Pakkā, Multan and Lahore. Their enclaves are named as agency in Chiniot, *Shāhī Maḥalla* in Lahore and Tulambā and Ḥarrām gate in Multan.

classes invite eunuchs, for such parties, who in the local terms are identified as *natt* or *zanānā* (She-male).<sup>128</sup>

Marriages in Jhang also contain some other important aspects. Child marriage is not observed in the district. Females are mostly deprived of their inherited property at the time of marriage. Traditionally, it is considered disrespectful if a female demands her rights of inheritance. It involves a matter of tribal ego as well. In an agriculturist society, land has been a major category of property. Female heirs are also deprived of inheritance. Land, like a woman, is considered as a symbol of prestige and honour. Another aspect of the marriage in Jhang is that the marital connections have been religiously confined to the relative castes.<sup>129</sup> Although the boundaries in this regard are becoming porous in the recent time, yet the caste base restriction are still in full swing. The leading caste Sayyāls, Sayyids, Quraishīs and Balauch are very much concerned with this tradition. Any violation in this regard could have led to the social boycott (within *birādarī*) as well.

#### 2.2.2.2. Death

Death, generally, in Punjab and particularly in District Jhang, like marriage, is also very much ritualistic. It seems these rituals are comprised of a mixture of Islamic and local traditions. Some aspects of these rituals are also gender specific. Design of graves is an example of gender specifications. Same is the diversity on age basis. There are differences in the rituals based on age of the deceased. These changes are also evident in the manners and duration of observation of grief after the demise. If the deceased is a child, their rituals will be comprised of a short period. In case of the demise of a young all the rituals are performed. Death ceremonies start with the funeral and continue with the *sūyyam* (third day) and *chihlam* (fortieth day). Death also contains some other interesting customs and tradition. For example, *lungī* (clad) tradition is observed on the death of a male. The female's relatives and near ones put a *lungī*<sup>130</sup> on the bed of deceased. Here is an example of difference regarding gender basis. The *lungī* is replaced with *baichhanr* at the death of a female. It is a piece of

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<sup>128</sup> *Khārā* is a term used for such dance parties.

<sup>129</sup> *Punjab District Gazetteers*, Jhang District 1883-84, 70

<sup>130</sup> A piece of cloth with red and green colors imbedded together. This cloth is used as leg wear.



cloth which resembles veil. A further tradition is *kaurā wattā* which means ‘sour (unpleasant) return’. The *kaurā* (sour) adjective of the term denotes to its attachment with a sad incident. This term connotes to a tradition that relates to the death. After death, relatives and other close friends consider themselves responsible for the provision of meals for the family of deceased and the attendees for the condolence. They divide the days among each other and serve the deceased’s family. This is to be returned. This works in a circle and is a symbol of collective responsibility. The time duration lasts from three to seven days but is flexible. The term *bhājī* connotes to two different meanings. One meaning resembles the *niūndrā* (wedding gift) and the other means ‘return’. In case of death, the family of deceased collects it twice, once at the time of burial in graveyard and once at the time of *qul khawānī* (concluding ceremony of death). It works both as a collective responsibility and reminds the family about the participation. At *sūyyam* and *qul khawānī* the attendees or the participants are served with a full fledged meal or with some food articles.<sup>131</sup> In some cases, the family of deceased invite their relatives and friends by sending them the invitation cards. The gatherings at the funeral and the ceremonies after the funeral also depict the social status of the deceased and his family. This phenomenon works significantly in local politics.<sup>132</sup> In some cases, it seems that the people deliberately invite more and more people on funerals not for the sake of condolence but for the sake of exhibiting their social capital.<sup>133</sup> It is so much important that even politics is not an exception in this regard. In the rural parts of District Jhang, politicians focus to maximize their participation in the ceremonies related to death and marriages. This participation benefits them in electoral politics. Political success is attached with the participation of politicians in these kinds of activities. It has been observed that these customary traditions are rapidly shrinking to the rural boundaries and most of the traditional and expensive aspects are vanishing with the passage of time.

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<sup>131</sup> Interview with Salīm ‘Abbās Quraishī, September 2015

Salīm ‘Abbās Quraishī, in response to the question about the purpose of these serving at *Qul Khawānī*, replied that this is not mere extravagancy, but this is kind of a tribute to the deceased by his family and near relatives. It is recognition of his being. So, it must be preserved to pay an appropriate amount of tribute to the deceased.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid, Quraishī, after favouring the tradition of food servings at the deceased ceremonies, criticised the huge gatherings at these ceremonies. He maintained that it has become an order of the day for the exhibition of social power which is inappropriate and condemnable. He told that he used to receive several invitations of such gatherings from unknown people as well.

<sup>133</sup> Interview with Sayyid ‘Adnān Haider Advocate, September 2015

Above are narrated two examples which shine a light on the expressions of happiness and grief. Both these ritualistic celebrations, as per their examination, go beyond their basic ideas. The first thing is the religious content of these celebrations. These are criticised for containing some local traditions and are supposed to be antagonistic to Islam. However, at the same time their observance and specially a full-fledged observance announce the financial position of the performers. It is seen that most of the rich people traditionally follow these practices. I had, however, found negligence in the newly emerging elite. They do not avoid these traditions due to extravagancy but because they are antagonistic to all forms of tradition.

Another cultural aspect, these celebrations contain, is the detachability of the performance from its context. Both marriage and celebration bear a strong sense of social status and involve some socio-political and socio-economic aspect. They also show some aspects of collective responsibility and support in shape of *niūndrā* and *kaurā wattā*. As, in most of cases of these celebrations to abide by all is very much expensive so these are not existing at general level. Although as far as traditional culture is concerned, these as a cultural depository, contain a mix of tradition and new developments. This discussion is extended to the next part which deals with the examination and analysis of the society and social stratification in district Jhang.

### **2.2.3. Caste based structures**

This is the third category of depository of cultural meanings. It tells us about the society and its major forms of division. Social division is a universal phenomenon. Societies contain various divisive standards through which communal identities are preserved. The examination of the divisive trend gives a clear picture of social segregation. It embodies the social changes and adopts various new positions as well, which, in many cases remain in continuous contexts for justifying authority. It is interesting to note that here tradition is challenged by repeating it or by following it. Tradition exists either in form or structure but still its compromises are also being run simultaneously.

In district Jhang, people are divided into various castes and caste-based structures. Although this phenomenon is very much common in the whole Punjab,

still caste based social development contains some distinctive aspects as well. The following are the major trends in this regard.

### 2.2.3.1. Diversification of nobility

The term nobility is used here to categorise a social group bearing respect and honour. This usage of the term cannot be analogised by the mediaeval or early modern concept of nobility which was connected with the royal courts. Here, it represents the upper social status groups. Punjabi nobility is starkly divided into two caste groups Jatt and Rājput. Generally, there are two classes based on social ranks, one is the *ashraf* (nobles) and the other *kammī* (Menials). This caste pattern, in district Jhang includes Jatt in between the above-mentioned social ranks. Sayyāl, being the main caste in the district claim Rājput descent.<sup>134</sup> However, they do not commonly use their Rājput identity.<sup>135</sup> They avoid the use of Rājput titles of grace i.e. *rānā*, *rāu*, *rāy* etc. They use the titles of *khān* and *mahar*.<sup>136</sup> Ghulām Akbar Khān Sayyāl was awarded the title of Nawwāb and his descendants use this title as a prerogative.<sup>137</sup> The titles also depict the social category and sub caste of the Sayyāl. They are divided into numerous sub castes. The ruling elite of the Sayyāl tribe belonged to the Jalāl Khanāna sub caste. Ghulam Akbar Khān, who was entitled as Nawwāb, also belonged to this sub caste. The title ‘Khān’ remained a prerogative of this sub caste for a long time. Certain interesting things occurred in this domain. With a passage of time all the Jalāl Khānānā used to use the title of Nawwāb irrespective of the fact that they were direct descendants of Nawwāb Akbar Khān or not.

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<sup>134</sup> Zubairī, *Ta'rikh-i-Jhang*, 90-91

Sayyāls are the descendants of Rāy Sayyāl, from the family of Panwār Rājput of Jaun Pur, rebelled against the Ghayyath al-Dīn Balban (Sultān of Dehli). After being defeated Rāy Sayyāl had to seek refuge with Sufī saint Bābā Farīd al-Dīn Mas'ūd on whose request Rāy Sayyāl got a pardon from the monarch. Rāy Sayyāl embraced Islam at the hands of Farīd al-Dīn Mas'ūd.

<sup>135</sup> Punjab District Gazetteers, 1883-84, 57

<sup>136</sup> Khān is Turkish title, mahar has two origins, one is Arabic which explains it as expert or skillful, the other is Irish which connotes to be generous or kind. The Arabic origin justifies the title for the cultivating expertise of the people who use this title. Mahar is mostly used by the so-called Jatt in District Jhang. Persian meaning also strengthens the title which defines it as professional.

<sup>137</sup> Title was conferred upon by the colonial administration. The certificate is known as *Nawwābī Tikkā* which is currently being held by Nawwāb Hākīm Asad Zamān Jadd Sar.

Historically, the title of *mahar* was used for the rest of sub castes but they also seemed to be striving for the title of Khān after getting some land grants and a rise in social and political stature. Rajbānas and ‘Alyānas are the major examples in this regard. Bharwāna and Sargāna sub castes are an exception in this regard. They still use the title of *mahar* even after a rise in the land ceiling and political elevations. In second come the sayyids and Quraishīs. Their titles of grace include makhdūm, *shāh* and *Miyān*. ‘*Miyān*’ and ‘*Shāh*’ are common but the term makhdūm bears a colonial connotation and the Sajādā Nashīns of Shāh Jīwanā and Quraishīs of Jā’i Wain adopted this. With the disintegration of ranks and change in the social makeup, the title of makhdūm is even used by the rest of Sayyid and Quraishī communities living at various centres. At third come the Balauch who even exceed the Sayyid and Quraishī in numerical strength, but it seems in Jhang they are left behind in case of tribal honour and prestige. Although some of them have an enormous land ceiling but still in the contest for the supreme nobility in Jhang they are far behind from Sayyids, Quraishīs and Sayyāls. Balauch are of various origins. They are from the Rind, Lashārī, Jatauī, Bāqrī, Shākrī and Jaskānī sub caste.<sup>138</sup> They use sardār and Khān as a title of grace. This is a brief picture of how social respect and nobility is dynamic and segregated. It clearly shows the patterns of changing identity, which may, at the beginning, have to face social criticism, but with the passage of time, it can establish itself by using the ‘cultural’ power that is generated through the utilisation of cultural symbols.

The connotation of Jatt, also, becomes different in district Jhang. Jatt does not connote to a fixed caste group but is an identity marker for the land cultivators, irrespective of their caste. Even the main clan Sayyāl contains a lot of sub caste, which are identified as Jatt in the area.<sup>139</sup> Most of the tenants have been from this social group instead of being from the menials. Menials had been mostly held for certain inferior purposes and were avoided in the cultivation of lands. It, the above discussion, does not mean that the general conception of Jatt and Rājput is altogether absent from the society. It exists but mostly in the migrated class.

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<sup>138</sup> Interview with Na‘īm Khān Lashārī, August 2016

<sup>139</sup> Punjab District Gazetteers, 1883-84, 57

### 2.2.3.2 Local and migrants

The next issue of diversified nobility is of locals and migrants. Ethnic confusions are at full swing in this sphere. Most of the people identify themselves as Punjabi and their language as Punjabi, but at the same time the inhabitants speaking the standard Punjabi (mājhī dialect) are regarded as muhājirs or *Ābādgars*.<sup>140</sup> Their language is identified as muhājari. These people have either migrated from East Panjab to Jhang during the time of Partition of India or had shifted here in the land settlements by the colonial administration.<sup>141</sup> Thus, in Jhang they are seemed to be deprived of their Punjabi identity. They in turn label the locals as *jānglī* (uncivilized) and their dialect (lahndā) as the jānglī dialect.<sup>142</sup> The migrants from Haryānā and Rajistān are not properly identified as Rājput but are labelled with some derogatory terms like pānīpatiyya, bhītrī bhayya.<sup>143</sup> The social and communal boundaries in this case are very strong and even after passage of a long time, still local and muhājirs are not truly integrated.

The major problem lies with the dialect of the local language in Jhang. The common identification of the dialect is that it belongs to Punjabi language, but the issue came to a head with the influx of migrants from the East Punjab, who speaks the standard Punjabi dialect, mājhī. The claim of superior dialect created a sense of othering between the people speaking different dialects. The main jatt castes which include Warrā'ich, Chīmā, Chathā, Rānjhā, Gūndal, Uthwāl are identified as muhājirs for the local people.<sup>144</sup> They categorise the Rājput and Jatt in same group, which they unanimously categorise as muhājirs. Same is the case with the migrated community. They exclude the local people from the Punjabi ethnicity and accuse them of being jānglī the uncivilised people.<sup>145</sup> This othering is not only based on lingual differences

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<sup>140</sup> *Ābādgars* is a common term for Panjabi settlers. Local people use this term for the whole Punjabi-migrated community living in the neighboring Districts of Faisalabad and Toba Tek Singh as well. The other equivalent of this term is 'panāhī'

<sup>141</sup> Punjab District Gazetteers, 1883-84, 147-153

. See also Ajmal Kamal, "The 'new land' in Punjab," *Express Tribune*, 20 July, 2012, accessed 22 January, 2017 <http://tribune.com.pk/story/411007/the-new-land-in-punjab/>

<sup>142</sup> Two connotations, label of jānglī by Britishers because of the resistance (Aḥmad Khān kharal) they had to face from this area. Secondly, the *muhājirs* gave this title for the inferior civility of the region.

<sup>143</sup> Interview with Rānā Muḥammad Ali, September 2015

<sup>144</sup> Interview with Gulzār Jatt, Civil Contractor. September 2015

<sup>145</sup> Abou Zahab, "The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Jhang," 167

but also on some customary aspects that are mentioned in the upper portion. Most of the customary traditions in Jhang are closer to the region southward from Jhang, which claims itself as Sara'ikī. The customs regarding the death and marriage make the people closer to Sara'ikī than the people of mainland central Punjab. Sara'ikīs also claim the language and culture of Jhang to be Sara'ikī. Sara'ikī literature accepts the Jhangwī dialect as daryā'i dialect of Sara'ikī language.<sup>146</sup> This lingual tension is on the rise nowadays and is generating a new phase of discourse around lingual identity of the region.<sup>147</sup>

### 2.2.3.3. Diversification of menials

Menials, as described above, are the lowest caste group. Their caste system and denominations are based on a duty or service they perform. They are considered as social inferiors and are deprived of equal social status with the socially respected caste groups. As mentioned above, menials have comparatively more diversity regarding identity and classification in Jhang. Menials include *Mirāthī*, *Malāḥ*, *Tarkhān*, *Machhī*, *Mauchī* and many others. *Mirāthī* (bards) are further divided into *jhattā* (lineage barrier), *pirhāin* (drum beater), *laurī* (lullyby singer), *sharnā'i* (Flute master), *kalāwant* (singer)<sup>148</sup>. *Malāḥs* (boatmen) are into *taubā* (real boatman) and *pātnrī* (a boatman by caste)<sup>149</sup>. The interesting thing regarding the menials is the

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<sup>146</sup> Interview with Professor Shafiq Bhattī, Chairman Department of History, Bahauddin Zakariya University Multan, August 2015

Also, Interview with Sāḥir Rangpūrī, a Sara'ikī Nationalist poet serving as Lecturer at University of Education Okara, August 2015

<sup>147</sup> 'Āqib Satyānwī, local poet has launched a new journal 'wirāg' to protect the lingual identity of Jhang. He is being highly criticized by the Sara'ikī nationalists at the social media on his inclinations towards Punjabi. He has established a welfare platform that is named as 'Aḥsās Foundation' that works for the welfare of artists in Jhang and neighboring areas. He is using this platform also to organize seminars on the lingual identity of the area. Interview with 'Āqib Satyānwī

<sup>148</sup> Jhattā are the mirāthīs who are attached with the Sayyāls. It is narrated that Bābā Farīd Ganj shakar appointed this caste to serve the Sayyāls clan and maintain the written record of the lineage. Interview with Manzūr Hussain Jhattā of Rashīdpūr

*Pirhā'in* is a sub caste of mirāthīs who are expert in beating *dhūl*. *sharnā'is* are expert in playing *Shārnā'is* and flutes.

<sup>149</sup> *Malāḥ* (sailors) are mostly inhabited near the rivers. Those who are still attached with their profession are termed as '*Taubā*' (the one who can swim and go down in the water). Those who have left the profession and have held permanent settlements at the rural or urban centers are termed as '*pātnrī*' (the one who has left the river and has inhabited the '*patanrī*' riverbank. Interview with Mahar Shahzād Malāḥ

change of caste. They change their caste to enter the realms of nobility. Ajmal Kamal mentions, Pahlūn sī asī Julāhay, fair banṛ gay Darzī/ Haulī haulī hū gay Sayyid, agūn Rab dī mardī! (In the beginning we were julāhā (weaver), and then became darzī (tailor), gradually we turned into Sayyid, whatever God wills happens!)”.<sup>150</sup> Toby Miller stated it as, “The working assumption was that subordinate groups adopt and adapt signs and objects of the dominant culture, reorganizing them to manufacture new meanings”.<sup>151</sup> They are specific even in this case. *Kumhārs* (potters) mostly identify themselves as Khaukhars, *Mirāthīs* generally opt to be of quraishī origin, *Malāḥ* chose Sayyāl identity. Change of caste is very much common in the whole Punjab among the economically growing menials.<sup>152</sup> No doubt, equality with the nobles is denied to the menials but it does not simply mean that they are inferior in all respects. Some of them also bear a sign of respect. It is debatable whether this attitude towards them can exactly be entitled as respect or it is something else. *jhattās*, as narrated above, are said to be assigned by Baba Farīd with Sayyāls to maintain the record of lineage, are bestowed with a special position. They, in this respect, are not only distinct from the other menials but also distinct from their other caste fellows. Sayyāls were advised to take care of *jhattās* and to avoid demanding from them any inferior work like sweeping.<sup>153</sup> Sayyāls were also recommended to maintain their pleasure by avoiding their anger. Another, if not similar, case is that of *jaugīs*. *Jaugīs* are normally beggars but are also famous for their wisdom and cultural knowledge about the astronomy and the zodiac.<sup>154</sup> They also receive alms and are popularly known as *faqīrs*.<sup>155</sup> Their displeasure is eluded to avoid bad luck.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>150</sup><http://tribune.com.pk/story/370904/castes-in-punjab/>

<sup>151</sup> Miller, *A Companion to Cultural Studies*, 2

<sup>152</sup> Punjab District Gazetteers, Jhang District 1929, (Lahore: Government Printing Punjab, 1930): 59

<sup>153</sup> Interview with Nawwāb Fakhar ‘Abbās Sayyāl, August 2014

<sup>154</sup> Haidrī Maḥalla, Jaugiyān wālā Maḥalla and Akbarpurra are the main localities where *jaugīs* live. On the elevation of the social and economic status they are also acquiring other identities like *māhnī* Sayyāls. They also fantasise this conversion by linking their lineage to the famous Ṣāḥibān of ‘Mirzā Ṣāḥibān fantasy’.

<sup>155</sup> Connotation of *faqīr* is not that of a beggar but a spiritual pathfinder.

<sup>156</sup> Abou Zahab, “The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Jhang,” 166

#### 2.2.4. Recent developments

The theorists define the recent social developments, which lack a long historicity and cultural authority but contain a reasonable account of immediacy and necessity, as popular culture. The discussion of these developments of socio-cultural patterns is justified based on the following definition.

“There are many ways in which the term popular culture has been used. For example, it may refer to that which is ‘left over’ after the canon of high culture has been decided upon or it may pertain to the mass-produced culture of the culture industries.”<sup>157</sup>

This is differentiated from the high culture or tradition. This is discussed in the preceding part either being ‘accommodated’ or being ‘tolerated’ by the tradition. In most of the cases it gains a space in society based on compromise of tradition.

Popular culture is also defined as,

A variant of high-low cultural boundary is that which decries community-based culture as inauthentic, manipulative and unsatisfying. This perspective reproduces again the ‘inferiority’ of popular culture. The argument is that commodified capitalist ‘mass culture is ‘inauthentic’ because not produced by the people, is ‘manipulative’ because its primary purpose is to be purchased and ‘unsatisfying’ because it requires little work to consume and thus fails to enrich its consumers”.<sup>158</sup>

It can be found in the collection of images, narratives, ideas and symbols that are popular among the people in each culture. It, as an idea, emerged in nineteenth century with the rise of industrialisation. It is perceived to be the effect of mass media which introduces new things with more utility than the traditional ones. This is also said to be the culture supported and sponsored by the masses. It cannot be equated

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<sup>157</sup> Barker, *Cultural Studies*, 81

<sup>158</sup> Ibid



with the anti and sub-cultures. It is not necessarily an anti-product of an existing high culture.

Defining and locating these recent socio-cultural developments in district Jhang is not an easy task, but there certainly are some visible trends. These can be regarded as the most recent developments in the society which lack historicity but provide some popular standards of understanding to the people.

#### **2.2.4.1. Education**

Education, traditionally, has been marginalised in the agrarian society of Jhang. The statistics from the Gazetteers show that a few among the people were regarded as literate only on the basis that they could read and write.<sup>159</sup> According to the deputy commissioner's report in 1881 this number also includes the shop keepers who only know how to read and write their daily business. Although, Government schools were established but still the number of students going to maktab and dharamshālā had been more.<sup>160</sup> Why is education regarded here as a popular culture?<sup>161</sup> This question can be answered and highlighted with the two examples from the pages of history.

Qudrat Ullāh Shahāb narrates his memory in Shahāb Nāmā that when he was serving as Deputy Commissioner at Jhang, a feudal visited him and offered the land for the establishment of a school.<sup>162</sup> Shahāb was very much impressed from the will but was astonished when another feudal requested him to refrain from doing that. On his inquisition, the feudal answered that the one who has offered land and grant for school had not meant it for his own area, but he wants to establish this school in the area of the current attendee on the basis of rivalry. Therefore, according to this story education was a 'weapon' to defeat the rival in his home. One feudal was trying to create a challenge for other by opening the doors of education in his rival's area. Thus, allowing people of the area to get educated and challenge the system.

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<sup>159</sup> Punjab District Gazetteers, Jhang District 1929, 76

<sup>160</sup> Ibid,

<sup>161</sup> Abou Zahab, "The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Jhang," 166

See also Athīr, 214

<sup>162</sup> Qudrat Ullāh Shahāb, "Shahāb Nāmā" 480

An elder from Sayyāl family told the second story about Major Mubārak Shāh (Politician from the feudal family of Sayyids of Shāh Jīwanā). He eyewitnessed that Major Mubārak Shāh was rejecting the project of establishment of college in his constituency, Shāh Jīwanā. He quotes Major Mubārak that the establishment of college will deprive us from our servants and service men.<sup>163</sup> These two examples show that education, especially liberal education worked as a popular culture. It was against the interests of the feudal political elite class. They, at first, hindered the establishment of schools. Secondly, they will, with the help of religious seminaries, advocate the propaganda that formal education corrupts the morals and destroys the social fabric. Although they themselves had a plethora of chances to get educated but they were against the public education. Female education was considered as a social sin. On the other hand, traditionally they had no issue with the religious seminaries because they were not challenging them in any respect. They focused on the establishment of yatīm Khānās (orphan homes) and madrassas with generous cash and land grants. The role of Sayyid elites of Rajū‘a and Shāh Jīwanā is very significant in this regard.<sup>164</sup> In this background, the role of the private and public educational institutions was vital. From 1979 onwards, there existed a layered educational system. The upper layer was the English medium missionary schools which were the colonial legacy. The second layer was comprised by the private schools which directly or indirectly were inclined towards the right wing. Sir Sayyid made it very clear that modern education should be the exclusive realm of Muslim *Ashrāf* and the educational aspirations of the lower caste Muslims should settle for traditional madrassa education. The role of the Zia regime cannot be neglected in this regard. As for as Jhang is concerned there were two parallel private Urdu medium school systems. These were the Ghazālī School system and Fārān School system. Ghazālī schools were established by Gauhar Šiddīqī while Fārān School system was started by

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<sup>163</sup> Interview with Nawwāb Fakhar ‘Abbās Sayyāl, September, 2016

<sup>164</sup> Records of *Anjuman Hussainiyya*.

Establishment of Jāmi‘a Hussainiyya at Jhang Saddar with the chief grants of Sādāt al-Rajū‘a. Similar steps were taken by Khān Muḥammad ‘Arif in Shorkot and Jhang. On the other hand, establishment of Sunni seminaries was also being supported by the Sunni feudal and Pīrs. *Tadhkirah Muḥammad Dhākir* contains a list of donations by the *zamīndārs*. The role of Bharwāna feudals from Satyāna and Mukhiyyāna is remarkable in this field.

Ḥāfiḍ ‘Abd al-Jabbār. Both were the members of Jamā‘at Islāmī.<sup>165</sup> The tradition, in this case got educational challenged by the product of these educational systems. They resisted the social stratification with modernised religious models of education.

There was, however, another group of individuals — exposed to modern education, Western ideas and urban life — that felt dissatisfied with the old, worn-out traditional values and aspired for a more just and equitable social order based on egalitarianism, individualism and democracy instead of a rigid social and economic hierarchy.<sup>166</sup>

The alternative of the elite English mediums and the mass based public schools was an education system based on right wing thoughts. As the only English medium school was a Christian Missionary school, Sacred Heart School. It was losing its credibility day by day and an increased religious thinking also stood against the co-education, the school was delivering. To meet the gaps of the Sacred school and to deal with the cultural and religious realities of the district, in the early nineties the Junior Public School was established which, later, became Chanāb College under the authority of district administration. It is also supervised by the Jhang Educational Trust. Dominant part of the membership of Trust belongs to right wing on the basis of their ideological affiliations. Interestingly most of the principals of the college are the graduates in Natural Sciences.

#### **2.2.4.2. Mass media**

Popular culture is also thought to be the product of mass media. Mediatisation of culture means that media is constructing the meanings and people are adopting.

More important is the increasing extent to which people’s lives in western capitalist societies appear to be affected by the popular culture presented

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<sup>165</sup>Gauhar Siddiqī remained intact with the education throughout his life. He was a member of Jamā‘at Islāmī. Ḥāfiḍ ‘Abd al-Jabbār Khān runs the Fārān model school. He contested local body’s elections from Satellite town Jhang and was elected as Nāẓim (administrater) of Union Council. He was supported by JI besides the support of Shaikh Group.

<sup>166</sup> Kamal, “The ‘new land’ in Punjab,”

by the modern mass media. It is clearly important in other societies, both past and present, but in these societies, the sheer volume of popular media culture which is made available gives it a specific significance which needs to be considered.<sup>167</sup>

In the recent times mediatisation is at its apex. Talking about Jhang and the presence of mass media, throughout the period of this research, needs some deeper analysis. From the late seventies till the end of eighties, radio and print media had been the main source of information. Although, television had been introduced, but it had not been very much popular due to financial non-affordability and social barriers. Especially in the rural areas it was against the honour to keep television in the proximity of house. Owing to the literacy rate the most popular source was radio, which was listened to in order to gain knowledge of national and international affairs. In the start of nineties, coincided with the democratisation, television became popular and it also accompanied VCP and VCR as a source of entertainment. The only access was PTV and international access was through dish antenna which was ousted by the introduction of cable networks in the late nineties. The noteworthy and important aspect in this regard is that there was no vernacular print or electronic media.

#### **2.2.4.3. Business and emergence of middle classes**

The cultural position of business and market in a dominantly agrarian society, which was being led by the feudalism, cannot be optimised. Most of the respectable symbols were clustered in the agricultural activities and business and market based commercial activities were regarded as culturally inferior occupations.<sup>168</sup> The big industry and business could not flourish in the area and the small business and commercial activities, left by the Hindu's, were handled by the local and Punjabi jatts besides the khūjās or the shaikh community at the urban centres. Still to become a “dūkāndār” is not very graceful and that is why the more people become prosperous the

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<sup>167</sup> Dominic Strinati, *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture*, (New York: Routledge, 2004), x

<sup>168</sup> Kamran, “Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,” 55-85

See also, Abou Zahab, “The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Jhang,” 169

more agricultural property they buy.<sup>169</sup> Agriculture is still a dominant symbol of respect in the district. This is a ‘popular’ status of business in the district, which hindered the way of its industrialisation as compared to the industrial and commercial progress of the neighbouring district like Faisalabad.

The narration and examination of the socio-cultural patterns or the depositories of the cultural meanings results in the appearance of certain traditional, recent and futuristic trends in the broader ways of social understanding. These trends are explored through various signs and symbols coming out of the description above. These signs and symbols are very much significant as is described,

A sign is anything- a colour, a gesture, a wink, an object, a mathematical equation, etc.-that stands for something other than itself. The word red, as we saw, qualifies as a sign because it does not stand for the sounds r-e-d that comprise it, but rather for a certain kind of colour and other things.<sup>170</sup>

Similarly, their importance is also evident as narrated below,

The thing to which a sign refers is known, logically, as the referent. There are two kinds of referents: (1) a concrete referent, such as the animal designated by the word cat, and (2) an abstract referent, such as the “bright idea” concept designated by the light bulb figure above. The former is something that can be shown to exist in the real world--e.g., a “cat” can be indicated by simply pointing to one. The latter is imaginary and cannot be indicated by simply pointing to it-how would you point to a “bright idea” inside the brain? Signs allow us to refer to things and ideas, even though they might not be physically present for our senses to perceive.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Revenue record shows that a considerable tract of land has been transferred to the emerging middle class at urban or sub urban centers.

<sup>170</sup> Marcel Denisi, *A Basic Textbook in Semiotics and Communication* (3rd), (Toronto: Canadian scholars Press, 2004), 4

<sup>171</sup> Ibid, 5

Although all the categories and their types are separately summarised in their respective parts still those summaries can be combined for a collective comprehension of the socio-cultural patterns. The following can be regarded as the concluding ends of this part.

At first this discussion describes a clear ontological model of tradition excavated from the proverbs, local songs, customary practices and social structures. As discussed above in the concerning part, these traditional boundaries are humanly constructed. External factors like divinity, spirituality or meta-physical intervention seems to have no place in the traditional standards of reality. It does not mean that they reject the religion altogether. Religion is mentioned in a respectful way but with an inclusive tone. Contextualisation based on social good and other religions is legitimate in this tradition. This tradition is modern in the sense that it defines some objective roles and behaviours and postmodern as it allows and confirms the possibilities of change. Another aspect of this traditional culture is its all-embracing capacity. It is evident from the subjects and strategies of the local songs, poetry and other genre like *māhiyya*. The proverbial realities are dominant, but the rest of discursivities are also allowed and well placed by tradition.

Secondly, this tradition also shows some accommodation with recent developments. The second category of the socio-cultural patterns which describes the customary traditions is an example of this argument. Traditional culture accommodates the recent development either by being silent at some point or by allowing something that brings equal authority with it. As described above, all the ritualistic celebrations regarding marriage are not possible to be observed nowadays on account of unavailability of time and financial resources. Tradition allows the unavailability of time and money by silencing some aspects of it. It appears in minimising the number of rituals observed. Secondly, it allows the migrant community to observe their rituals as per their own socio-cultural patterns which, in turn, bear the equal historical and performative authority.

The above discussion, thirdly, also gives a clue of resistance to the tradition. It comes in the social matters which involve the compromise of tradition over the immediate necessity. Tradition does not allow it to be compromised at the cost of

immediacy or doctrine of necessity. This trend is evident from the whole discussion of the third part about the social stratification and the fourth which contains an account of recent developments. It resists the emerging classes, for example. Emerging classes also resist tradition, but they try to maintain it, as well, for their own concerns of identity. It is evident in the case of an educated emerging middle class. They transform their class from masses to the middle classes and in case they are menial, they try to change their caste as well. Firstly, they must go against the tradition just to return to it for a proper recognition. At first, they resist its structure in order to escape from it and then raise their social and economic status. After raising their status, they need a cultural recognition which compels them to utilise tradition in that culture and perform accordingly. What is important for the coming part of interaction between socio-cultural patterns and religious development is the entry of religion at the final stage of the above return to tradition for some recognition or cultural authority. In some cases, religion replaces the utilisation of tradition in the provision of identity. Education has also emerged as a new ontological and epistemological standard.

### **2.3. Socio-cultural patterns and sectarian discourse**

Sectarian discourse, as an aspect of religious development, has a potential relationship with socio-cultural patterns. Academically, a dichotomy or even a separation of religion from the society and culture is perceived as a fallacy. To separate religion from culture and conduct a comparison in western context is taken as a surprise. However, this question or to an extent a trend in which religion and socio-cultural patterns are dealt with separately, still, exist in South Asian context. This separation is not merely a discursive separation, but is real. There are various grounds of contest between socio-cultural patterns and religion. In the West, religion, to a dominant extent, has been infused in the socio-cultural trends but a segregation of socio-cultural and religion is evident in the societies like Pakistani. In this case a dichotomy of religion and social script or culture is maintained in the presence of rivalry of ontological ends. Both have different sets of defining the social realities. They have difference of opinion over a variety of issues. This difference starts with the nominations of time and places and extends into other intricate social phenomenon like social relations and ranks. Some examples are as follows.

Barelwīs, Deobandis and Shias represent Islamic religious traditions. All these sects follow a definite time schedule of the Islamic calendar and their various performances are deeply embedded in that division of time. On the other hand, a local calendar also exists which regulates the local events and ceremonies. In the case of district Jhang, the established sectarian traditions follow the Islamic calendar, but the local Sufi-spiritual activities are regulated based on local calendar.<sup>172</sup> The other difference is the status of social stratification. Theoretically, religion opposes the stratification, but it is a social reality. Religion guides to follow Quran and Sunnah but social script attracts the individual to it for the contextualisation and comprehension of a social act. This dichotomy also exists in the rival conception, procedures, codes, punishments and rewards in the judicial institutions of both religion and culture as ontological models.<sup>173</sup> This dichotomy is not only maintained by the traditional script but is also established by the popular social script as well. But per the following lines,

A ‘conversation between lovers’ runs along a different script from a ‘conversation of a teenager with her angry mother’, but conversations between lovers and between teenagers and their angry mothers occurring in the same place over the same time period tend to resemble one another.<sup>174</sup>

Thus, while living in shared social space religion and culture, as ontological models, interact with each other. This relation is relative and reflexive in its nature. It gives birth to variety of resultant patterns. This part of the chapter only focuses on the way in which both systems interact. The understanding of socio-cultural script will be borrowed from the above narrated detailed discussion of socio-cultural patterns. Whereas, religious content will be derived from the sectarian side.

Semiotic method includes both the synchronic and the diachronic study of signs-terms introduced by Saussure. The former refers to the study of signs at a given point in time, normally the present, and the latter to the

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<sup>172</sup> These are held in *Chait and wisākh* (March to May)

<sup>173</sup> Faisal Japa, *Jhang dī Sath*, (Jhang: Jhang Adbī Academy, 2002), 22

<sup>174</sup> Barbra Czarniawska, *Narratives in Social Sciences Research*, (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 4



study of how signs change, in form and meaning, over time. As a case in point, consider the word person.<sup>175</sup>

### **2.3.1. Interaction between socio-cultural and religious script**

Mysticism can be regarded as a main spiritual and traditional language of the local people. Being traditional is also evident from the fact that it coincides with the socio-cultural script. As mentioned in the preceding part, mystic activities at the Sufi shrines are still being regulated based on local standards of time. Most of the activities at the traditional shrines have more local content and forms than the Islamic content and forms. Sectarian development and modern canonised fiqh-based Islam, being a colonial product in South Asia, came to this part of Punjab, especially in Jhang at a later stage. Even, two sectarian denominations, Barelwīs and Deobandis came into existence in the second half of the twentieth century. The introduction of religious development in shape of established sectarian traditions held strong footing after the partition of India. It does not mean that this phenomenon was brought in and flourished by the migrants. Local population also took an enthusiastic part in its development.

To simplify the interaction of the socio-cultural script and religious development, concept of semiosphere is taken from the cultural semiotics.<sup>176</sup> This perspective gives the idea of existence of different symbol systems within a culture. Cultural semiotics deals with the competitive aspect of these symbol systems. Here one system is regarded as pure socio-cultural system of symbols which have been explored in the previous part and other system is identified as the sectarian segments of religion. It intends to find interactive positions between the both systems. This phenomenon is more common among the Barelwīs and Shia. They have utilised the socio-cultural tools and symbols at their best. At some points, it seems that they have entire adaptation in the culture. Use of music, for example, has been very common in the both sects.<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>175</sup> Marcel Denisi, *A Basic Textbook in Semiotics and Communication*, 9

<sup>176</sup> Gloria Withalm and Josef Wallmannsberger (eds.), "Basic Tasks of Cultural Semiotics: Signs of Power – Power of Signs," in *Essays in Honor of Jeff Bernard*, (Vienna: INST, 2004), 56-89.

<sup>177</sup> Music has been part of the local traditions for centuries. Both, Barelwīs and Shia had utilised music and this utilisation has exhibited itself in various spheres. *Qawwālī* is famously attached with the Sufi

Different sectarian traditions have reacted and reflected the influence of their interaction with social script and traditions. While doing so, religion went through various positions. At first, especially in this section, its penetration in cultural language is narrated. It describes the acquiring of socio-cultural language in the sectarian discourse. This is evident in the presence of discursivities. The foremost discursivity is regarding the status of women. In a, traditionally feudal, society the role of women is restricted but in case of masses and lower middle classes these restrictions are of different nature. For example, when a proverb narrates, '*anhāy nūn māwn masīt ich bahā ga'i*'. The mother in this phrase belongs to lower strata of society because masīt (mosque) going is a mass activity rather than an elite one. On the other hand, going towards the end of sectarian development, when a Shia dhākir, Sayyid Zarghām 'Abbas Shāh says, *Putar jāidād day wārith, dhī manjī dī wārith* (Son heirs property, daughters heir the funeral of parents), he mentions and focuses on the women from elite feudal class.<sup>178</sup> He simply affirms the traditional social deprivation of women from the ancestral property. The second example comes from the same domain. The tradition of inter-family marriage is also supported with the particular explanation of the issue of Kufw.<sup>179</sup>

Sectarian development also used the cultural frames of expressions to describe their own agenda. The '*Qaṣīdah*' and '*Na'at*' being respectively Shia and Sunni genre followed the patterns of local cultural songs. Na'at not only uses the structure of songs but in some respects, it also follows the gender role of songs and māhiyya as well. In the recitation of many *Na'ats* the lover of Prophet personifies himself as a woman. This is proved from the phrases like "*jāun gī ban kay Jaugan*" (I will go there in the guise of a yugi), "*Tatrī day raugān dā ilāj mithā madnī*" (Cure of all my grief is the attention of Prophet)

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and Barelwī thought. This genre can be entitled as a dominantly a Barelwī/sufi genre. The utility of music and its different aspects can be found at maximum in the case of shias. They not only used it but, in some cases, have attached some sectarian connotations with some musical instruments and musical tones and notes. Use of rag *Jūg* and *Mārū* are the prime examples. Most of the Shia Dhākirs while reciting the *Nauhā* or *marthiyya* use *Rāg Jūg* and *Bhairwīn* in the recitation. These *Rāgs* are supposed to create sadness in the environment. *Mārū* is a rāg which is completely attached with the '*Azādārī*' rituals. These aspects are still very popular.

<sup>178</sup> Naqvi, S.M.A, "*Dhākir -Zargham-Abbas-Shāh -Ḥaḍrat-Imām-Ḥussain shadat*", You Tube video, 50:00, Posted (June 2011) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S6nNy\\_11qE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S6nNy_11qE)

<sup>179</sup> Muḥammad Ḥussain, *Aṣlī Islām aur Rasmī Islām*, (Sargodha: Maktaba al-Sibtāin, 2012), 187-189

The earlier discussion regarding society and social composition suggests that people on becoming rich or prominent pose to claim respect and nobility by the change of their caste.

The Muslim social history of the Northern subcontinent is very interesting and revealing as it can be seen as an ongoing struggle of the middle caste Muslim individuals and groups to attain a social status within their communities that would be compatible with their newly earned economic status.<sup>180</sup>

Similarly,

Everyone wants to have, or make, or be considered as possessing cultural significance. No one knows what the social maps are any more, so it is more important not be left out, over-looked or misrepresented. Everyone wants a stake in action, though no one is quite sure where the party is.<sup>181</sup>

The significance of caste and change of caste is evident from the fact that even religious sphere is not an exception in this regard. The religious scholarship that spreads the message of equality of all human beings in Islam has to spread the message of equality by disguising themselves as nobles. There are many examples and many prominent scholars are blamed of changing their castes. Ṭāhir al-Qādirī claims to be Sayyāl. His neighbours told that he belonged to a family of Tarkhāns (carpenter).<sup>182</sup> Same is the case with Najafī. Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī is regarded as Muslim Shaikh by his opponents but he claims to be a jatt Dhakū.<sup>183</sup> This phenomenon can be understood by analogising the situation with the emergence of capitalist societies in Modern Europe. Fischer narrates five conjecturing factors of the capitalist society which clearly depict the negotiation of the material aspects of life.

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<sup>180</sup> Kamal, "The 'new land' in Punjab,"

<sup>181</sup> Barker, *Cultural Studies*, xix

<sup>182</sup> <http://www.urdubiography.com/politicians/tahir-ul-Qadir.html><http://pat.com.pk/english/tid/60/Autobiography-of-Dr-Muhammad-Tahir-ul-Qadir/>

<sup>183</sup> <http://www.Sibtain.com/en/Biography.aspx><https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XiHv6N3YmM4> (19:15 to 19:30)

Interestingly the discussion also includes the new religious necessities of such status groups.<sup>184</sup>

### 2.3.2 Sufism: Scriptural coexistence

As has been discussed above, spirituality has been the main language in which people have, for a long time, been seeking strength of soul and ways of salvation.<sup>185</sup> In district Jhang spirituality is flavoured with all the colours and tastes of Sufism. Shāh Jīwanā, Shāh Ismā‘īl, Shāh Daulat and *Nūrī Ḥaḍūrī* Gul Imām are the representatives of the Later Suhrāwardī order being the descendants of Makhdūm Jalāl al-Dīn Surkhpaush Bukhārī. Shāh ‘Abd al-Qādir Jilānī Thālith and Sulṭān Bāhū are the main names in the Qādirī order. Chishtiyya order is represented by the strong following of the Pīrs of Sayyāls sharīf. There are large number of other shrines which are either connected with one of the above-mentioned main schools of Sufism or are belonged to the smaller Sufi cults i.e. Nūr Shāh, Madāriyya order.<sup>186</sup> Naqshbandīs are being represented by Pīr Dhulfiqār Naqshbandī son of Allah Yār Naqshbandī. These traditions can be regarded as a buffering space which allows the interaction of religion with the local customs and traditions. They also, with the passage of time, have achieved real sectarian identities. Bukhārī Suhrāwardīs are identified as Shia, Qādirīs are only meant for Barelwīs and Chishtī is shared by both deobandis and Barelwīs. Naqshbandī order is dominantly Deobandi one. Let see how they have allowed the local traditions and customs.

‘Urs, marriage, is a popular tradition attached with the Sufi shrines. It is celebrated differently at different shrines. Shāh Jīwanā and some other Bukhārī shrines have introduced the local customs of marriage in the celebration of ‘Urs. The Spiritual heir of the shrine must perform some rituals that have a strong analogy with the rituals performed by the local groom and bride during the marriage. Like maidhī

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<sup>184</sup> Michael M. J. Fischer, “Culture and Cultural Analysis as Experimental Systems,” *Cultural Anthropology*, 2, no.1 (2007): 1–65.

<sup>185</sup> Quraishī, *Sar Zamīn-i-Jhang: āthār wa thaqāfat*, 23

<sup>186</sup> Zubairī, *Ta’rīkh-i-Jhang*, 438

His shrine is in the Northern peripheries of Jhang Saddar. Bilāl Zubairī (author of *Ta’rīkh-i-Jhang*) is of the view that Nūr Shāh had a prominent position in Jhang. He rebuilds the city after the floods during the reign of Akbar in sixteenth century.

they perform kīrī (isolation), like gharūlī (pitcher) they perform chakkī chūng and finally dīwā (elevation of light lamp) decide the future fate of the heir.<sup>187</sup>

Although Qādirīs are more Sharī‘a bound in this matter but still they have utilized the social script while explaining their message to their audiences. Sultān Bāhū used some proverbial terms and some social symbols in his poetry.

Ilm Parhyān ashrāf nā hauwin

(Knowledge can not bring nobility)

Jairhay haunday aṣal kamīnay hū.<sup>188</sup>

(For the original lowborn)

At some point, he criticises the maulwīs like

Jithay vaikhanr changā chaukhā

(When they see an extraordinary material return)

Uthay parhday kalām sawāi hū<sup>189</sup>

(They recite more enthusiastically)

Chishtīs in district Jhang have mostly remained under the influence of Pīrs of Sayyāls Sharīf. They fall between the Bukhāris and Qādirīs. They support music and the use of musical instruments to celebrate happiness.<sup>190</sup>

Another aspect of spirituality is the presence of women in the spiritual spheres. The most significant name in this regard is of the famous Hīr.<sup>191</sup> Bībī Rāstī, mother of

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<sup>187</sup> MuradAlijanjua, “‘urs Ḥaḍrat Shāh Jīwana Rasmay Chirāgh new.mp4”, You Tube Video, Posted (May 2012) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kv2hi7PTER8>

See also <http://www.dawn.com/news/408053/Shāh-Jūnā -annual-urs>

<sup>188</sup> Na‘īm Akhtar, *Kalām-i-Bāhū*, (Jhang: Jhang Adbī Academy, 2002), 9

*Ashrāf* and *Kammī* are social attributes for superior and inferior social groups respectively. As the study of proverbs suggested that people in Jhang are very much conscious of their being noble are inferior and do not allow a low born to adopt a respected identity. *Sūltān Bāhū* uses the socio-cultural terms to equate with the spiritual superiors and inferiors.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid, Sultān Bāhū adopts proverbial criticism on the *Mullās* and is of the view that their worship also depends upon the material benefit, they bear in their minds.

<sup>190</sup> *Sayyāl sharīf kay gaddī Nashīn kiya kah rahay hain*, Facebook, July 10, 2015 <https://www.facebook.com/akhtar.ch1/videos/vb.100000776535490/863660247003185/?type=2&theater>

Sulṭān Bāhū is also cherished as a female saint<sup>192</sup>. The shrine of Mā'i Chhaliyyān Wālī is also among the most visited shrines in the heart of city, Jhang.<sup>193</sup> Another name in this regard is Māi Turk, whose shrine is attached with a graveyard.<sup>194</sup> Again, the narrations attached with this female's sainthood strengthen the socio-cultural image of the woman. Here the social capital of a common woman is replaced with the spiritual capital.

### 2.3.3 Sectarian modes of scriptural reflexivity

In the theoretical section, while defining and explaining the social script, it was found that social scripting involves two processes. The one is the internalisation and the other is externalisation. Internalisation takes place through the interaction of different symbol system in one semiosphere. This interaction in this research occurred between the socio-cultural patterns and sectarian scripts. The externalisation of the interaction appeared in various shapes which can be comprehended in two categories based on the nature of externalisation.

- Inclusion of cultural aspect in the religious fold by religiously rationalising the culture
- Exclusion of the cultural aspects to purify the religion.

In the first case, religion accepts the social script as a source of defining the socio-religious or socio-sectarian reality. While in the second case religion rejected the socio-cultural patterns as a justification behind the religious acts.

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<sup>191</sup> Zubairī, *Ta'rikh-i-Jhang*, 107-109 Ta'rikh-i-Jhang narrates that Hīr was a spiritual figure and disciple of Sayyid Aḥmad Kabīr Thānī. He is of the view that Bahlūl Laudhī, Sulṭān of Laudhī Dynasty bestowed a Jāgīr to Hīr on the recommendation of Sayyid Aḥmad Kabīr Thānī.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid p 447

<sup>193</sup> Bilāl Zubairī, *Ta'rikh Auliyya-i-Jhang*, (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publishers, 1990), 29

The shrine of Mā'i chhaliyyān wālī is located in the center of Jhang Saddar. This shrine is famous for the cure of skin diseases. Audiences seek health by offering a Jhārū (duster) and a packet of salt.

<sup>194</sup> Quraishī, *Sar Zamīn-i-Jhang: āthār wa thaqāfat*, 53

Barelwīs and Shias are considered more inclusive in this regard. They borrow many aspects of the local social script in their performances. This borrowing is not merely a borrowing, but it is more an inclusion. Barelwīs being the custodians of the traditional spiritual traditions legitimised the socio-cultural adaptation. The celebration of ‘īd Milād al-Nabī and other sacred times is linked with socio-cultural ways of celebration i.e. music, dance and with the formation of *Pahārī* (a small reflection of mountain). Interestingly, Barelwīs inclusion of the social script is mostly borrowed from the customary traditions and literary lingual aspects. They include less proverbial aspects such as positivism. They criticise the recent establishments in society by equating them with salafī trends. This can also be regarded as a main reason for the shrinking boundaries of Barelwī Islam. The emerging segments of society equated Barelwī Islam with tradition. Rejections or modification of social tradition also led to certain changes in Barelwī demography in the District.

The second example of inclusion is the celebration of Muḥarram rituals by the Shia sect. They mix the socio-cultural traditions of marriage and death and use these rituals to celebrate the grief of Family of Prophet. Celebration of *mihindī* of Amīr Qāsim in Shab-i-‘Āshūr (10<sup>th</sup> night of Muḥarram) is the most performed ritual in Shia sect. Same is the case with the models of funerals of Imāms and building of models of Shrines in Karbalā and Najaf is common. However, this cannot be generalised for the whole Shia community as there exist some segments which deny this inclusion and are determined to purify Islam from such cultural scripting.

These two trends have created certain changes in the formats of the established sects that needs a new insight to properly identify the emerging trends out of traditions. It is the domain where some Sunnis becomes *Mawālī* (Shia term)<sup>195</sup> and some Shias become Wahhābī (pure sunī term).<sup>196</sup> Therefore, culture, by being the subject and object of study compels the sectarian discourse to adopt some emerging prominent shapes. It means it has acquired a requisite potential to drive sectarian/religious developments in set ways.

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<sup>195</sup> *Qalandarī* cult is a recent development. It is very much popular in the Barelwī circle especially at urban centers. This trend is more inclined towards shi‘ism. This will be described in the following section in detail.

<sup>196</sup> Shias, who reject the socio-cultural orientation of the religious traditions.

## 2.4 Impact of socio-cultural patterns on sectarian discourse

The above section described the relation between religious development and socio-cultural patterns by conducting a three-dimensional narration. It observed the semiotic interaction of the two spheres in the initial stage of interaction, at the places of co-existence and in a reflexive experience. All these levels and ways of interaction resulted in the emergence of certain sectarian patterns. Below are described these resultant trends in sectarian discourse.

### 2.4.1. De-construction of religious space and time

Muslim societies contain some religious spaces i.e. mosque, shrine and Imām bārgāh. These places do not work independent of time. Various sacred times are attached to these places for the performance of religious practices. Mosques are enjoined with the daily five times of prayers. Dates of birth and the demise of the Prophet along with different saints are attached with the shrines. The negotiation of time and space in a set manner also shows the sectarian differences.<sup>197</sup> The clash of time also leads towards sectarian ends.<sup>198</sup>

Proverbs no. xii, xiii and xiv describe the cultural relativity attached with the concepts of time and space. A shift has been observed in this domain as well. Punjab, in general, and particularly District Jhang witnessed the celebration of an 'īd Milād al-Nabī by making 'pahārīs' in the streets and road of the city.<sup>199</sup> Seemingly, this tradition has appeared to die amidst of the severe sectarian clashes of mid 1990s. Most of the celebrations regarding the birth of Prophet are now shifted to the pure sacred spaces like mosques and shrines. It shows a shift of a sacred time from a

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<sup>197</sup> *Sunni* space invites the Muslims five times a day through ādhān on the other hand Shia mosque calls for the prayer only thrice a day.

<sup>198</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> of Muḥarram is the day celebrated with grief among the shias and Sunni to commemorate the tragedy of Karbalā. The same day is celebrated as 'urs of Imām Ḥussain at the *Darbār Sulṭān Bāhū* with some festivities. This leads to a sectarian divide and it is just because of it that most of the Shia community of the neighboring area does not visit the shrine of Sulṭān Bāhū.

Hanif, Waseem, *Urs of Imām Ḥussain (A.S) at Sulṭān Bāhū (R.A.) Darbaar - 8th Muḥarram 2013*, You Tube video, 01:47:49, Posted (November 2013) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-Oydk0f4Ow>

<sup>199</sup> *Pahārīs* (image of mountain) were made in the streets and were decorated with many toys to celebrate the event of birth of Prophet. Music was also played to attract the audiences. See Ḥussain, Bilāl, "12 rabi ul awal Pahari", You Tube video, 20:57, Posted (February 2012) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=on4GvAxzc0k>



neutral space to a sacred space. The Shia sect celebrates the birthdays of Imāms (Ithnā ‘Asharīs). These celebrations have been confined to set dates and places. For example, the 13<sup>th</sup> of Rajab has been celebrated in the Imām bārgāh as the birthday of ‘Alī. A new trend has emerged in Jhang regarding the celebration of this day by organising tent pegging and a horse dance<sup>200</sup> especially in the villages. In this case a neutral and liberal space is challenging not only the religious space but also the sacred content and structure by utilising the sacred time. It clearly shows that the concepts of the sacred time and space are being reconstructed.

#### 2.4.2. Expansion and contraction of sectarian boundaries

The second main impact is the numerical changes in the sectarian boundaries. Historically, much of the population belonged to the traditional Barelwī sect. Sufism has been the order of the day for decades. In the wake of new socio-cultural adjustment and religious development this sect shrunk. At one extreme were the Shias with whom it had cherished the memories of collective participation in the shrine rituals and celebrations of Muḥarram. It is evident from the fact that the main event of ‘Āshūrā, a Shia ritual, starts with a Ta‘ziyya procession and the license of this procession is issued in the name of a Barelwī Sunni. The Sunnis active participation in Shi‘ite celebrations of Muḥarram is evident. A further bond with Shias was the *Pīrs*, who in some cases were Shia.<sup>201</sup> In this case, the foremost example is the sayyid *Pīrs* of Shāh Jīwanā. They have a bulk of spiritual following from the Barelwī Sunnis. This ‘following’ is not restricted to the boundaries of district Jhang but is found in neighbouring Districts as well.<sup>202</sup> Similarly, *Pīrs* of Shair Shāh of Multan have a vast murīdīn (followers) in Jhang and majority of these followers belong to Sunni Barelwī

<sup>200</sup> This tradition was introduced by Ghulām ‘Abbās Surbāna, a landlord. Latter it got popular in other Shia landlords as well. Following is the video link of Horse dance performance on 13 Rajab at Mauḍā ‘Pātūana, a village in the northwestern peripheries of Jhang city. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gIKU7QyKLxA>

<sup>201</sup> Quraishī, *Sar Zamīn-i-Jhang: āthār wa thaqāfat*, 23-50

Bukhārī *Pīrs* of Shāh Jīwanā have a considerable following of the Sunni followers. These followers belong to the Bharwāna Sayyāls, Purbāna Sayyāls and Balauch castes. Many people from Quraishī, Khaukhars, Sayyāls and some menial groups adhere the spiritual leadership of *Pīrs* of Shair Shāh from Multan. See, Gazetteer of the Jhang District (1883-84), 51

<sup>202</sup> Interview with Tāriq Purbāna, August 2014

Sect. They include Khaukhars of Pīrū Bhairū, Pātūana of Bulhā Pātūana, and many other castes.

It was the sunī school of thought (Deobandis and Salafīs) with whom they had common fiqh and shared denomination.<sup>203</sup> This situation led to the decrease in the numerical strength of the Barelwīs, resulting in the increasing following of Shia and Deobandis. Many people transformed their sects and entered into Shia or Deobandis folds. Shaikh Muḥammad Ḥākim, former provincial minister of Fisheries and one of the founding members of Anjuman Sipāh Ṣaḥāba expressed that his grandfather was a Barelwī but with the grace of God, He exclaimed, Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī showed us the right path, Deobandism.<sup>204</sup> Similar trends can be found in the Gujjar, Shaikh and Kumhār castes living at the urban centres of the District Jhang. Transformation from Barelwī to Shia sect also contains numerous examples. Majority of ‘Aliyāna, Bhūrāna, Ladhyāna, Sargāna sub-castes of Sayyāls and other caste groups like Khaukhar, Gilānī Sayyids and Wains converted to Shia sect during last thirty years.<sup>205</sup>

It occurred in the wake of new social adjustments i.e. the arrival of Muslim migrants from India along with the emerging business activities which produced new social groups in the urban centres.<sup>206</sup> A new social group emerged in the rural areas where feudalism has fallen prey to the two consecutive land reforms.<sup>207</sup> The folk wisdom and the local cultural traditions were insufficient to recognise the new developments and give them proper respectable identities.<sup>208</sup> Barelwīsm had long been surviving with the socio-cultural setup but with changing social compositions and defending the traditional and existing cultural value it had to face an outflow.

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<sup>203</sup> Abou Zahab, “The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Jhang,” 170

<sup>204</sup> Interview with Shaikh Ḥākim ‘Alī, September 2016

<sup>205</sup> Field observation

<sup>206</sup> Zubairī, *Ta’rīkh-i-Jhang*, 123-24

<sup>207</sup> The land reforms established a new social group, which benefitted from the distribution of land. Majority of these people were from the Jatt social ranks i.e. *Mangan* clan from Tehsil shorkot, Sanpāl and ‘Alī khanāna from Tehsil Jhang. Source revenue records

<sup>208</sup> Michael M. J. Fischer, states that protestant faith got popular because it gave social and religious identity to the emerging urban middle classes.

Culturally only two classes were identified, one that bears respect and others who are inferior. These inferiors include both Jatt and menials. The emerging social group, especially jatt after the downfall of feudalism could not find a respectable place in folk wisdom and other customary traditions.

### 2.4.3. Neo-sectarian developments

The third significant impact of the interaction of religion with culture is the emergence of neo-sectarian trends. These neo-sectarian trends can be rightly observed under the light of concept of popular culture. As described in the former debate that a popular culture is a material and historical phenomenon irrespective of the fact whether it abides by the tradition or not. This is the space where high culture and shared meanings are negotiated to be silenced in favour of an immediate social consensus. One can be justified in believing that as the entire social phenomenon contains established cultural roots, popular culture is based more on immediate social trend than a long-established cultural reality. From a performative aspect, the social performance based on coming under the boundary of popular culture is not highly contextualised in history but more in the existing social, political and economic dynamics. In the sectarian discourse these trends are intra sectarian developments which are developed in the presence of reflexivity in the sectarian discourse. It occurs with the give and take relationship among the sects while sharing a social space but when it emerges, it acquires a religious position. Following are the main examples of these neo-sectarian developments.

#### 2.4.3.1. Barelwī-Shia

This is an emerging trend in the Shia and Barelwī sects. It emerged after the decline in the militant sectarianism. It confronts the established and traditional sectarian structure and boundaries and seeks salvation and spiritual comforts by performing some cultural rituals like *Dhamāl*.<sup>209</sup> They focus more on the spiritual aspects. It is necessary here to mention that although the spiritual aspect makes them closer to the Sufism, they cannot yet be denoted as Sufis as per the traditional definitions and orientations of Sufism. It would be also true to say that this trend does not have a homogeneous shape. They even do not have a proper understanding of the established and traditional Sufi orders. The institutional spaces where this trend exists can be identified as the so-called current institution of *pīr*, which shares a cultural

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<sup>209</sup> Dhākir 5tan, “Shia Youth Jhang Sadar jashan 3 Shiban 2016”, You Tube video, 10:09, Posted (May 2016) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNKaUGAXb7E>

This video contains a *Dhūl* and *Dhamāl* performance. Red flag can be seen in the background. Red *Qalandarī* flag can be regarded as a compromise between green Barelwī and black Shia flags.

identity with an ‘āmil as well and at geographical spaces like the shrines of some Madārī Sufis. Although they claim to be Sufi, they also utilise the titles of the various Sufi orders and still their status as Sufi is doubted. Four main Sufi orders of Sufism, Chishtiyya, Suhrawardiyya, Qādiriyya and Naqshbandiyya, have well organised and well identified structures in Jhang. Mawālīs are denied places in the traditional Sufi orders since their being popular in the light of above-mentioned debate about popular culture. The ‘āmil and pīrs in this trend use the institutions and symbols of established Sufism like *marāqibā*, *chillā* and *ta’wīz* but their connotations make the differences. *Mawālī* ‘āmil recommends these for the worldly purposes to his attendees while all this mean for a divine access in the traditional Sufism. This is another aspect that differentiates is the institution of *hisāb* (spiritual calculation), which conceptually is closer to the *Kundālī* (predictive calculation) of Hindus. They normally abstract the knowledge from the *Jantarīs*.<sup>210</sup> In case of Shia segment of this neo sectarian development they insist on the practices like *mātam*. This also brought forward the personality of Shahbāz Qalandar. This cult considers him being at the apex of all spiritual standards and real heir of spiritual lineage after ‘Alī. The slogan of Qalandar is introduced by this cult in religious performances like *majlis* and *Milād*.<sup>211</sup> Another semiotic appearance of this neo sectarian development is the introduction of red flag. Shias elevate ‘*alam* (black flag) on the roof tops as a marker of Shia identity and to avoid bad omens and ensure protection and prosperity. Barelwī use the green colour as their symbol. Qalandarī red flag can said to be as a point of negotiation between the Shia red and Barelwī green<sup>212</sup>. This also gave rise to some neo-spiritual personalities who could not find any space in the established sufi/spiritual traditions.<sup>213</sup> Organising Shām-i-Qalandar<sup>214</sup> and paying an annual visit in the month of Sha‘bān to the shrine

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<sup>210</sup> *Imāmiyya Jantrī* is consulted by most of the Shias and Barelwī.

<sup>211</sup> *Baulu Baulu Sakhī Lā ‘l Qalandar Mast*.

<sup>212</sup> Traditional Barelwī rejects the red flag on the basis of its resemblance with the Shia ‘*Alam* on the other hand traditional Shia rejects it by blaming it of an intrigue against the Shia purity.

<sup>213</sup> Interview with Makhdūm Hāmid Raḍā, Sajādā Nashīn, Darbār Shair Shāh

These personalities are fake and have nothing to do with sufism and spirituality. They, after being failed to have a place in established sufi orders, have established such cults which are not only repugnant to religion but also contrast with Sufism. Makhdūm Hāmid Raḍā, Sajādā Nashīn, Darbār Shair Shāh

<sup>214</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mx82Yif77Og> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rZK-FbMjxgY> This video contain the clips from a celebration of Shām-i-Qalander with a clear mixture of Shia-sunni audiences. In the first link the person addressing the ceremony is Shaikh Nawāz Akram s/o

of Shahbāz Qalandar in Sehwan, Sind is practiced religiously. The identity of this trend is also popular based on being popular among the masses. There is a very little space left by the 'have nots' for the haves.

#### 2.4.3.2. Deo-Barelwīyat

This neo-sectarian development emerged in the Barelwī sect. A considerable number of followers of Barelwī school of thought tended to understand Islam by following the Deobandi ideals. They urged to distance themselves from the Shia with whom they are often confused. In securing their Sunni identity they adopted Deobandi ways of understanding. This is not an altogether a one-way traffic of Barelwī to adopt some Deobandi colours but a response from the other side is also significant in this regard. This response and the conjunction between these two sects institutionalise at some spaces. These spaces are not an immediate availability but are historical in nature. The issue with these has been the marginalisation of these. These are the Sufi orders and some puritan socio-political platform with a religious outlook. These two points, among others of this kind, are more significant. To positively locate the trend and justify its status as a neo-sectarian development, it needs to describe some ideological trends and people attached with them. Below is example of an institution and some personalities, who have been the part of this institution. This example clearly describes how this trend emerged.

This is about Jāmi‘a Muḥammadī Sharīf situated near Jāmi‘a ‘ābād, Chiniot.<sup>215</sup> Jāmi‘a ‘arbiyya Muḥammadī was inaugurated on May 14, 1933. It was established by a Barelwī scholar Maulānā Muḥammad Dhākir, a graduate from Dār al-‘ulūm Deoband. Later he was accompanied by his younger brother Muḥammad Nafa‘. It is important to ponder that what compelled a person who brought up in a Barelwī surroundings, was enunciated with Khawājā Ḍīā al-Dīn Sayyālwi of Sayyāl Sharīf, a Chishtī Nizāmī sufi, to attend Dār al-‘ulūm Deoband. According to the sources Ḍīā al-Dīn Sayyālwi himself visited the Dār al-‘ulūm Deoband. Then after coming back from Deoband, Maulānā Dhākir established above mentioned institution and led a social, educational, religious and political reform Movement. His principle stand was

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Shaikh Muḥammad Akram (MNA). He belongs to Sunni sect. He is accompanied with Wājīd Shāh, a Shia figure from Gilānī Sādāt.

<sup>215</sup> Details obtained from *Dhikr al-Dhākir* of Sa‘ad Ullāh.

against the cultural innovations in the religious domain and against the socio-political hegemony of the Shia feudalism. He was very successful in this regard and politically ousted the symbols of political strength from the Sayyids of Rajū‘a and Shāh Jīwanā. He defeated them in the elections and paved way for the involvement of Sunni peasants and emerging middle classes in the politics. It is said that Ḥaq Nawāz, the founder of Sipāh Ṣaḥāba, did nothing except monopolising the movement of Muḥammadī Sharīf. Muḥammad Dhākir was leading the institution against the Shia feudals and his younger brother Muḥammad Nafa‘ was doing the same job at the level of sectarian discourse. He was making easy for the local Sunni people to locate and identify the Rāfḍīs to keep themselves at a distance from them. His critical approach towards the Barelwī’s inclination towards family of prophet and his puritan aspect of Sufism made him at a distance from the rest of Barelwī school of thought. His nephew Maulānā Raḥmat Ullāh forbade his followers to offer prayer behind Muḥammad Nafa‘ because he seized to be a Barelwī Sunni.<sup>216</sup>

#### 2.4.3.3. Wahhābī-Shia

The term is derived based on methodology and approach some Shias scholars use in the juridification of cultural aspect in the religious or sectarian practices. Firstly, this cult is critically against Sufism and the cultural aspects in the religion. They consider Sufism as devoid of basic Islamic principles. Furthermore, their criticism and rejection of Sufism is not due to the cultural content of the Sufism which includes *langar* (food distribution), *dhamāl* (sufi dance), and practices like *chillā* (a ritual of forty days) but they exclude Sufism at the level of principles and teachings. Their core critic revolves around the debate that in the presence of Imāmat, there is no need of a parallel tradition of guidance like Sufism.<sup>217</sup> They also accuse Sufism of corrupting the religion by including the ideas like, *ḥalūl*, *wajad*, *fanā* and *baqā*.<sup>218</sup> It is interesting

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<sup>216</sup>Maulānā Raḥmat Ullāh s/o Maulānā Muḥammad Dhākir and nephew of Muḥammad Nafa‘, also a member of the provincial assembly asked his followers to abstain from offering prayer before his uncle Nafa‘ due to latter’s deviation from the Barelwī sect. Narrated by Dhulqarnain Chadhar, a representative of Muḥammadī group, under the leadership of Maulānā Raḥmat Ullāh.

<sup>217</sup> M. Ḥasan Ja‘frī, *Taṣawwuf aur Tashī‘ main farq*, (Karachi: Majma‘ ‘ālmī Islāmī, 2008), 315

<sup>218</sup>Ibid, 317

to note that this group even rejects *ʿirfan* as a source of getting guidance which was introduced by Imām Khumainī to replace Sufism.<sup>219</sup>

The second aspect of their being Wahhābī is evident from their criticism to the local customs and traditions. This group and specially the leading figure Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī criticise the culture by examining its lingual, customary and popular aspects. Lingual section of the culture is criticised based on its roots which are laid by the social consensus instead of Quran and Sharīʿa.<sup>220</sup> The customary part attracts their critics on being extravagant and full of socio-cultural formalities. Popular culture comes, in their eye, in the category of absolute innovation (*bidʿat*). They are of the view that religion should be totally reformed of all these cultural additions and evils.

The main issue which strengthens the title of Wahhābī to this Shia group is their attitude towards the socio-cultural expression of Shiʿism in Jhang. Shiʿism, in practice, contains a huge amount of cultural content in district Jhang. Najafī categorise most of the cultural elements attached with *ʿazādārī* as *bidʿat*. He is not only critical of the way *Taʿziyya*, *dhuljinnāh* and *mihindī* traditions are observed but, at the same time, also denies the commencement of religious gathering by blaming them of non-Islamic nature. He rejects the romanticising of history in the shape of poetry and prose and is of the view that it allows lies and misinterpretations and misunderstandings. In Punjab, the Shia Dhākirīn and religious scholars fix the cash money for the deliverance of speech. Some dhākirīn and scholars even demand near 70,000 PKR for the one hour. Najafī issued a decree against the fixation of price for religious lectures and oral performance.<sup>221</sup> From that day onward he is the victim of abuse on the part of majority of dhākirīn. In fact, the title of Wahhābī was used for the first time by the dhākirīn for him.<sup>222</sup>

Wahhābī Shias consider these as *bidʿat* (Bad Innovation). They are also very much vocal against the local custom regarding the marriage and right of inheritance of

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<sup>219</sup> Muḥammad Ḥussain, *Aqāmā al-Burhān ʿalā Baṭlān al-Taṣawwuf wa al-ʿirfān*, (Sargodha: Maktaba al-Sibṭain, 1999), 56

<sup>220</sup> Muḥammad Ḥussain, *Iṣlāh al-Rasūm al-Zāhirā bā Kalām al-Iṭrat al-Tāhirā*, (Sargodha: Maktaba al-Sibṭain, 1999), 42

<sup>221</sup> Ibid, 142

<sup>222</sup> *ʿDhakkū pay laʿnat* has become a trend in Shia majālis. He is accused because of his stance against the cultural aspects of *ʿAzādārī* against his position on prevalent and traditional Shia historiography and against his decree; he issued in opposition to Dhākirīn for their cash payments.

the woman. As discussed previously, many local traditions of marriage and death have made their way into the mourning celebrations of Muḥarram. This group considers this as a grave sin. Their numerical strength is growing day by day.<sup>223</sup> The leading figure of this cult is Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī, who himself belongs to Sargodha district but has a significant and considerable following in Jhang.

#### 2.4.3.4. Salafī-deobandi

Many people could not differentiate between the Wahhābīs and Deobandis. It is a cultural conception in Jhang that the terms Wahhābī and Deobandi are similar and can be applied to the Sunnis who are against the spiritual aspects of religion and criticise the Sufism. They are also equally identified on behalf of their exclusive behaviour towards Shias.<sup>224</sup> For a common Shia and Barelwī, culturally, there is no difference between a Deobandi and Wahhābī. Although as is evident from the history and principle stands both sects are clearly segregated and separated from each other. There is still a considerable majority of the local people who do not know that Deobandis also have some Sufi traditions and there are many Deobandis who are enunciated into various Sufi orders. There is still confusion whether Pīr Dhulfiqār Naqshabandī is a Deobandi or Barelwī<sup>225</sup>. Jāmi‘a Masjid ‘Uthmāniyya and its connections with Rāy Pūrī Sufi order is also hidden from the sight of the common people.<sup>226</sup> People, normally, have only one identification of Deobandi which was

<sup>223</sup> His followers are increasing specially in the South-western parts of the District. Balauch from Islāmwalā, Satt kautā and Kaut Bahādar, Quraishīs of Ḥasū Bulail, Rajbāna Sayyāls froms Mad Rajbāna and Sayyids from Saiwā Sādāt are among the leading followers. All of these are from the emerging social groups who have emerged after the downfall of feudal lords of Garh Mahārājā and Jā‘i wain.

<sup>224</sup> Intsam Ilāhī Ṣahīr and Ḥaq Nawāz were perceived from one group.

<sup>225</sup> Pīr Dhulfiqār Naqshbandī born on April 1, 1953 in a Kharal family in Jhang. He got both religious and formal education parralarly. He was enunciated at the hands of Sayyid Zawār Ḥussain before getting admission at Engineering University Lahore. After the demise of Sayyid Zawār Ḥussain, he was enunciated at the hands of Murshid ‘Alam. He is nowadays head of Naqshbandiyya Mujaddadiyya Jamā‘at in Paksitan and has a considerable following in approximately sevently countries on the globe. He has allowed his caliphship to reach more than 130 people. His seminary, Dār al-‘ulūm Ma‘ahad al-Faqīr, is situated in the south eastern periferies of Jhang Saddar.

<sup>226</sup> A seminary being run by the Maulānā Dr. Muḥammad Nāṣir, a teacher at Government College Jhang. He leads Jum‘ā prayer in the Jāmi‘a mosque adjacent with the seminary. He is enunciated in the Rāy Pūrī order. This seminary has remained aloof of all the sectarianism concepts. They, in some respect, are critical to their own school of thought and demand some socio-political reforms to meet the needs of hour.



defined by ASSP. They do not know that this trend is basically an offshoot of Deobandi school of thought. They reject the cultural aspects as well as reject the main Sufi principles.<sup>227</sup> They, for the first time, introduced a new cult in sectarian discourse who paid utmost importance to Ṣaḥāba (companions of Prophet). They demand excommunication of Barelwīs and Shias based on Shias hatred for some companions and early caliphs of Islam and Barelwī's inclination towards cultural aspects.<sup>228</sup> This is also called a Jhangwī cult, after the name of Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī, in the Deobandi sect. They earned name at international level in the wake of sectarianism in Pakistan in late eighties and early nineties.

## 2.5. Summary

The whole discussion of this chapter was the defining and locating the culture as a depository of shared meanings that is consulted and applied by the members of society. The initial discussion concluded that these shared meanings are embedded in particular scripts and these scripts can be socially found in shape of linguistic corpus (folk wisdom). Furthermore, found in some functional social realities like customs and the social hierarchies. The descriptive analysis of the depositories of social script exhibited many new aspects and hinted that there are certain cultural confusions in society and these confusions have emerged due to two main reasons. The first reason is the remarkable and continuous social change and inadequacy of the existing script to meet the needs of all the members of society. The second reason lies in the fact that the traditional and indigenous script is also facing a significant challenge by the introduction of a range of 'foreign' scripts. The interaction of these socio-cultural changes and scripts is not a simple phenomenon which leaves uniform patterns but is complex and leaves behind plethora of interactive possibilities. This interaction contains all possible results and sometime also creates a sphere (popular culture) which does not belong to the rival scripts altogether but is accepted temporarily.

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<sup>227</sup> Tariq, Ahmad, "Maulānā Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī Shāh īd Shān e Awlīā awr Wasīlā Ki Haqīqat Parts of ALLAH Kon", YouTube video, 06:30, Posted (December 2013) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-j8\\_ZmGvc](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-j8_ZmGvc)

<sup>228</sup> Ilyās, *Amīr-i- 'Azīmat: Maulānā Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī*, 39

The first reason mentioned above is the inadequacy of the existing cultural scripts to meet the needs of emerging social changes. These social changes can be regarded as the downfall of feudalism and emergence of new middle classes. As mentioned, also, in the initial pages that the traditional part of culture mostly dealt with a society which was divided into some clear divisions of 'haves' and 'have nots'. Thus, this was embedded in the culture but culture as a depository of social meanings could not immediately accommodate the emerging social stratification. On a second level this issue can be linked with the post colonialism which resulted in the partition of India and a large-scale migration across the borders. District Jhang inhabited many migrants from different parts of India with different social backgrounds, and so these 'muhājirs' brought with them the diversity of scripts.

It can be assumed from the above discussion that a natural socio-cultural script development is undergoing and in the wake of diversity of interaction and outcomes it is exhibiting itself in a confusing and divisive manner but it can lead to some uniform ways in which the development of a harmonious script in future may occur.

The sectarian development is also a social issue and it followed the same pattern of social and cultural development and witnessed the emergence of some new trends. In some cases, it displayed very violent interpretations of the religion. It can be hoped that by monitoring the sectarian development just like the rest of issues of social development it can also lead to some peace and harmony. Meanwhile this diversity of neo-sectarian development can be taken as a positive trend that challenges the inertia. This argument can also be supported by a historical fact that even the 'tradition', both in pure religion and in general, as a socio-cultural reality once emerged in a social manner has replaced the 'then' tradition. Therefore, this development is never static and continuously moves forward.

**Oral Sectarian Performances: Ontological Reciprocity****3.1. Introduction**

The previous chapter explained the socio-cultural basis of sectarian development and established that the major sectarian development and trends are subject to social transformations that occurred in the post-colonial Punjab. It focused on two major developments i.e. migration of Muslims to Pakistan after the partition of the Indian Subcontinent and the emergence of the middle classes after the two successive land reforms in Punjab.<sup>229</sup> These developments led towards significant alterations in cultural patterns and during these cultural re-settings and adjustments, a new form of sectarianity emerged. The proceeding violence can be traced as a form of cultural frustration coming out of social adjustments. The present chapter tends to examine and analyse the sectarian orality. After establishing an explanatory note, justifying orality as a major medium of expression in the society and affirming its inclusion in this research it proceeds to build a conceptual frame for the study by fusing the concepts of social performance, oral tradition, and social script. The established framework is applied to the specific oral expression by the speakers of rival sects. It tends to explain the structural impacts of the sectarian development in a complex society.

The present chapter elaborates on the oral traditions in the sectarian discourse. Orality has been considered the most vivid and primary expression which a culture adopts to manifest it.<sup>230</sup> Social interaction that generates culture is dominantly/primarily an oral one.<sup>231</sup> Text and writing followed orality. It is the foremost depository of human knowledge which is, then, preserved in the shape of

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<sup>229</sup> Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan*, 48-53

<sup>230</sup> Walter J. Ong, "Orality, Literacy, and Medieval Textualization," *New Literary History*, 16, no. 1 (1984): 1-12

<sup>231</sup> Ibid

text and other mediums. So, oral expression is the primary medium for the presentation of individual's social situation. Sectarian discourse also involves oral traditions in the shape of various performances. Orality provides both, a medium of performance and diversity of expression in the sectarian discourses. Diversity of oral tradition in the sectarian discourse is one of the significant phenomena. *Khiṭāb*, *bayān*, *majlis*, *Milād*, *qaṣīdah*, *naʿat* and *nauḥā* are different kinds in which orality becomes an integral part of sectarian discourse.<sup>232</sup> Each of the above-mentioned genre has a specific structure of its performance. Some of them are commonly used by the different sects and the rest are specific with particular sects. These can be contextualised in the same way but their performance and way of cultural extension to the audience would be different. They also need certain spaces for their presentation. Their content changes with the change of place and the immediate audience. Their presence in the society and their relationship with the culture is an important aspect to be explored. It would be interesting to know that how they utilise and at the same time affect the culture in which they flourish.

The exploration of oral traditions in the sectarian discourse also needs elaboration of some theoretical concepts based on the research being conducted. This chapter includes theoretical insights into the concepts of oral/social performance, cultural script and the examination of some sectarian oral performances in Jhang in the light of above-mentioned concepts.

### **3.1.1. Conceptualising oral performance**

This section strives to challenge the established trend regarding sectarian development by investigating its socio-cultural basis. It argues, in the light of available material and personal initial findings, that the sectarian boundaries, which are generally supposed to be absolute, are going through a continuous change in the presence of relativity and reflexivity. This reflexive and relative nature of the issue is largely due to the social complexities. Secondly, sectarianism has only been perceived as a dividend factor but in a multi-society it also brings the rival approaches close to one another. To investigate the validity of the argument this study conducts the

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<sup>232</sup>Different denominations of sectarian oral performances which are based on the style of narration and recitation.

performative analysis of the oral traditions in the sectarian discourse. This theoretical angle blends structural analysis and hermeneutics<sup>233</sup> which helps in the development of the methodological operation. This blend gives a wholesome picture of the issue being investigated. This notion of social performance has been borrowed from the work of Jeffrey C. Alexander who defines the cultural performance as...

Cultural performance is the social process by which actors, individually or in concert, display for others the meaning of their social situation. This meaning may or may not be one to which they themselves subjectively adhere; it is the meaning that they, as social actors, consciously or unconsciously wish to have others believe.<sup>234</sup>

Two important points are to be explained in greater detail, 'social situation' and 'meanings'. Conveyed meanings are more significant in the determination of study than the actual situation because this 'generated' meaning constitutes the 'social' rather than the social situation itself. One can infer that the sect, sectarianism and sectarian development exist more in the sphere of meaning than 'situation'. It also conveys that even a religious situation can be regarded as secular, determined by the meaning it generates and, at the same time, a neutral situation can generate a sectarian meaning. The process by which the social situations can display and convey their meanings, at first, consults the background representations (structures of narratives, symbols etc.). Then a scene is created for an appropriate representation of the meaning through symbolic action that is to be conveyed to the audiences. While doing so, an actor is aware of the socio-political and economic factors either by accommodating them or just by refraining from acting on them.<sup>235</sup>

How actors procedurally display the meanings of their social situations is not only explained by the Alexander, but Mabel Berezin also throws lights while reviewing the concept. He is of the view that a performer takes from the society

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<sup>233</sup> Mabel Berezin, "review of Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual, edited by Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen and Jason L. Mast," *American Journal of Sociology*, 116, no. 1 (2010): 273 -275

<sup>234</sup> Alexander, "Cultural pragmatics: social performance between ritual and strategy," 29-91

<sup>235</sup> Ibid

(consisted of de-fused realities) some realities (background representations and social structure) and by refusing them, displays and conveys the meanings of his or her social situation. Furthermore, the level of success of any performance is gauged by the intensity of its social and political resonance.<sup>236</sup> Jonathan H. Turner links the success of the social performance with the generation of emotional arousal and psychological identification.<sup>237</sup> Alexander further describes the basic elements of a cultural performance includes the actor, audience or observer, a means of symbolic action, *Mise-en-scène* and social power.<sup>238</sup> He views that in a social action or performance, a performer implies both historically structured and popular techniques. The prime intention of the performer remains on the re-fusion of the previously mentioned elements in a way that could serve the purpose of conveyance of a set message by him to the audience. He explains in detail the level of success or failure of the performance. In the present research, it must be declared that it does not intend to approve or disapprove the authenticity or success of a performance but only focusses its attention on the description of variabilities in sectarian performances in a multi-society. These variabilities accelerate the process of alteration in the sectarian boundaries. As mentioned above, it will focus more on co-sharing and structural borrowings rather than gauging the success or the failures of performances. It does not mean that a question of success or failure does not emerge. It appears but at a later stage in the study of this research.

A sect, as a meaning of a social situation establishes itself by several mediums. It is performed through various mediums in a society. Although this so-called ‘sectarian’ performance is very much structural<sup>239</sup> yet, in its essence, still in complex societies a continuous process of de-fusions and re-fusions is at full swing. It is here when structures are reconstructed, and contextualisation falls a pray to detachability<sup>240</sup>.

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<sup>236</sup> Mabel Berezin, “review of Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual,”

<sup>237</sup> Jonathan H. Turner, “review of Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual, edited by Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, and Jason L. Mast,” *Social Forces*, 87, no. 3 (March, 2009):1695- 1697

<sup>238</sup> Alexander, “Cultural pragmatics: social performance between ritual and strategy,” 29-91

<sup>239</sup> An example of a sectarian performance can be ‘*Tahrīk Nifādh Fiqh Ja’fariyya* founded with the absolute aim of implementation of Shi‘ite laws in Pakistan. Owing to the critic in complex Pakistani society it transformed itself in *Tahrīk Fiqh Ja’fariyya* by exempting *Nifādh* (implementation).

<sup>240</sup> Karin Barber, “Text and Performance in Africa,” *Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies*, 66, no. 3 (2003): 324-333

Structures become reflexive and this reflexivity gives birth to certain inclusions and exclusions in a pragmatic way. It does not mean that different structures completely unite.

They are just de-fused and their re-fusion occurs in discursive manner. This discursivity also involves legitimacy and power to re-structuralise the ‘social’ or ‘sectarian’. As the current chapter deals with the generation of the ‘sectarian’ by the processing of the ‘situations’ through the medium of orality so, at first it is necessary to explore how orality, as a medium exists in District Jhang. The next part contains a brief description of orality in Jhang from which sectarian orality defines itself and justifies its status.

### 3.1.2. Oral traditions and the sectarian discourse in Jhang

District Jhang is also rich in this regard. Orality exhibits itself in diverse ways. Folk oral tradition is rich and diverse. It will be better to have a brief glimpse of language and oral traditions of Jhang before the explanation and analysis of sectarian oral traditions in the district. Although the language and dialect are still waiting for a proper definition, yet, it can be deducted easily that orality is not only the major source but also contains diversity. *Dauhrā māhiyya*<sup>241</sup>, *gāwanr*<sup>242</sup>, *laurī* are among the local poetical brands with their particular subjects and structural compositions.

Similarly, non-poetical expressions include *akhānr*<sup>243</sup>, *dāstān*<sup>244</sup>, *wagṭī*<sup>245</sup> etc. These oral traditions are the real custodians of the local culture. The local culture that

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<sup>241</sup> Described in previous chapter

A verse comprised of two lines, but the two lines are mostly irregular as far as the conceptual theme of the expression is concerned. The first line is always very vague and makes no sense. The second line contains the main concept of the reciter.

<sup>242</sup> Described in previous chapter

*Gāwanr* (local songs), is a romantic aspect of culture in District Jhang. It is more than a poetical expression and its overall image arises when it is performed. It is distinct form of a song based on accommodation of *Dauhrās* and *Māhiyyas* within the lyrics of the main song. It is a way of expressing joy on the marriages and at the birth of male child. Professor Sami’ Ullāh Quraishī explains the above mentioned three terms in his work, *Sar zamīn-i-Jhang: Āthār wa Thaqāfat*.

<sup>243</sup> Described in previous chapter

*Akhānr*, which means proverb, is a part and parcel of day to day conversations. These are used generally to accredit one’s point of view or to exhibit the experience and familiarity with the social and cultural structures. Bilāl Zubairī mentions the popular *Akhānrs* in his book, *Ta’rīkh-i-Jhang*

<sup>244</sup> Bilāl Zubairī, *Jhang kī Lauk Kahāniyyān*, (Jhang: Jhang Adbī Academy, 1988), 23

lies in these genres informs us about how people think, how they materialise concepts, how they define joys and sorrow and how they celebrate it. These are not only the cultural representative but also speak about the society. Social composition, role, stratification and development can be seen easily through these frames.

Thus, the popularity of the orality also exhibits its strength in the development of religiosity in the area. Religiosity, here in this area, is based mostly on listening rather than reading. The diversity of oral religious tradition involved oral presentations. In the wake of this emerged the sectarian oral traditions. Not only the existing genres were utilised but at the same time different kinds of orality were also introduced by different sects. These were, indeed, the addition by the sectarian denominations. Therefore, the sectarian discourse not only benefitted from the local oral tradition but also added to it by the introduction of new genres in the field. The proceeding part details some oral traditions which are popular in the sectarian discourse in Jhang. This part will not include the accounts of *akhānr* (proverbs) and *māhiyya*, which have been discussed in the previous chapter.

### 3.1.2.1 Dauhrā

Dauhrā is a stanza. It is performed by singing it on patterns designed for this genre. It is also named as *band*. Structure of Dauhrā and *band* is borrowed by the Shia indigenous oral traditions and Dhākirs recite these bands in maṣā'ib. Below are mentioned examples from the both, local culture and Shi'ite use of *Band*.

Sajnaun day magrūn lauṛ tūn bāhlī hāmū ādhā bhājīṛ ghat nāi

(O my heart! Do not rely blindly on friends)

Changā rahsain rāit day airay tay wailhay mānṛ day kauthay ghat nāi

(It will be better to avoid building castles in the air)

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<sup>245</sup> *Wagtī* or *ḍila' jugat* is an oral expression of humor particular with the district Jhang. It is performed either by two individuals or by two parties of individuals who entertain the audiences by casting mocking remarks on each other following a particular topic.

See Tanvir Abās , “*imran wedding wagti programe*”, You Tube Video, Posted (March, 2016) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SxbNdg2yZM>



Dilā hāun imdād tay marḍiyyān ālā mannī tain majbūr dī mat nāi

(But, O my heart, you didn't pay heed to me)

Sat lagī haī dard tān hunṛ wadā āhnain, kahīn bashar tay wisnṛā wat nāi

(Now you are repeating my words after being deceived by friends)

Similar poetic structure is used by the Dhākirs to narrate the poetic expression of Hardships of Family of Prophet. Following *band* narrates the dialogue between Hussain and His sister Zainab, before leaving their native city of Madīna.<sup>246</sup>

Maidā ithay rahnṛā nā mumkin hay, wich Nānay dī jāgīr

(My stay in the city of my Grand Father (Prophet) has become impossible)

Main apnṛā Shahar āp wasaisaun, Imdād Karau hamshīr.

(I have to lay the foundation of my own city: Karbalā)

Maidiyyān tarīhū Bhainrāun Julū nāl maiday adh kar danā haun taḥrīr

(My sisters (all) please join me for this cause, you will be getting equal share)

Maiday qudsī ānṛ ri'āyā bansin vaikhīn ujjiṛ kay wasdā wīr.

(I will be revered by the divinely angles in the new land after being expelled from my native city)

### 3.1.2.2. Laurī

Laurī is a song which is specific to the children. It is mostly recited by the mother to make the children fall asleep. It is a common practice throughout the Punjab province but the distinction of Jhang in this regard is the presence of a set caste, *laurīs*, who performs Laurī on the different ceremonies related with birth. They are invited by the people to perform at the time of births. This genre has been used both

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<sup>246</sup> Shia Dhākirs narrate that Hussain brought his family at the time of leaving Madina, to fulfil the divine plan in which the responsibilities of saving Islam were equally distributed between Him and his sister, Zainab. He had to sacrifice his life in Karbalā and Zainab had to fight their cause in the court of Yazīd.

by Barelwī Sunnis and Shias in their sectarian performances. Barelwī Sunnis used Laurī for the beautification of expression of Prophet Childhoods event. Shia used Laurī to commemorate the martyrdom of ‘Alī Aṣghar, an infant son of Ḥussain, who was martyred in the battle of Karbalā. Here is an example from Barelwī Sunni sect.

Dā’i Ḥalīmā daiway Sūhnṛay nū lauriyyān

(Dā’i Ḥalīmā sings Laurī for the Dear)

Phar k Gibrāīl bathā jhūlay diyyān auriyyān

(Gibrāīl holds the strings of cradle)

‘Arshān dā lāhrā āyā jinū mawn gaud khidāyā

(I am fostering a bridegroom of heavens)

Har pāsaiy chānaṛ hau giyā hau giyā dūr hanairā

(A light has spread all around and darkness is over)

Rabā Ḥalīmā walay khushiyān nay tūriyyān

(God has showered special blessings on Ḥalīmā)

Dā’i ḥalīmā daiway.....

Hūrāwn nay jashan manay āqā day sahray gāy

(Houries celebrated the event)

Sūhnṛā burāq tay chariya, laṛ wī gibrāīl nay pharyā

(The Baby felt himself flying in the skies in the company of angles)

Hauyān fair galān uthay rab nāl gūriyyān.

(He had a conversation with God)

Dā’i Ḥalīmā daiway.....

### 3.1.2.3. Dāstān

Dāstān, kahānī are the local stories which are narrated in casual gatherings. These are also fostered to the youngsters by the elders, just to make them aware of the

culture they are living in. Folklore is the custodian of socio-cultural realities and a mythological expression of objective realities of an area. Bilāl Zubairī compiled a book comprising of number of local stories or dāstān.<sup>247</sup> These stories mostly are related to the colonial period and on certain basis, cannot be declared as the true expression of ‘folklore’. The other work, which is more academically directed, is written and defined by Professor Sa‘īd Bhutā who is focusing on the genre, especially in its native language.<sup>248</sup>

This genre is used by all the sects. Deobandi and Barelwī scholars use this expression to narrate the events of different Prophets and other Islamic incidents. Scholars construct their subject in the shape of stories to preach to the audiences. Shia sect utilised dāstān in both the *Faḍā’il* and *maṣā’ib* tradition. They even maintained the mythological character of the dāstān in the expressions of both previously mentioned traditions. Dāstānī symbols are used to acculturate the history of Family of Prophet.

Above is a brief account of local oral genre and its impressions in the sectarian orality. The proceeding part is going to describe a major oral trend in sectarian discourse which is identified as bayān, khiṭāb and in Shia case as majlis. This is the most famous and popular oral genre prevalent in the sectarian discourse. It resembles the public performance of dāstān but cannot be equated with it altogether. It is an expanded performance and sometime absorbs all the diverse colours of oral genres in its body.

### 3.2. Sunni speech

Orality has been part and parcel of Islamic traditions. It appears in the shape of oral bayān, khiṭāb, dhikr, tablīgh and many more shapes. These are the famous oral performances which are performed in the presence of audiences and through which the particular messages of the sects are delivered to the listeners. These are particular in their delivery, way of communication, space and audience as well. The performers are also supposed to be well equipped with the qualities of best orators. Sometimes they are trained in a certain way so that they would be able to deliver. Their training

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<sup>247</sup> Zubāri, *Jhang kī Lauk Kahāniyyān*, 55

<sup>248</sup> Sa‘īd Bhutā, “Aṛay Mulk kūn āp wasā tūn,” *Pachham*, 31, no.78 (2010): 34-40

involves the learning of background knowledge, the requisites of the scene in which they should perform and the appropriation with respect to the audiences.<sup>249</sup> These performances are held in specific places and supported with the presence of sectarian symbols which help the performer to communicate the message he wants to deliver.<sup>250</sup> Their particularities are basically defined by the sectarian cultural scripts. It is the specific script that guides the participants, the performers and the audience about the behavioural codes. Even the spatial decoration is as per the scripts of different performances.

This genre is popular almost among all the sects in Jhang. Special gatherings are arranged in the district for the bayān and khiṭāb of popular religious scholars and pīrs of Barelwī school of thought. Barelwī gatherings are commenced in the Barelwī mosques and the shrines which belong to the school. On the other hand, Deobandi gatherings are held in the mosques and the religious seminaries.<sup>251</sup> Therefore, demonstrating these commence in particular places. The sanctity of place is very much significant for the transmission of spirituality among the listeners. Barelwī bayāns are also time specific.<sup>252</sup> They have particular dates on the calendar to celebrate. The 11<sup>th</sup> of every Islamic month is celebrated with proper zeal and zest in the memorial of Shaikh ‘Abd al-Qādir Jilānī of Baghdād, founder of Qādirī order.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>249</sup> Interview with Dhākir Ghulām Shabīr ‘Imrānī, August, 2015

‘Imrānī explained that *‘ustād Shāgird’* is an institution in which the whole tradition of Dhākiri is transmitted. Every newcomer in this field has to formally join this by putting a pot of brown sugar before the *ustād* and also has to present some gifts. This tradition is known as “*Shakkar*” (brown sugar). Afterwards he does an internship with that senior and learns script, contents and other demands of the profession by observing and copying his senior. He added that a good performer in this field is one who adds his novelty in the training of his senior.

<sup>250</sup> Ṭāhir Qādirī, *Al-Dhikr al-Thamīn fī faḍīlat al-dhikr wa al-dhākīrīn*, (Lahore: Minhāj al-Quran Publisher, 2003), 21-47

<sup>251</sup> The most famous places of Barelwī bayān are Purānī ‘īdgāh, Gumbad Wālī Masjid, Masjid Nūr-i-Muṣṭafā, and shrines of Pīr Kaut Sadhānā, Mangānī Sharīf, Pākhrā Sulṭān, Kaut Lakhnāna, Bāhū Sulṭān and at the houses of Baghdādī pīrs of Baghdād Sharīf. The prominent places of Deobandi gatherings are Jāmi‘a masjid Pipliyān wālī, Jāmi‘a ‘Uthmāniyya, Jāmi‘a Maḥmūdiyya, Ma‘ahad al-faqīr etc.

<sup>252</sup> Calendar preserves the Sunnite sacrality of time. The famous dates in this regard are 12 Rabī‘ al-Awal, 11<sup>th</sup> of every Islamic month, 10<sup>th</sup> of Muḥarram. This time is not only sacred but also is spiritually illuminated with the grace of Allah and His selected people.

<sup>253</sup> A gathering on any day, though generally on 11<sup>th</sup> of the lunar calendar, consisting of recitation of the Holy Quran, Dhikr (Remembrance of Allah), reading Fātiḥa and distributing food to send the reward to Ghauth al-A‘zam Shaikh ‘Abd al-Qādir Jilānī is called Giyārhawīn Sharīf. Its basis in the religion is from the concept of sending rewards to others. (<http://www.iecrcna.org/>)

The event includes bayān, *mahfil-i-na‘at*<sup>254</sup>, *khatam al-Quran*<sup>255</sup> and the distribution of langar.<sup>256</sup> The other days include the month of Rabī‘ al-Awal and Muḥarram and the days, specific with the companions of Prophet and famous Sufi saints, particularly the local Sufis. Time and place play a vital role in the Barelwī bayāns. Deobandi speeches are conducted on the days connected with the companions and wives of the prophet.<sup>257</sup> Deobandi speeches are diverse in the categories of topics delivered to the audiences. They include the topic related to the grace of Ṣaḥāba, companions of Prophet, their distinction from the Shia and Barelwīs and incorporate their political agenda in their deliverance of speech act.<sup>258</sup>

The most famous personalities in this field are Ṭāhir al-Qādirī<sup>259</sup>, Ashraf Sayyālī<sup>260</sup> and Pīr Mubārīk Shāh of Baghdād Sharīf.<sup>261</sup> Deobandi speakers include

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See also, RoterNMastarTvcOm, “Gyarvi Sharif Kya Hai Great Explanation by Mufti Qasim Attari”, You Tube Video, Posted (2014) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cXecISUKLLw>

There is a tradition in Punjab attached with this day. No milkman sells the milk on this day. They just distribute as blessing and contribute in the celebrations of 11<sup>th</sup>.

<sup>254</sup> Ṭāhir Qādirī, *Ma‘mūlāt al-Milād*, (Lahore: Minhāj al-Quran Publisher, 2003), 43-75

<sup>255</sup> *Khatam al-Quran* commonly stands for the recitation of Quran, but the term ‘*Khatam*’ connotes to two different meanings especially when it relates to the Quran. The one meaning is ‘complete recitation of the book’ and the other is ‘to illuminate particular food stuff with the recitation of some part of Quran to make this food a source of blessing for the deceased’.

<sup>256</sup> Pnina Werbner, “Langar: Pilgrimage, Sacred exchange and perpetual Sacrifice in Sufi Saint’s Lodge,” in *Islam and Society in Pakistan: Anthropological Perspectives*, ed. Magnus. M, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 177-201

This term denotes to the distribution of food to the participants of a spiritual or religious gathering. The participants are served with the food. This tradition was introduced and started by the Early Chishtī Sufi s in sub-continent and is still preserved by the followers of Barelwī and Shai sects.

<sup>257</sup> M.MUZAMMIL SHAIKH, “*Tahir Jhangwī Siddeq-e-Akbar Ki Tu Hai Beti 17 Ramazan Yom-e-Wafat*”, You Tube Video, Posted (2012) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ri-FQeC35-k>

A video of celebration of the day of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph of Islam. Deobandis in Jhang, especially under the banner of ASSP, have long been demanding for the observance of the days of companions and wives of Prophet at state level. They organize rallies and seminars on Ist of Muḥarram to commemorate the martyrdom of ‘Umar, second Caliph in Islam.

<sup>258</sup> Walī Ullāhī talk about state, Naqshbandīs talk about Ihsān, SSP talk about excommunication of Shias.

See Muḥammad Aslam, *Hālāt-i-Faqīr*, (Faisalabad: Maktaba al-Faqīr, 2013), 267-271

Also, Ilyās, *Amīr-i-‘Azīmat*, 35

<sup>259</sup> Prof. Dr. Ṭāhir al-Qādirī is a famous religious personality of Jhang. He got doctoral degree from Punjab University, Lahore in 1986. The title of his doctoral research was, “Punishment in Islam, Their Classification and Philosophy”. He is the author of more than 300 books on fiqh, Ḥadīth, Tafsīr and comparative religion.

See *Biography of Shaykh ul Islam Dr Muḥammad Tahir ul Qādirī*, Minhāj al-Quran International, <http://minhaj.org/english/tid/3003/Biography-of-Shaykh-ul-Islam-Dr-Muhammad-Tahir-ul-Qadirī.html>

Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī<sup>262</sup>, Ithār al-Qāsmī<sup>263</sup>, A‘zam Ṭāriq<sup>264</sup> and Pīr Dhulfiqār Naqshbandī<sup>265</sup>.

### 3.2.1. Khuṭba

Bayān starts with the recitation of Quran. This recitation also contains some portion of Ḥadīth. Here lies the difference between Barelwīs and Deobandīs. Barelwī tilāwat ends with the recitation of *Durūd wa Salām* on the other hand Deobandīs mostly end with the Ḥadīth or with a particular verse from Quran, which provides context to the whole speech. It is this part of the bayān, which directs the further process. The selection of verses of Quran and tradition is specific, and it depends upon the occasion on which bayān is going to be delivered. *Durūd wa Salām*<sup>266</sup> is the

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<sup>260</sup> Maulānā Ashraf Sayyālwī is the disciple of Khawājā Qamar al-Dīn of Sayyāl sharīf. He is a renowned Barelwī scholar. His work includes some polemical books and speeches in defense of Barelwī Islam against the Shia and Deobandi point of views. He is the author of many books i.e. *Tuḥfā al-Hussainiyya*, *Madhhab-i-Shia*, *Taḥqīq*, *Fatāwā Milād Sharīf*, *Muta‘ aur Islam*.

<sup>261</sup> Discover Baghdad Sharif, *BAGHDAD SHARIF DESTINATION GUIDE*, <http://www.tripmondo.com/pakistan/punjab/baghdad-sharif/>

Baghdād Sharīf is a town in Mian Channu, District Khanewal. It is centre of Qādirī saints from the Gilānī sayyid family. The town is maintained well and is one of the oldest towns in the area. It is also said that the graveyard of this town contains graves of some early Prophets. It becomes interesting if one believes in the story behind a nearby place Sarāy Karishnā, which according to sources, is also established as a place where the famous characters of the Hindu mythology Rām and Sītā lived. Being a meeting place of two rivers, Chanāb and Rāwī, it bestows some credibility to the above-mentioned constructions of presence of Prophets and the revered characters of Rām and Sītā here in this region.

Many individuals from the spiritually leading Gilānī sayyid family have migrated to Jhang and have been taking part in sectarian polemics. Mubārak Shāh Baghdādī was one of the prominent Barelwī scholars from this land who took active part in polemics against Shia and Deobandi sects.

<sup>262</sup> Founding father of *Anjūman Sipāh Ṣaḥāba* Pakistan

<sup>263</sup> Political descendent of Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī. He contested the 1990s election for National Assembly on the ticket of IJI (*Islāmī Jamhūrī Ittīḥād*). He was assassinated in 1991.

<sup>264</sup> He descended the leadership of Sipāh Ṣaḥāba after the assassination of Ithār al-Qāsmī. He remained the member of National Assemblé twice in 1993 and 2002. He was assassinated in Islamabad.

<sup>265</sup> A Deobandi self-proclaimed Naqshbandī saint. He follows the *naqshbandī* path and has established a large seminary, ‘*Ma‘ahad al-Faqīr*’.

See Muḥammad Aslam, *Hālāt-i-Faqīr*, 29-31

<sup>266</sup> Qādirī, *Ma‘mulāt al-Milād*, 85-106

*Durūd wa Salām* is the combination of *Durūd* and *Salām* which is mostly unified in one sentence or statement. It has various versions, but the simplest version is one in which the blessings of Allah are conferred only upon the Prophet Muḥammad. The second version, which is also common and recognised in Shia sect, includes the family of Prophet. Finally, the third pure suuni version includes companions and wives of Prophets as well in the *Durūd wa Salām*.

distinction of Barelwī school of thought. *Tilāwat* is followed by the recitation of *na‘at* in Barelwī performances. The audience took part in this practice by repeating *salām* and some other words which appreciate the reciter. On the other hand, the Deobandi audience responds to the deliverer by raising their slogans.<sup>267</sup>

### 3.2.2. Bayān

This is the main part of Sunni *khiṭāb*. It is structured around some particular topics. In case of Barelwīs, it consists of the praise of Prophet and his stature as ‘*nūr*’. Barelwīs share this *nūr*’ aspect of Prophet’s being with the Shias, who believes in the spiritual grace of Prophet and the Family of Prophet.<sup>268</sup> This aspect is a part and parcel of Barelwī performance’s script. In a way, it is a distinctive aspect of Barelwīs which separates them from Deobandis and Wahhābīs. The other topics in this genre include the description of faith, distinctions from the other schools of thought and the praise of Sufī saints.<sup>269</sup> As mentioned earlier Deobandi bayān are more diverse than the Barelwī. Deobandi bayān includes the topics related to inter-sectarian and intra-sectarian dialogues and, in addition to, the Barelwī demonstrate their political beings as well in these religious gatherings.<sup>270</sup> This diversity owes its existence to the political involvement of the Deobandi community and to the particularities of time

<sup>267</sup>Deobandis raise slogan of *Takbīr*. In some cases, they raise the slogans depicting the grace of companions of Prophet.

*Na‘rā-i-Khilāfat*

*Ḥaq Chār yār*

<sup>268</sup> According to Shia and Barelwī belief the creation of Prophet and Family of Prophet is distinctive from the rest of mankind, which is created with dust. They, generally, believe that God created the Prophet and Family of Prophet from the light emanating from himself. This light is termed as *Nūr*. Ṭāhir al-Qādirī describes this point in his book, “*Ghayat al-Ijābā fī manāqib al-qurābā*”.<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cKGOyC-S6jM>

See also Yousaf Ḥussain, *Al-Batūl fī Waḥdat Bint al-Rasūl*, (Karachi: Islāmiyya Mission Pakistan, 1989): 10

<sup>269</sup> The most revered ones are *Ghauth al-A‘zam*, Junaid Baghdādī, and some local names as Dātā Ganj Baksh, Pīr Mihar ‘Alī Shāh etc

<sup>270</sup> Politics has been part and parcel of the Deobandi *Bayāns*. They always seem to have a political agenda before them and even their different sub-denominations are directly and indirectly connected with politics. ASSP, although apparently appears as a sectarian organization but still its moto is the ‘constitutional’ excommunication of Shias. So even if it cannot be regarded as political organisation like *Jamī‘at ‘Ulamā al-Islam*, both (F) and (S) but still it highly yearns for some political ends. In the Barelwīs this trend had been dominant with the *Tahrīk Nizām-i-Muṣṭafā*, but after that it almost diminished and they remained mostly busy in polemical (defending, offending, reshaping, restructuring) performances.

around which the study is based. Jihād, as an ideology is also an integral part of Deobandi bayāns.<sup>271</sup> The Barelwī and Deobandi audiences also have differences in their response towards the speech and speaker. Speakers, while delivering speech are supposed to bear certain symbols which are mostly incorporated in their dress code. The use of turbans with different styles and colours is one of the distinctive features.<sup>272</sup> Barelwī audiences ornament the occasion with *Durūd wa Salām* and three conventional slogans. While, Deobandi either avoid the slogan or just restrict them to the slogan of Takbīr. Some of them raise the slogans which glorify the role and stature of companions of Prophet. To explain the mentioned factors of social performance and oral performative traditions, below is the detailed analysis of two speeches by a Barelwī and a Deobandi scholar respectively.

### 3.2.3. Ṭāhir al-Qādirī's speech: Performance of wilāya (authority)

Following the main theoretical model of social performance this section will sketch the speeches or bayāns of Ṭāhir al-Qādirī<sup>273</sup> and Ḥaq Nawāz. This sketch will be narrated under the frame of social performance by dividing the content of these speeches into different constituent phases of the social performance. At first their context, scene, acts and strategies will be described. It will proceed towards the narration of the fact that how these elements are seamed together.

#### 3.2.3.1. Context

The most difficult issue while describing a performance is to evaluate and define its context. This becomes worst regarding a socio-cultural description of a religious performance. The performer describes it, sometimes in a plain statement and

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<sup>271</sup> Hasan, "From the Pulpit to Ak-47: Sectarian Conflict in Jhang, Pakistan," 67-87

It is important to understand the re-orientation of Concept of Jihād in Deobandi discourse. They decentralised the concept of Jihād to sectarian level and then applied it to fight against Shias whom they have demanded to be constitutionally excommunicated.

<sup>272</sup> Dress code contains a lot of significance in this regard. Each sect has some particularities in this regard. The use of Jināh cap, Sindhī Taupī, dastār, Jubbā or Qabā are common in the sectarian religious scholarship. They always tend to be different from the rest. Although the distinction between the Sunnis and Shias has attained some structural position but still Deobandis and Barelwīs need more distinctions to be historicised.

<sup>273</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LcJm0yV1N0Y>



sometimes in a very complex manner. Audiences also have their opinion and it can become difficult to rely on the participants and a proper location of a social context. This issue can be resolved by going through the discursive treatment of the performance. It becomes clear in a discursive field and so to define a context of the performance of Ṭāhir al-Qādirī, certain things should be taken into consideration. How he himself defined the context, how audiences are perceived and how it was reflected by the opponents. This can also be contributed by having a glimpse into the socio-political developments.

The immediate context can be understood by the calendar. This speech is performed in *Shab-i-‘āshūr*, the night between 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> of Muḥarram. This time is observed in this manner and speeches are held at different sacred places to commemorate the incident of Karbalā. Ṭāhir al-Qādirī used to deliver a bayān of Shahādat-i-Ḥussain annually. However, the unusual aspect is that this year he was performing this bayān after the gap of almost a decade. Many audiences related Qādirī’s appearance and performance with the coming elections. This was confirmed with Qādirī’s own concluding remarks of this speech in which he requested for and electoral support in coming elections.

This performance can also be contextualised in a historical context. This historical context affirms its sectarian intent. He is defining a Sunnite version of the incident of Karbalā but his methodology is based on a negation of a narrative which also exists in Sunni Islam. His distance from his Sunni community is pointed out by his opponents as well. Ḥaq Nawāz, a Deobandi cleric, in his speech mentions him and his fellows of Purānī ‘īd Gāh (Old/traditional space for performing ‘īd prayer) as the supporters of Shias. In this case his speech is highly contextualised in the sectarian discourse in which Barelwī School is intensely contesting its identity with respect to Shias and Deobandis.

### **3.2.3.2. Scene**

This bayān is scripted to be delivered in Purānī ‘īd Gāh, a renowned Barelwī space in Jhang which contains a history of Barelwī existence in Jhang. Generally, it is supposed to be the centre of Ṭāhir al-Qādirī but this confusion is erased by an architectural addition. A minaret’s addition, in the memory of success of Ashraf

Sayyālwī in the famous '*Fataḥ al-Mubīn*' (a clear success)<sup>274</sup> polemic, which he contested with Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī, the founder of Sipāh Ṣaḥāba. The space is, in fact, run under the auspices of Ashraf Sayyālwī who is more attached with Chishtī Nizāmī tradition of pīrs of Sayyāl rather than the Qādirī tradition of Ṭāhir al-Qādirī. Ashraf Sayyālwī's stature and his status in the Shia-Sunni discourse will be highlighted in the coming chapter about textual performances in the sectarian discourse. The selection of time is also significant, with it falling in the month of Muḥarram.

The creation of the scene shows accordance with the performance and with possible contextualisation. Its context and strategies can be defined by the words of performer. He starts with a brief description of the topic and then elaborates some salient features of the scene he has created for his performance. He mentions the name of some notable participants which include, Ghaḍānfar Karārī<sup>275</sup>, Murtaḍā Pauyā<sup>276</sup>, Makhdūm Ḥājī Ilyās Shāh of Uch Gul Imām<sup>277</sup>, Pīr Mazḥar Shāh of Mangānī

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<sup>274</sup> *Fataḥ al-Mubīn* or *Manāẓarah-i-Jhang* is the most famous and celebrated polemic between the Barelwīs and Deobandīs at Banglā Naul Wālā (9 km away from the Jhang Saddar on the road to Gojra) on August 27, 1979. Both parties claim to be the victorious. It was contested between Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī and Ashraf Sayyālwī. The interesting aspect of the polemic was the governmental supervision and involvement of local administrative bureaucracy. The mediators were

1. Professor Taqī al-Dīn Anjum, Principle Government College Jhang
2. Manẓūr Ḥussain Khān Advocate
3. Master Ghulām Bārī

As discussed above both parties claimed the victory but the official letter by the mediators was issued in the favour of Barelwīs. So Barelwīs, to celebrate this victory, constructed a minaret in the Purānī 'īd Gāh which is named after the title of the polemic.

See Nāṣir Ḥāshimī (comp.), *Manāẓarah-i-Jhang*, (Jehlam: Ahl al-Sunnah Publishers)

<sup>275</sup> 'Alī Ghaḍānfar Karārī is a Shia scholar, although he is not very popular in the Shia religio-political circles, yet he bears some significance on account of him being Secretary General of 'Majlis 'amal 'Ulamā al-Shia Pakistan'. He is also the author of a book '*Fatwūn kā Talātum*', which he wrote to respond some decrees against Shia sect from Deobandi religious seminary, Dār al-'ulūm Banaurī Town. Besides he is also the part of Minhāj al-Quran and Pakistan '*Awāmī Tahrik* which are apparently Barelwī Sunnī organization running under Dr. Ṭāhir al-Qādirī.

<sup>276</sup> Murtaḍā Pauyā is the son of famous Shia scholar Āyat Ullāh Mahdī Pauyā. He is currently part of Pakistan '*Awāmī Tahrik* under the leadership of Ṭāhir al-Qādirī

<sup>277</sup> Ḥājī Ilyās Shāh of Uch Gul Imām is a spiritual and political personality. He belongs to a family of Bukhārī Sayyid which is an outshoot of Bukhārīs of Uch Sharīf in Bahāwalpur. Although he could not succeed in provincial and national politics, yet he has maintained his political influence in the district level politics. He and his two sons Sayyid Fakhar Ilyās and Sayyid Asad Ilyās have been the members of District Council for many times. (Records of District Council Jhang)

Sharīf,<sup>278</sup> and Shaikh Waqār Aḥmad.<sup>279</sup> These names create a symbolism which in fact Qādirī wants to materialise. His conclusion will decide how he wants the materialisation of this symbolic presence. While taking these names his first focus seems to be the identification of Shia participation. When he took the names of Ghaḍanfar Karārwī and Murtaḍā Pauyā, he mentioned their designations in his political party, Pakistan ‘Awāmī Taḥrīk. Then he mentions the name of two gaddī nashīns, respectively, from Shia and Sunni sects. Makhdūm Ḥājī Ilyās Shāh of Uch Gul Imām is a leading Shia pīr and feudal. His stature is extraordinary in many respects. He is the gaddī nashīn of Uch Gul Imām, which is one among the six Uch centre which work as Sub-Uch under the main centre in Bahāwalpur, Uch Sharīf. These are the centres of Bukhārī Sayyids in India and Pakistan. Secondly, Sayyid Ilyās also bears political and spiritual significance being the spiritual elder of Bukhārīs of Shāh Jīwanā. Shaikh Waqār is a politician, although he has not found success in this field, his identity as Shaikh with a reasonable electoral following is important. Sayyid Maḥzar Shāh is a Sunni pīr from Mangānī Sharīf. The others include Ghulām Akbar Sayyāl and Sājīd Khān Sayyāl. He also mentions that he can see the people from different parts of district Jhang in the audiences and is happy to find them here. He reveals that this audience is not here to just listen to his speech but to show their solidarity with the cause of Ḥussain, the grandson of Prophet. Then he prays for the peace and prosperity of the people of Jhang and wish for the decline in the sectarian sentiments.

### 3.2.3.3. Performing the wilāya

He starts his speech by reciting the first verse of *sūrah al-Dahr* in Quran. After reciting the verse, he starts the first part of his speech, which is focused on the translation and interpretation of the verse, with the help of understanding of Quran, Ḥadīth and Islamic hermeneutics. He also implies analogical reasoning. The first part

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<sup>278</sup> Darbār ‘Āliyya Mangānī Sharīf near Mauchīwālā Jhang Pakistan. Ṣāhibzādā Pīr Muḥammad Maḥzar Ḥussain Qādirī. sajadā nashīn. Great center for learning Islamic Studies and Sufism. *Silsilah* ‘Āliyya Qādiriyya Quṭbiyya. They have maintained their spiritual status even in the hegemonic presence of Gilānīs of Pīr Kaut and A‘wān of Sulṭān Bāhū in the Qādiriyya.

<sup>279</sup> Shaikh Waqār Aḥmad is a local politician who once got elected as member District Assembly in 2001. He also contested elections for National Assembly and got around 10 thousand votes. see

[http://ecp.gov.pk/ConstResult.aspx?Const\\_Id=NA-89%20&type=NA](http://ecp.gov.pk/ConstResult.aspx?Const_Id=NA-89%20&type=NA)

is concerned with the discussion of creation of ‘being’. His focus is on the historicity of being and the prime position of Prophet Muḥammad as the first ever being. He contextualises the performance of famous ‘*kun*’ in the love of the ‘being’<sup>280</sup>. He states that this being is the personality of Prophet Muḥammad who even existed before the recitation of ‘*kun*’.

Is āyat say thābit hūa Muṣṭafā uskī chāhat thī aur chāhat kau *Kun* say bhī pahlay rakhā thā. chāhat pahlay hay ṣahūr ba‘ad main hay, chāhat pahlay hay amar ba‘ad main hay, chāhat pahlay hay khalq ba‘ad main hay, chāhat pahlay hay sārī kā’ināt ba‘ad main hay. Is līay farmāyā laugū jis nay khudā tak ānā hau pahlay Muṣṭafā tak āy.

Translation

(Hence it is proved from this verse that Muṣṭafā was beloved to God and He created Muṣṭafā before the pronouncement of word ‘Kun’. This love precedes creation, order and even the whole universe. That is why it is said that whoever wants to approach God, he must come through Muṣṭafā.)

He concludes that God is the lover and Muḥammad is beloved and the lover can be accessed through the beloved. This aspect of love being the essence of ‘creation’ is jointly shared by majority of Barelwīs and Shia; still, considerable sections of these sects do not believe in this concept.<sup>281</sup>

In the second part, he extends the chain of love and brings Ḥussain, the grandson of Prophet into the chain.<sup>282</sup> Prophet is the love of God and Ḥussain is the love of Prophet. The authenticity of the love between Prophet and his grandson is proved through sources of Ḥadīth and Islamic history. He refers to three traditions of Prophet

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<sup>280</sup> “*Kun*” has mostly been used in the meaning of direction based on power. But in this case Ṭāhir al-Qādirī translates it as a wish to be complied with the agency of love.

<sup>281</sup> Ja‘fir, *Taṣawwuf aur Tashī‘ main Farq*, 70-72

<sup>282</sup> Ḥussain, 3<sup>rd</sup> Imām in the Shia sect and grandson of Prophet Muḥammad.

from *Ṣiḥāḥ al-Sittah*<sup>283</sup> in favour of the affection between the grandfather and grandson. The first Ḥadīth narrates the tradition of prolonged prostration by Prophet due to the interference of Ḥussain, when he was a child. Qādirī says

Muṣṭafā khudā kay maḥbūb hūay. Aur Jhang wālū Allah kī ‘izat kī qasam  
Ḥussain Muṣṭafā kā maḥbūb hay. Sau Muṣṭafā Ḥussain kay baghair nahī  
miltā.

Translation

(Muṣṭafā is beloved to God, and o people of Jhang I swear, by the grace  
of God, Ḥussain is beloved to Muṣṭafā and both are part and parcel)

The second Ḥadīth is that ‘Ḥussain belongs to me and I belong to Ḥussain’. Who loves Ḥussain, he loves me and who loves me, loves Allah. The third is Ḥadīth al-Qudsī in which God announces that one who remembers God, God remembers him.

The third part connects the ‘being’ of Ḥussain with His Parents and brings them as well into the Chain of Love. He establishes, based on understanding of Jalāl al-Dīn Sayyūfī<sup>284</sup> that Ḥussain emanates from the oceans of spirituality and purity in the shape of pearl along with his brother Hasan. He personalises the narrative images of maraj al bahrayn, lolo and mirjān with the family of Prophet.<sup>285</sup>

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<sup>283</sup> *Ṣiḥāḥ al-Sittah* is denoted to the six main sources of Ḥadīth in Sunni tradition. These six sources of Ḥadīth include the following books,

1. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ismā‘īl
2. Jami‘ al-Tirmadhī
3. Ṣaḥīḥ al-Muslim
4. Sunan Abū Dā‘ūd
5. Sunan Ibn al-Majā
6. Sunan al-Ṣughrā

These six have been accepted as the most authentic sources of Ḥadīth by Sunnīs.

<sup>284</sup> Abū al-Faḍl ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr ibn Muḥammad Jalāl al-Dīn al-Khuḍairī al-Sayyūfī was an Egyptian religious scholar, juristic expert and teacher, and one of the most prolific writers of the Middle Ages of Persian origin, whose works deal with Islamic theology. In 1486, he was appointed to a chair in the mosque of Baibars in Cairo. He adhered to the Shāfā‘ī Maslak and is one of the latter-day authorities of the Shāfā‘ī School, considered to be one of the *Aṣḥābūn-Nazzar* (Assessors) whose degree of ijtihād is agreed upon.

<sup>285</sup> Ṭāhir Qādirī, *Maraj al-Bahrain fī manāqib al-Ḥussain*, (Lahore: Minhāj al-Quran Publisher, 2009)

Jab is Ḥussain kau dunya main zāhir karnay kā waqt āyā tau is Ḥussain kay lāy āik bāp kī ḍarūrat thī, āik māwn kī ḍarūrat thī tau Quran nay dhikr kiya “Maraj al-baḥrain-i-yal-takiyyān... ab Ḥussain kay māwn bāp kā dhikr hau rahā ha.....Imām Jalāl al-Dīn Sayyūṭī kī tafsīr say ya bāt bayān kar rahā hūn....Imām Sayyūṭī farmātay hain āik samandar Ḥussain kay bābā hain āik samandar Ḥussain kī māwn ha

Translation

(When God had to send Ḥussain to world, it required the selection of parents. Quran mentions, verily we combined two oceans.... According to Imam Sayyūṭī, one ocean, in this verse is the father of Ḥussain and the other is His mother.)<sup>286</sup>

In the fourth section of the speech he meets two tasks. One is the rationalisation of Wilāya<sup>287</sup> of ‘Alī and his supreme position in the Islamic spirituality. The second is the proof of the ‘infallibility’ of Fāṭimā<sup>288</sup>, the daughter of Prophet. He presents the

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This book defends and elaborates this particular term and its meanings.

<sup>286</sup> Sayyūṭī’s name is utilised to enhance the credibility of Shi‘ite meaning. It means a notable Sunni scholar is endorsing the Shi‘ite point of view.

<sup>287</sup> Wilāya is one the most contested terms in Islamic Discourse. It bears three different connotations which are listed below.

1. Shi‘ite concept of Wilāya first defines it as ‘governing authority’ and then combines both spiritual and temporal governing authorities in the institution of Imamate.

See S. Jafri, *The Origins and Early Development of Shia Islam*, (New York: Oxford, 2000), 1-27.

2. Sunnite concept of Wilāya although contains various connotations but the one which distinguishes them from the Shi‘ite concepts is that it means ‘friendship’ and the ‘Walī’, who bears Wilāya is friend of God.

Muḥammad Nafā‘, *Ruḥamā Baināhum*, (Lahore: Dār al-Kitāb, 2004)

3. Sufi concept of Wilāya defines it as a governing authority but limits it to the spiritual domain only.

Alhaq, *A Forgotten Vision*, 753.

<sup>288</sup> Seyyed Nasr, *Shi‘ite Islam*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1975), 151.

*Taṭhīr*’ is one of the most revered symbols in the Shia lexicon. It connotes to the absolute purity of the sins. They have the belief that Prophet Muḥammad, His daughter Fāṭimā and Twelve Imāms all are infallible and absolute free from all kind of minor and major impurities. The main verse of Quran on which they have based this concept is *Āyat al-Taṭhīr*’ from *Sūrah al-Nisā*.,

Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain, the Shia version<sup>289</sup>, the incident of *Ghadīr al-Khum*<sup>290</sup>, with Shia historicity to start his discussion on the ‘wilāya’ of ‘Alī. He adds that, at Ghadīr, Prophet announced that “Jiskā main Maulā us uskā ‘Alī Maulā” (whoever follows me is the follower of ‘Alī as well). At this time ‘Alī also received greetings from the Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. Ṭāhir al-Qādirī, says at this point, “Wo Musalmān nahī jau ‘Alī kau Maulā nahī māntā. (One is not a Muslim if he does not believe in the Wilāya of ‘Alī). He extends his argument by taking the examples from the life of first two Caliphs, Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. They both seek help from ‘Alī and according to Abu Bakr to see the face of ‘Alī is worship.<sup>291</sup> He gives a very interesting statement here, “I am referring the Ḥadīth sources from Sunni books to tell the people that what is Sunnism (Sunnism is based on love with Prophet and Family of Prophet)”.

After clarifying the position of ‘Alī in the chain of love the speaker comes to Fāṭimā. He narrates that the ‘nikāḥ’ of the ‘Alī and Fāṭimā was first recited at the 4<sup>th</sup>

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The other important concept in this regard is *Batūl*. The status of being *Batūl* is only restricted to the women. According to Shia tradition this title has been bestowed only upon three ladies who are,

1. Mariyam, mother of Jesus
2. Fāṭimā Bint Muḥammad
3. Āsiyya Bint Mazāḥim

See Yousaf Ḥussain, *Al-Batūl fī Wahdat Bint al-Rasūl*

<sup>289</sup> Muḥammad Ḥussain, *Taḥqiqāt al-Farīqain fī Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, (Sargodha: Maktaba al-Sibṭain, 1999)

This book defends the Shia version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain which narrates from Muḥammad that after him (after his demise) there would be two sources of guidance which are The Book (Quran) and His Family.

See also, Muḥammad Nafā‘, *Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, (Lahore: Dār al-Kitāb, 2012)

This book describes and verifies Sunni version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain which narrates the two sources of guidance as The Book (Quran) and Sunnah (Character) of Muḥammad.

<sup>290</sup> Ṭāhir Qādirī, *The Ghadīr Declaration*, (Lahore: Minhāj al-Quran Publisher, 2003), 13

The incident of *Ghadīr al-Khum* is very much significant in the Shia discourse. This incident plays a significant role in historicizing some basic Shia beliefs which includes the Imamate as the foremost. It is narrated that Prophet Muḥammad, whilst returning from the last pilgrimage, received the last ‘waḥī’ in which Prophet was directed to deliver the message. It was conveyed to him with the assertion that if he will not deliver, he will suppose to do nothing for Allah. So, this was a message for the vice regency of ‘Alī.

This tradition is challenged by Sunnis and even if some of them have accepted it, they have contextualised it in very different manner without linking the announcement of *Wilāya* of ‘Alī with the completion of Islam as a religion.

sky.<sup>292</sup> God himself became the walī of Fāṭimā. He quotes Ḥadīths from the ‘Āishā<sup>293</sup> in favour of Fāṭimā.

In the Fifth section, he recited the Shahādat of Ḥussain by following the maṣā’ib<sup>294</sup> tradition of Shia. Ḥussainiyyat, according to him, needs a sacrifice in every age. He concludes that this sacrifice in the present scenario is very easy. In the current scenario, it means the proper use of the adult franchise.

Ḥussain nay tau apnī aur apnay qabīlay kī jān day kar dīn kau bachāyā  
thā. Āp kau tau garden katwānay kī naubat nahī āy gī, khālī vote day kar  
bachānā hay. Sastā saudā hay ..... wo gardanain day kar Islam bachā gay  
aur āap say tau sirf vote māngā jāy gā.

Translation

(Ḥussain saved Islam by scarifying his and his family’s lives but you are  
only required to protect religion by casting your vote (in my favour). They  
save religion with their blood; you should follow them by casting your  
vote.)

The people who yearn for, ‘*Nizām-i-Ḥussain*’ should cast their vote in favour of Qādirī. So, by concluding the whole debate, he started with the question of the creation of being and the spiritual and political supremacy of the Prophet and his family and then in connecting his political career with the great plan of creation and

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<sup>292</sup> According to some Shias the Nikāḥ between ‘Alī and Fāṭimā was held first in the heavens where God Himself was the witness and Walī from the side of Fāṭimā. e.g.

Ghazanfar Taunswī.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K7HjgKBLvAQ>

The other group of scholars who are termed as *Wahhābīs* falsify this event. e.g.

Sayyid Gulāb ‘Alī Shāh

<sup>293</sup> The wife of the Prophet, who is perceived to be at unfriendly terms with the family of Fāṭimā. She was the daughter of First Caliph Abu Bakr and had played a significant role in the period of first three caliphs. She was one of the leading figures among the opposition to the caliphate of ‘Alī and had fought a battle against ‘Alī. The battle is known as ‘Jang al-Jamal’, the battle of camel. Any tradition in favour of ‘Alī and Fāṭimā quoted in the Sunni sources of Ḥadīth is narrated by Shias to construct their argument.

<sup>294</sup> *Maṣā’ib*, with literal meanings as hardships is denoted is a genre in Shia Majālis in which the hardships faced by the Family of Prophet, especially by Ḥussain and his companions in Karbalā are narrated in a very gloomy tone. This genre is performed in various diverse manners which are described in detail in the portion of Shia oral performances.



ultimate salvation. It is evident from his speech and from his words. Here lies his strategy which he defined in stages and at every stage it seemed that what he is focusing on is the prime object of his strategy. In the beginning presents the Prophet as the first creation and beloved of God. In this part, his strategy seems to be the description of real stature of Prophet. In the second he seems to deliver the importance of Prophet's family and establishes that even Muslim hood cannot be claimed just based on believing in the Prophethood, but it also needs the allegiance of Family of Prophet.

### 3.2.3.4. Strategy

As per his words the context is Muḥarram but his ending remarks also show that the context of the speech is not only Muḥarram, but it can also be for the upcoming election.<sup>295</sup> It contains both aspects. At one end, he wants to create an equation between the Sunnis and Shias, on the other hand he wants both sects to unite and vote for him in the coming elections. The second aspect also makes sense on the standard of contemporary world of Scheub<sup>296</sup> which he counts as one of the ingredient features of the oral performance. Therefore, his strategy is to divide Barelwīsm from Deobandism and to gain a popular Shia electoral support in the coming elections.

### 3.2.3.5. Blending the elements

His performance of dhikr-i-Ḥussain, as maintained above, is designed to meet two purposes. One is to bridge the differences between Barelwī Sunnis and other is for the electoral purpose. The seaming of performance with both contexts is carried using narrative images and historicising the concepts related to the images. These images are '*khalq*', '*shay*' (love), '*wilāya*', '*ṭahārā*', '*dhikr*', '*Shahādat*', '*wirāthat*' (inheritance, in this case, spiritual inheritance). These narrative images carry certain symbols and their symbolic utility is utilised by the performer not only to blend his performance with the context but also to extend it to the audiences as well. Definition and explanation of the *khalq* raises the question of the first creation. The use of image

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<sup>295</sup> General Elections in 2002

<sup>296</sup> Harold Scheub, "Body and Image in Oral Narrative Performance," *New Literary History*, 8, no. 3, Oral Cultures and Oral Performances, (Spring, 1977): 345-367.

of *shay* (love) also attracts the Barelwī and Shia audiences to be more acquainted with the status and stature of Prophet and Family of Prophet. Wilāya is a concept without the use of which it becomes difficult to address a Shia gathering especially when the subject is related to the Family of Prophet. It also attracts the Sufi Sunnis. Although, the connotations of Shia and Sunni wilāya is clearly different from each other, but its use works as a symbol to attract joint attention of Shias and Sunnis. Especially in the contemporary world of the electoral season justifies its random or general usage. Purity of the Prophet and his family of the all the impurities has long been part of discourse and it is more intra-sectarian than the inter-sectarian in its discursive nature. This is accommodated in the term ‘*tahārā*’. Dhikr and Shahādat also connect the performance with the context very well. *Wirāthsat*, here does not mean exactly inheritance. Here it serves more for the continuity than the inheritance. The continuity of the spiritual lineage is carried throughout the flow of the performance.

The next stage is the extension of his performance to the audiences. The extension is more cultural in both the framework of the term culture and popular culture. The blending of the performance can be made through less culturability but it cannot be applied to the extension of the performance to the audiences. Any uncultured step during this stage can ruin the performance. Even a weak connection of the performance with the context can be overcome with the most culturally equipped extension. This aspect is evident from the phenomenon of the popular culture. Tāhir al-Qādirī does this by the explanation and interpretation of the above-mentioned narrative images. Their explanation is made through Quran, Sunnah and Sufi logic that is determined on a love-based reason. Culturally, credibility of a point of view is believed to be more if it is also justified on the epistemological standard of the rival point of view. This sense is also implied by Tāhir al-Qādirī in his speech. He used the Shi‘ite version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain to justify the wilāya of Family of Prophet and quotes it from different Sunni sources.<sup>297</sup> It is also significant to note that he himself during his speech said, “I am not putting the references from the Shia sources. I am going to tell the Sunnis, their real identity (not different from the Shias)”.<sup>298</sup> This

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<sup>297</sup> The historicity and content of the Shi‘ite version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain is challenged by his Barelwī fellow cleric Muḥammad Nafa‘. This would be discussed in the coming chapter regarding to the Textual performances. Next chapters detail this discussion.

<sup>298</sup> ‘Ābidā Ḥussain is a senior politician whose most of standing has been with different factions of Muslim League. She started her career as Chairperson of the District Council Jhang in 1985 and then

methodology is endorsed when he uses the Prophetic traditions from the source of Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Āishā. In case of Shahādat and its connection with the family of Prophet he quotes a Sunni source of Mishkāt Sharīf, which mentions the tradition from Prophet in which he predicted the martyrdom of Ḥussain. All these efforts are not only to extend the meaning of dhikr-i-Ḥussain to the audiences but also to establish that still the legacy of Ḥussain is there. It is there to be followed and it is obligatory upon every Muslim to be conscious of that legacy and attach himself with that legacy otherwise he would cease to be a Muslim. All this worked very well for the extension of the performance of dhikr-i-Ḥussain but, as discussed above, it was unable to meet the electoral demands. At the end of his speech he demanded the audiences to vote for him if they want the continuity of the tradition and legacy of Ḥussain. He was unable to win the coming elections in which he participated. One reason for the defeat can be his direct demand for vote after establishing himself a Ḥussainī. People of the constituency are of the view that if he had left his speech without a demand for vote, he would have been elected with a well-defined margin from his contesters. They are of the view that culturally, people of Jhang do not like to mix the religion with politics. Even in the case of Sipāh Ṣaḥāba they vote for a sectarian group rather than religion.<sup>299</sup>

### 3.2.4. Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī's speech: Performance of Shahāda (martyrdom)

#### 3.2.4.1. Context

Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī's speech can also be contextualised into two backgrounds. One is its immediate context and the second is the historical one. This speech is delivered at the same sacred time of *Shab-i- 'āshūr*, as was the case with Qādirī's speech. Again, like Qādirī, his immediate context can be identified through his own syntax. It is focused to attract the Sunnite majority in the area to join the Deobandi fold and differentiate Deobandi Islam from Barelwī as a true version of Islam. Secondly, as described in the previous chapter, regarding the emergence of the middle

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entered in National politics. She had been a diplomatic ambassador to USA (1991-93) and worked as Federal Minister Science and Technology (1997-99). <http://ecp.gov.pk/Documents/GE%201972-1997.pdf> NA 68

<sup>299</sup> Ḥassan, "From the Pulpit to Ak-47: Sectarian Conflict in Jhang, Pakistan," 67-87

Most of the electoral support is limited to the migrated Deobandi community.

classes and the rise of critic on the socio-cultural script, he wants to point out the equation of socio-cultural traditions with the excommunication from religion. This aspect is linked with the rise of middle classes on the basis that Ḥaq Nawāz was a local inhabitant of the soil and in social terms he could only challenge cultural script due to a class change. It is also evident from the incident quoted by Maulānā Ilyās Bālākautī that the foremost issue that compelled Ḥaq Nawāz to launch this anti- Shia and Barelwī movement was an incident in which a landlord abused the Ṣaḥāba while taming a bull in the fields. Ḥaq Nawāz could not cope with that owing to the social capital of the landlord but once he came to urban centre, he waged a resistance against the traditional religion and traditional society as well.

The historical context is highly embedded in the discourse around the competitive stature of the Family of Prophet and his Companions. Ḥaq Nawāz extended the Sunnite version with the addition of disgrace of Ṣaḥāba, as a crime which leads immediately to excommunication. He placed his speech to purify Sunnite Islam of Shi'ite traces. His focus on 'Aṭā Ullāh Bukhārī contextualises his efforts for the purification of religion as Bukhārī is famous for his movement and role against Aḥmadis which concluded in the latter's excommunication from Islam.

### 3.2.4.2. Scene

Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī, the founder of Anjuman Sipāh Ṣaḥāba Pakistan, was a leading orator in the Deoband sect in Jhang. He was khaṭīb at Jāmi'a Maṣjid Maḥalla Pipliyān wālā which is popularly known as '*markaz*' (center).<sup>300</sup> He also took part in politics and contested an election against Sayyidah 'Ābidā Ḥussain.<sup>301</sup> The khiṭāb, which is the part of this study, is delivered at Aḥrār Park is named after the famous Aḥrār Movement.<sup>302</sup> This place is near the Jāmi'a Maṣjid (a mosque where Jum'a prayer is offered) and is located in front of the residence of Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī. This

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<sup>300</sup> Jāmi'a Mosque near Maḥalla Pipliyān wālā is commonly known as '*Markaz*'. The word markaz can be translated as center in English. This mosque was held by Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī and currently is managed by his descendants. It is situated in the circumference of 200 meters from the Barelwī markaz 'Purānī 'īd gāh'.

<sup>301</sup> Although he lost the election against 'Ābidā Ḥussain yet his political descendants pocketed 38995, 62486, 55004 and 44796 votes respectively in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections of National Assembly. Results obtained from [www.ecp.gov.pk](http://www.ecp.gov.pk)

<sup>302</sup> Kamran, "Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan," 55-85.

is delivered on the 9<sup>th</sup> of Muḥarram and is part of the shuhadā al-Islam conference.<sup>303</sup> The title or subject of the khiṭāb is ‘wāqi‘a-i-Karbalā’ (Incident of Karbalā). He starts his sermon with the Khuṭba and then after giving some initial remarks about his previous sermon he announces that he wants to avail as much of this time to enrich his audience. So that, even if someone would be missing the coming day’s sermon, they will not be deprived of some basic aspects of my subject. Then he starts his khiṭāb about Shahādāt and Shahādāt-i-Ḥussain.<sup>304</sup>

### 3.2.4.3. Performing Shahādāt

He initiates his discussion with the quotation from the Khalīl Aḥmad Sahāranpūrī’s Fatawā-i-Khalīliyya. Sahāranpūrī<sup>305</sup> decrees,

Muḥarram kay mahīnay main Shahādāt-i-Ḥussain kau is andāz main bayān karnā jis main sāth dīgar Ṣaḥāba-i-karām kā Tadhkirah nā hau, dīgar shuhadā kay Faḍā’il nā haun....., is qisam kī Shahādāt bayān karnā ḥarām’ hay, ḥarām’ hay, ḥarām’ hay.

Translation:

Remembrance of Martyrdom of Ḥussain without mentioning the rest of martyrs in the early history of Islam are erroneous and this way of remembrance is forbidden, forbidden and forbidden.

He endorses that martyrdom of Ḥussain comes in a sequence and without that context of the sacrifices of Ṣaḥāba the martyrdom of Ḥussain not only is incomprehensible but also is useless to be narrated. Ḥussain is not the sole custodian of martyrdom, but

<sup>303</sup> The main title of the conference is always “Shuhadā al-Islam Conference”. This title is given to challenge the Shi‘ite reductionism of remembrance of martyrdom of Ḥussain only.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AG6E7MTGsm8>

Interview with Shaikh Ḥākim ‘Alī, Former Provincial Minister Fisheries and founding member of Anjuman Sipāh Ṣaḥāba Paksitan, September, 2016

<sup>304</sup> The incident of Karbalā and its different narrations

<sup>305</sup> Khalīl Sahāranpūrī, *Mitraq al- Karāmā*, (Lahore: Sunni Dār al-Ishā‘at, 1980), 7

Khalīl Sahāranpūrī belonged to Sahāranpūr, he was born in December 1852. He was affiliated with Deobandi school of thought. He authored *Badhl al-Majhūd*, an 18-volume commentary on the Ḥadīth collection. He was also a sufi shaikh of Chishtī order, being a disciple and successor of Rashīd Aḥmad Gangūhī.

he comes at a later stage. We should remind the sacrifices of Abu Bakr<sup>306</sup>, ‘Umar<sup>307</sup>, ‘Uthmān<sup>308</sup>, Sumayyā<sup>309</sup> and rest of the Ṣaḥāba before the sacrifice of Ḥussain, he added.

Islām itnā qīmtī hay kay is islam pay lahū-i-‘Umar lagā, lahū-i-‘Uthmān lagā, lahū-i-Sumayyā lagā ... Lahū-i-Bilāl lagā, ... lahū-i-Zubair lagā..... batānā sirf yay hay kay is Islam kay liay āik jān nahī gaī hazāraun jānain gaī hain.

Translation

(Islam is so much precious that it is supported by the sacred blood of ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān, Sumayyā, Bilāl, Zubair... I want to clarify that it is not a single individual (Ḥussain) who has saved Islam through the sacrifice of his life, but they are in thousands.)

This trend of thought is not new, but in Indian Sub-Continent this approach took birth with the establishment of seminaries like Deoband. This approach has been identified by the Shias as Nāṣbiyya. Muḥammad Nafa‘, a Barelwī scholar and a graduate of Deoband also exhibited the same idea in his writings.<sup>310</sup> At the same time, Maulānā Ṭariq Jamīl, a renowned Deobandi cleric has focused a lot on the Shahāda of Ḥussain in the current scenario. His narration of ‘Wāqī‘a’ of Karabalā resembles Shias in its performances.<sup>311</sup> He believes in the supremacy of Family of Prophet.

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<sup>306</sup> Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, he argues, sacrificed a lot. In Deobandi narrations Abu Bakr sacrificed his household, his business for Prophet and joined Prophet in Migration from Makkā to Madīnā.

<sup>307</sup> ‘Umar, second Caliph, lost life at the hands of a Persian slave.

<sup>308</sup> ‘Uthmān, the third Caliph also faced a lot of hardships and was also assassinated by a rebellious group. So, his sacrifices, according to Ḥaq Nawāz are equally worthy to be remembered.

<sup>309</sup> She was first female martyr in the history of Islam.

<sup>310</sup> Nafa‘, *Ruḥamā Baināhum*, 46

<sup>311</sup> Talk Shows Central, Waqia e Karbalā | Bayan By Maulana Tariq Jameel 12 October 2016 | Dunya News, You Tube Video, Posted (2016), 45:06, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZExS9aNKgw>

Then he proceeds with the clarification of his point of view and differentiating himself from the rest of Sunni scholars (Barelwī). He says, “I am a Sunni, neither a Rāfḍī (deserter/disloyal) nor an agent of Rāfḍī.”<sup>312</sup>

Main nahī mān saktā Hau Sunni aur rifḍ us say payār karay, jau rifḍ  
Paighambar kay pihlū main saunāy wālay say payār nahī kar saktā wu  
Jhang kī mattī say kaisay payār kar saktā hay. Zāhir hay kay kuch dāl  
main kālā kālā ḍarūr hau gā

Translation

(I cannot accept that a Sunni can be loved by a Shia. The Shias do not love the persons lying buried with Prophet (Abu Bakr and ‘Umar), how come they could love a Sunni of Jhang. It is evident that there is something wrong. (Qādirī seems to be a Shia)

He maintains that the rest of scholars have made common cause with the Shias and now they are not liable to use the title of Ahl al-Sunnat. According to him, the speeches and sermons held at Purānī ‘īd gāh are being fully facilitated by the Shia inhabitants of the vicinity so, for sure, they have established some common grounds.<sup>313</sup> Ḥaq Nawāz in his career as a religious scholar, entangled both with Shias and Barelwīs. He contested a famous polemic, *Fataḥ al-Mubīn* (Clear Success) with Ashraf Sayyālī.

He quotes a verse that is generally related with Mu‘īn al-Dīn Chishtī of Ajmair without mentioning the name of saint and criticises the content of the verse. The verse is, ‘*Ḥaqah kay Binā-i-Lā Illah Ast Ḥussain*’ (Base of Oneness of God is Ḥussain).<sup>314</sup> He strongly criticises the verse and maintains that the root of *La Illah* is not Ḥussain

<sup>312</sup> Khalīl Sahāranpūrī, *Hidāyat al-shia*, (Lahore: Maktaba al-Madīnā), 67

*Rāfḍī* is derived from the Arabic word ‘*rifḍ*’ which means to desert. So, the *Rāfḍī* means the person has left his group or army to which they belonged to. This is a term that is used for the Shias to establish that they have in fact deserted the mainstream Islam. (sources) *Rāfḍī*

<sup>313</sup> The people with whom he contested *Fataḥ al-Mubīn*.

<sup>314</sup> Persian verses connected with Mu‘īn al-Dīn Chishtī, founder of Chishtī Sufī order in India.

Shāh ast Ḥussain (Ḥussain is King)

Bād shāh ast Ḥussain (Ḥussain is an absolute monarch)

Dīn ast Ḥussain (Ḥussain is religion)

Dīn panāh ast Ḥussain (Ḥussain is the savior of religion)

but was the Prophet himself. This verse, according to the performer, is against the spirit of Islam and is causing confusion in the statuses. He announces that he will not allow someone to snatch the status of Prophet. At this movement, he suddenly complains about the noise from the female side. Thus, to confirm the female participation. He curses them with the words, “Allah Inhaun nau māray” (may God kill them) but shortly afterwards he changes his words and says, “May Allah show them the right path”. He warns the women that next time they will not be made the part of these gatherings due to their misconduct. This behaviour towards women is very common in the whole District. Women are part of almost all ‘majālis’ of Shia sect and at times they are criticised by the performer on the issue of making noise. In fact, they are mostly separated from the main audiences through a curtain and this aloofness is manifested in the lack of interest from the female side.

Next, Ḥaq Nawāz indirectly blames the Shias of the murder of Ḥussain, an age-old blame that the Sunnis put on Shias. He is determined to show the people who plotted against Ḥussain in Kūfa. Who called on that meeting? Who invited Ḥussain to Kūfa? What was the point of View of Ḥussain and what was the point of view of Yazīd?<sup>315</sup>

The most interesting part of his speech is the harsh critique on the socio-cultural customs and traditions and their equation with the Shia sect. The customs, social stratification and caste-based affiliations, according to him are repugnant to the spirit of Islam. He equates this so-called socio-cultural corruption with Shia and Barelwī sects. He starts criticising both regarding their following of social rituals particularly regarding marriage by calling them as,

Zarā Apnī Ḥussainiyyat daikh shādī āa ga’ī nau shau ghaut pūrī jur’at kay  
sāth hādir hay..... yay jurat dikhāna kis kau hay..... sauhrāy dā bhajā  
hauway tān sauchay .... ah churī lay kay jāndā kiday hay.... Karbalā jau  
hay..... pair day agay chhūwnrī hay.... Jau taurnī hay..... ay  
Ḥussainiyyat hay?

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<sup>315</sup> *Kūfi* is the second term that is to denote Shia sect. In Deobandi discourse Shias themselves killed the Ḥussain and now they are weeping for their own sin. These were the kūfis (The people of Kūfā, an important garrison in the early days of Islam, had been the capital during the caliphate of ‘Alī, the father of Ḥussain) who first invited Ḥussain to come and then deserted him in favour of Yazīd.



## Translation

(Look at your behaviour, is it Ḥussainiyat to carry a knife in hand at the time of marriage. To whom you want to show your bravery? To your in-laws? Where you intend to go with this knife? You want to go to Karbalā. Is this all means Ḥussainiyyat?)

Immorality, he proceeds, is part of most of the customary tradition related to marriage. Groom carries a knife or a little sword in his hands.<sup>316</sup> Then he must break a clay lid. Is all that is the symbol of his bravery? He adds that groom in a ritual must carry a pot of water and in case of failure he is twisted with fingers by the young girls. “Is it your Ḥussainiyyat?” “Even now you uphold that you are Ḥussainī?” Then the water pot is to be filled by a ‘*Dā’i*’<sup>317</sup>, Ulū dā pathā! (stupid)<sup>318</sup> Cannot he fill his water pot himself? All these traditions involve the role of women that is not only repugnant to Islam but also to the honour and status being a human being.

His speech contains a considerable part in which he praised the personality of ‘Atā Ullāh Shāh Bukhārī<sup>319</sup>. It seems he wants to establish himself in the narrative of ‘Atā Ullāh Shāh Bukhārī. His praise of Bukhārī is also linked with the politics of excommunication which was started by Bukhārī in case of Qādiyyānis and carried on by Ḥaq Nawāz applying the case upon Shia sect. He narrates two incidents regarding the religious and spiritual intellect of ‘Atā Ullāh Shāh Bukhārī, the first incident occurred in Māchhīwāl<sup>320</sup> where he came to contest a polemic with Maulwī Nadhar of

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<sup>316</sup> It is a tradition in Jhang, although currently diminishing, that the bride holds a metal knife in his hands to avoid some bad omens and intervention of ghosts in his newly married life.

<sup>317</sup> “*Dā’i*” is a multipurpose term used in the district Jhang specifically and generally in the whole Punjab. It contains the following meanings.

1. The one who bakes the bread at a public stove.
2. The one who operates the child delivery
3. The one who looks after the infants of feudals
4. It is also a common term used for the *Nā’i* (hairdresser).

Here the fourth connotation is used. A female from ‘*Nā’i*’ caste (menials) fills a tub of water for the bath of the bride groom. The first and the second *Dā’i* belong to the ‘*Māchhī*’ caste of menials.

<sup>318</sup> He abuses the bridegroom as son of a stupid parent.

<sup>319</sup> A confirmation of the thesis of Tahir Kamran. Tahir Kamran links the establishment of Sipāh Ṣaḥāba as a continuity of the issue and policies of *Majlis al-Aḥrār*.

<sup>320</sup> Māchhīwāl is in the Western part of the District near the Southern bank of river *Jehlam*. This area lies in between the river and desert and is denoted as Kachhī. Anjuman Sipāh Ṣaḥāba get a lot of

Silānwālī. This polemic was on the issue of *nūr* or *bashar*<sup>321</sup> being of the Prophet. ‘Atā Ullāh Shāh spoke throughout the night and at the end he asked the audience about himself. When he found respect in the eyes of people he asked about his deliverance and they replied that it was matchless. He stated, “You did not consider me as a son of a human being”. I am a descendant of the Prophet and you consider him *nūr* and not a *bahsar*. Ḥaq Nawāz adds that this moment was decisive in the history of Māchhīwāl and all the people adhered to the thoughts of ‘Atā Ullāh Shāh Bukhārī. Then the speaker narrates another incident related to the ‘karāmā’ of Bukhārī. Bukhārī once asked Allah during a speech which was disturbed by a thunderstorm, “Allah Quran Nahū Parhan daindā” (O God! Would you please let me finish the recitation of Quran?). The moment Bukhārī delivered these words, the storm stopped. Bukhārī’s personality is also elevated by putting a reference to Pīr Mihar ‘Alī Shāh<sup>322</sup> of Gaulṛā Sharīf. Speaker announces that Pīr Mihar ‘Alī Shāh prayed for the oral talent of ‘Atā Ullāh Bukhārī and for the writing capabilities of Maulānā Zafar ‘Alī Khān.<sup>323</sup> Speaker added that these personalities turned the British Empire towards defeat. Ḥaq Nawāz ends his discussion about Bukhārī in the words, “Rāt kiya yād rakhay gī, Bukhārī kay ba‘ad kisī nay rāt kau jagāyā” (Even the night will remember that how Bukhārī woke up the night itself) This sentence is very famous for Shias which consider it as a statement of ‘Alī.<sup>324</sup>

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support from this area. Māchhīwāl is a common name in Punjab and is used in various districts like Vehari and Mandi Bahā al-Dīn for different places. (District Gazzetair)

<sup>321</sup> *Nūr*’ connotes to the concept that is followed by Shias and Barelwīs and that Muḥammad unlike the rest of humanity is made up of Light, which is emanated from God. On the other hand, *Bashar* means that Muḥammad’s being is composed just like the rest of human beings.

<sup>322</sup> ‘Atā Ullāh Shāh Bukhārī was a leading Deobandi religious and political leader and was among the notable leaders and founders of Majlis al-Aḥrār Islam. He struggled against the colonial rule and after partition of India, his role is prominent in the persecution of Aḥmdiyya movement in Pakistan.

Pīr Mihar ‘Alī Shāh belonged to the shrine of Gaulṛā Sharīf. He was the first among the Chishtī Sufi order who issued a decree of excommunication of Aḥmadīs.

See also, Tahir Kamran, “Sharī‘a, Shias and Chishtiya Revivalism: Contextualizing the growth of Sectarianism in the Tradition of Sayyālvi Saints of Punjab,” *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 24, no. 3 (2014): 455-77

Also, The name of Khalīl Aḥmad Sahāranpūrī is mentioned above. He is the foremost author who is quoted by Ḥaq Nawāz in his speech. Sahāranpūrī was also enunciated in Chishtī order.

<sup>323</sup> Maulānā Zafar ‘Alī Khan is a prominent name in the freedom movement of India. He was a leading journalist. He issued a newspaper named as ‘*Zamīndār*’.

<sup>324</sup> In Shi‘ite tradition this phrase is quoted among the famous traditions of ‘Alī.

#### 3.2.4.4. Strategy

He ends his sermon by repeating his argument and coming back to the discussion of hardships faced by the Prophet. He repeats that the narration of sacrifice during the month of Muḥarram should be started with narration of hardships faced by the Prophet, then his companions and Ḥussain comes later in the hierarchy of remembrance.

#### 3.2.4.5. Blending the elements

This speech is delivered at a time which has become ritualistic in the commemoration of Tragedy of Karbalā. A large-scale mediatisation of the event of *‘āshūra* compels the scholars from different sects to avail this ‘sacred’ time. This availability is also made to keep the audiences intact with the sect and leadership. Ḥaq Nawāz’s basic struggle was to minimise the sacredness of this time and to raise the voice for the dignified status of companions of the Prophet. Thus, he availed this immediate context of Muḥarram but connected it with his historical context which he himself borrowed from some Deoband scholars of colonial period. He blended his context with the act of his speech by creating some equations. While doing so he kept intact with the narrative that he gained from Sahāranpūrī. He equated the elevation of Shahādat of Ḥussain with the ‘bad intention of Shias’. Then he managed an equation of Shias and Barelwīs, especially Barelwīs of Purānī ‘īd Gāh. He must have been informed with the fact that the Barelwīs he mentioned were actively taking part in polemical text with the Shias. The third equation is the equation of the above mentioned two sects with the cultural patterns which according to him are repugnant to the basic teachings of Islam. Therefore, he rejects the whole package of equations and tries to convey it to the audiences. Here is portrayed the cultural extension or the blend of act with the background knowledge of the audiences. He utilises the symbols of ‘Atā Ullāh Shāh Bukhārī, Maulānā Sahārapūrī and Pīr Mihar ‘Alī Shāh to justifiably connect his audiences with the narrative, he is following.

His blending of the act with the context is done through the equations of Shi‘ism, Barelwīsm and culture and this extension of the performance is maintained by the authoritative symbolism of famous Deobandi and Sufi personalities.

### 3.3. Shia Majālis (congregation)

Shias observe gatherings for the remembrance of the Family of the Prophet. The immediate connotation of the term majlis is sad; it denotes the recitation of historical events of hardships faced by the family of the Prophet. On the other hand, majlis is not only meant for the commemoration of hardships but it also holds the aspects of happiness. Based on the above two aspects, majālis are broadly divided into two categories i.e. majlis-i-‘azā and jashan-i-wilādat.<sup>325</sup> Majālis are also held to commemorate the death anniversary of deceased family members. In Shia tradition, commemoration of the annual death anniversary by observing a majlis is very common in this part of the country.<sup>326</sup> It is an interesting way to commemorate historical events with a blend of basic belief structure of the sect. These kinds of gatherings are oral in their nature. These majālis have their particular format, script, space and audiences. As it is obvious from the definition of the majlis that its context lies in the celebration of different historical events linked with the Shi‘ite Imāms, so the next part deals mostly with the format and structure of majlis performance, its scripts and cultural communication to the audiences. majlis is mostly held at specific spaces which are entitled as Imām bārgāh, Imām bārā, ‘azā Khānā. Imām bārgāh<sup>327</sup> is the memorial imitation of *Bait al-Huẓn*, which per Shi‘ite tradition was built by ‘Alī and Fāṭimā to commemorate the grief of demise of Prophet Muḥammad.<sup>328</sup> So, these spaces are built to follow the tradition of the Family of the Prophet, set for the observance of grief. Imām bārgāh is built by following the architectural symbols of

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<sup>325</sup> Majlis-i-‘azā is an umbrella term but generally it stands for the gathering held for the remembrance of hardships of Family of Prophet on the days of their demise. Jashan-i-Wilādat connotes to pleasant gatherings held at the days of the births of Imāms. Spatial decoration also varies in both gatherings. For majlis-i-‘azā the Imām Bārgāh is designed with the sorrowful images of *Karbalā* on the other hand Jashan-i-Wilādat is held with the lightings and ornamentation of space. The most popular images are ‘alam (black flag). *Ta’ziyya*, *dhuljīnāh* (image of Ḥussain’s, third Imām. Horse and *Jhūlā* (image of cradle of ‘Alī Aṣghar) Dress code for the audience is also different. For majlis-i-‘azā black dress is recommended.

<sup>326</sup> Majālis-i-‘azā and Barsī

Apnay bichhray hūay Rishtūn nay pukārā jab bhī

Hum kau Zahra tairī aulād kay gham yād ay.....

(Whenever we remember our departed fellows

We commemorate the hardships of Descendants of Fāṭimā)

<sup>327</sup> This *Bārgāh* connotes to the political aspects of Imamate. It can be denoted to preserve the conception of political imamate which, practically, is silenced in the present discourse.

<sup>328</sup> Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī in his *Sa‘ādat al-Dārain fī maqṭal al-Ḥussain* and ‘Alī Naqī Naqan in his *Ta’rīkh-i-Islam* describe ‘*Bait al-Huẓn*’ More detail and more references

shrines of Imāms in Karbalā and Mashhad (City in Iran).<sup>329</sup> However, the above discussion does not mean that Imām bargāhs are the only places where majālis are commenced. Majālis are also held in the houses and in other open places as well. In this case these places are decorated with the symbols attached with the space of Imām bārgāh. Stage is decorated with an *‘alam* (flag) and on its background a banner is mostly elevated which contains either a quotation like Yā ‘Alī maddad, Salām Yā Ḥussain or with a tradition from Prophet or Imām. The whole place is divided into two parts for the male and female participants. Normally a complete separation of the male and female portion is supposed to be observed but practically these parts are separated with a rope only.

Shia majālis are attended both by male and female participants. As mentioned in the above paragraph about the space of Imām bārgāh that the whole area is divided into male and female portions, so the female participation is obvious. Female participation is encouraged by the community. Their participation is essential for the observance of the majlis and in many respect majlis cannot be performed only in the male audiences. On the participation of the women there are different views which justify it and in other words endorse it. Dhākir Ghulām Shabbīr ‘Imrānī, when asked about the participation of women, viewed that as the majlis is a commemoration of the martyrdom of Imāms, so as per the local tradition of the area women accompany men in the ceremonies of condolence. So according to him, “We bring our women to condole Imām al-Zamān, as per our tradition”.<sup>330</sup> Maulānā Najam al-Ḥassan, in charge of a religious seminary Jāmi‘a Imām Sajjād’ was of the view that female participation is necessary to fulfil the tradition of Karbalā. He added that Ḥussain sacrificed in the Karbalā but His martyrdom was rescued by His female family members, especially His sister, who advocated for the righteous position of his brother, while she was a prisoner. She is also entitled as ‘Fātiḥā-i-Shām’ (Conqueror of Syria).<sup>331</sup>

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<sup>329</sup> See picture

<sup>330</sup> Interview with Dhākir Ghulām Shabbīr ‘Imrānī. Ghulām Shabbīr ‘Imrānī is the son of Dhākir Ghulām Ḥaider Malang. ‘Imrānī maintained that he the third generation in the institution of Dhākirī.

<sup>331</sup> Interview with Sayyid Najam al-Ḥassan, Principal Jāmi‘a Imām Sajjād, a Shia seminary in Jhang saddar. He belongs to Saiwa Sādāt, a town in Tehsil Aḥmadpur Sayyāl, and his whole family is directly or indirectly attached with learning of religious scholarship. September, 2013

Female participation is also considered necessary with some performative aspects of the majlis. Some majālis are followed with the *Shabīh-i-Janāzā* of the Imāms and Pious women from Prophet's household.<sup>332</sup> The *Shabīh-i-Janāzā* of the pious Fāṭimā and Zainab and Sakīnā are mostly confined to the female part and men avoid seeing the funeral.<sup>333</sup> This aspect will be discussed in detail in the coming paragraphs.

### 3.3.1. Structure of the majlis tradition

Majlis performance formats or structures itself in a certain way. It involves certain practices to justify its overall impact which communicates set meanings, attached with it, to the audiences. It has its purposely chosen starting points and specific endings. This part contains a detailed analysis of majālis performances of famous Dhākirīn and Shia scholars of district Jhang. These include Āghā Nasīm 'Abbās Riḍwī<sup>334</sup>, Maulwī Fāḍil Ḥussain 'Alwī<sup>335</sup>, Mahar Muḥammad Fayyāḍ<sup>336</sup>, Dhākir Zarghām 'Abbās Shāh<sup>337</sup> and Dhākir Ghulām Shabbīr 'Imrānī. This analysis will reveal how these different personalities adopt different position while performing the Majlis and what these differences produce as a result.

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<sup>332</sup> *Shabīh-i-Janāzā* is the symbol of the funeral. The participation of woman in the fore-funeral rituals is an important aspect of the culture. There a famous sentence mostly is narrated by the Shia Dhākir "*Putr Jā'idād day Wārith Dhī Manjī dī Wārith*" (A son inherits the property; a daughter is the sole custodian of deceased funeral). So, a person is considered lucky if his fore funeral rituals are well observed by his daughter with full grief. Female participation in Majālis is also supported and recommended based on this social-cultural tradition.

<sup>333</sup> The *Shabīh-i-Janāzā* of the female members of the Family of Prophet is normally held only in the female portions of the majlis gatherings and is avoided being brought into the male's side. The male participants even avoid watching the funeral.

<sup>334</sup> Āghā Nasīm 'Abbās Riḍwī a migrated Shia whose family got shifted near Aḥmadpur Sayyāl.

<sup>335</sup> Fāḍil Ḥussain 'Alwī's family migrated from Amratsar and shifted at Garh Mahārājā, a town in south western part of District. Here the influential feudal Sayyāl family belonged to Shia sect. They sent their men at Walton (refugee camp in Lahore) to attract the Shia migrants from there for settling at Garh Mahārājā. A 'wan family was brought here by them. (Interview with Qaisar 'Alwī, nephew of Fāḍil Ḥussain 'Alwī and interview with Maulwī Anwar 'Alī from Garh Mahārājā)

<sup>336</sup> Mahar Fayyāḍ belongs to Sayyāl family and considered as the disciple of Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī.

<sup>337</sup> Dhākir Zarghām 'Abbās is the third generation in this field after his grandfather Sayyid Ḥassan Shāh and his father Sayyid Ghulām 'Abbās Shāh. He is also preparing his son Na'lain 'Abbās to succeed him in this field. His stepbrother Sayyid Ahtashām 'Abbās is also linked with the same field.

### 3.3.1.1. Khuṭba

It is the starting point of a majlis celebration. It is the Arabic oral practice which mostly consists of the recitation of Quran blended with some tradition of Prophet or Imām or a prayer connected with the Prophet and the Family of the Prophet.<sup>338</sup> This practice blends the different aspects of Shia belief and points to the sources of their guidance. Shi'ite Islam constructs itself around the following of Quran, Sunnah, directions of Imām.<sup>339</sup> The Khuṭba recitation tries to remind the audience about the grand Shia narratives and builds the context of the overall majlis performance. The narrator designs the format of the Khuṭba himself. While delivering Khuṭba, he is supposed to be polite and more respectful. On the other hand, the audience also observes silence and recites *Durūd* on particular junctures of the practice. Audiences know how and when recite *durūd* during Khuṭba.<sup>340</sup> It is mostly recited when the names of the Prophet and Imāms are mentioned by the narrator. The *qir'at* of Khuṭba also distinguishes religious scholar from dhākir. Scholars recite the Khuṭba as per the accepted patterns of qir'at, but dhākir have evolved their own patterns of qir'at.<sup>341</sup> The content of the Khuṭba also decide the ideological position of the performer. Religious scholars, as opposed to the Dhākirs, present the immediate context and the topic of their discussion in the Khuṭba. The proceeding sections details the comparative analysis of the Khuṭba of various Shia oral performers.

### 3.3.1.2. Faḍā'il

Khuṭba mostly leads to Faḍā'il<sup>342</sup>, but in some cases, it is preceded with *mussaddas*.<sup>343</sup> Faḍā'il practice is diverse in its composition. It depends upon the

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<sup>338</sup> *Al-Ḥussain Minī wā Anā min al-Ḥussain*

<sup>339</sup> Nasr, *Shi'ite Islam*, 45

<sup>340</sup> When comes the name of Prophet and Family of Prophet and after the recitation of *Āyat al-Taḥīr* (a quranic verse that validates the purity in infallibility of family of Prophet).

<sup>341</sup> Patterns of Qir'at in Shi'ite Islam and the patterns of Khuṭba of Shia *Dhākir*

<sup>342</sup> The composition of Khuṭba lays the foundation basis of the Faḍā'il performance. Especially the ending phrases, as mentioned above, decide the pattern and content of Faḍā'il.

<sup>343</sup> *Mussaddas* is a chorus performance, which is performed by Dhākirs with a party of their assistants, *Sauzī*.

Maqdūr hamain kab hay tairī waṣṣaun kī raqam kā

(We do not intend to write down your attribute)

Ḥaqā kay khudā wand tū hay lauh wa qalam kā

person (dhākir, ‘ālim) who is the main actor in this performance, how he leads it. Here lies the main distinction between a religious scholar (‘ālim) and a simple narrator (dhākir). A religious scholar, who delivers a majlis is supposed to be well versed in the religious knowledge of the basic beliefs, practices and history. His deliverance mostly follows the patterns of Khuṭba. He chooses a topic and then constructs a debate based on the Quran, Ḥadīth and directions of Imām. On the other hand, dhākir relies on romantic ways of communication to highlight the contributions of family of the Prophet for the Islam and narrates the pleasant episodes of Ahl al-Bait. He utilises the variation of his voice and Shi‘ite symbols to attract the gathering to enchant the pleasure of Imāms. Dhākir, instead of rationalising his stance based on basic sources, tries to use the cultural ways for the communication of his message.<sup>344</sup> An important aspect of this kind of practice is qaṣīdah, which Dhākir recite either himself or in a chorus. His melodious voice plays a vital role in this regard.<sup>345</sup> He even utilises some classical and semi classical melodies to deliver *qaṣīdah*. This aspect of the Faḍā’il practice is criticised by the religious scholars, who have some adverse opinion about the music.<sup>346</sup> This division between the Dhākirs and ‘Ulamā also exhibits their ideological positions in the intra sectarian discourse. The audiences are found to be more relaxed in this part as far as its comparison with the other practices of majlis is concerned. They raise slogans to encourage the narrator and exhibit their joy.<sup>347</sup> Audiences are also appealed by the dress code of the speaker and other non-verbal

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(We believe you are the creator of all destiny)

Kauthar hay Nabī kā tū Kāsā hay ‘Alī kā

(Kauthar (Holy Water) is owned by Prophet and distributed by ‘Alī)

Kāsāy kay nīchay hāth, Ḥussain Ibn ‘Alī kā

(Ḥussain is the helping hand in the distribution of Kawthar)

See ShiaTV, DHĀKIR HĀFID MOHAMMAD ‘AlīBALOCH 1B, You Tube Video, Posted (2008) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z8mlA3amIS4>

<sup>344</sup> 107AliAli, *Dhākir Ghulām Abbās Ratan best qasida 2013 at majlis jhang*, You Tube Video, Posted (2013) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpTo48EcoCE>

Dhākir Ghulām ‘Abbās Rattan is reciting qaṣīdah. This *qaṣīdah* follows the musical patterns of a famous *Ghazal* by a known Pakistani singer, *Ghulām ‘Alī*.

Chamaktay chānd kaw Tūtā tārā banā dālā (you have turned a beautiful moon into a broken star)

<sup>345</sup> NADEYALI, *DHĀKIR GHULĀM QAMBAR QASEEDA*, You Tube Video, Posted (2008) [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_2rBAU\\_kBio](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_2rBAU_kBio)

Dhākir Ghulām Qanbar is reciting a Qaṣīdah with chorus.

<sup>346</sup> Ḥussain, *Aṣlī Islām aur Rasmī Islām*, 34-38

<sup>347</sup> Shia raise three slogans, *Takbīr*, *Risālat*, and *Haidrī*



symbols present inside the space. Religious scholars use ‘abā and qabā following the dress code of Shi‘ite religious scholars of Qum (Iran) and Najaf (Iraq). Dhākir uses, mostly, the cultural dress.<sup>348</sup> They mostly wear rings and bracelets embedded with some stones that bear spiritual connotations.<sup>349</sup>

### 3.3.1.3. Maṣā’ib

Maṣā’ib is mostly the last part of a majlis performance. It can be categorised as the most significant part of the performance. The sequence of the preceding practices seems to pave way for these practices in which sorrowful episodes of tragedy of Karbalā and the tragedies faced by the Imāms are narrated. This narration is also diverse on the same basis as are in the case of qaṣīdah. ‘Ulamā recite the hardships of the Ahl al-Bait on the basis of historical authenticity, per their own school of thought, while Dhākir blends the historical events with the cultural ways of mourning. *Nathar*<sup>350</sup>, *Wain*<sup>351</sup>, *band* and *marthiyya* are the genre; a dhākir uses to deliver his performance.<sup>352</sup> The audiences are supposed to be more attentive in this part of the majlis. It is the gloomiest part of performance in which audience weeps bitterly and, in some cases, beat their head with their hands as well.

As it has been established earlier that, ‘Ulamā and dhākirīn have different ways of performing the same concepts and ideas, so their presentation is different, and this difference is based on their discursive position in the intra sectarian discourse. Same is the case in the narration of maṣā’ib. ‘Ulamā narrate only the incidents with maximum historical authenticity. They follow the sources and history and confine the maṣā’ib performance to the historical accounts only. On the other hand, Dhākir follow

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<sup>348</sup> Shia Dhākir, as contrast to the Shia religious scholars, wears traditional dress instead of following a religious dress code.

<sup>349</sup> Most important and famous among the stones is ‘aqīq. Others are *Durr-i-Najaf*, *Yāqūt*, *Marjān* and *Nīlam*. According to traditions use of stones is recommended by Imāms on the basis of spiritual significance of these stones.

<sup>350</sup> Jamil Aqeel, *Dhākir Hāfiḍ Muḥammad ‘Alī Blooch Late*, You Tube Video, Posted (2009) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVAGt9TD8AY>

<sup>351</sup> Sayad Mushtaq, *Zaki Sabir Shāh and Dhākir Zuriat Imran and Dhākir Najam Hussain Notak (yadgar majlis)*, You Tube Video, Posted (2013) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FXr7WARCXmg>

<sup>352</sup> Historical validity vs romanticization

the romantic path.<sup>353</sup> It does not mean that this difference between the ‘Ulamā and dhākirīn is absolute. Still there are some ‘Ulamā who support the dhākirīn’s point of view and recommend romanticisation. A considerable number of dhākirīn also follow the scholarly principle of historic authenticity. Keeping exceptions aside, Dhākir, generally divide their maṣā’ib into ‘*taht al-lafẓ*’, *Nathar* and *band* followed by a *nauḥā*. *Taht al-lafẓ* is a simple narration. *Nathar* involves a narration with variation of pitch of the voice and some gloomy gestures of the sound. *Band* is the poetical imitation of the local *Wainr*.<sup>354</sup> *Natharī* dhākir recites the *band* alone on the other hand *Sauzī* dhākir recites it in chorus. *Band* is also based on rags. The most famous rag for the recitation of *band* in *nathari* dhākirī is *Jūg*. It is famous for its sad impacts on the audiences. On the other hand, most of the dhākirs who recite *band* with *sauzīs*, generally, recite it on the notes of *Rāg Bhairwīn*. The link in the reference<sup>355</sup> contains a *band* performance of dhākir Sayyid Šābir Ḥussain Shāh of Baihal who is the pioneer of *natharī* dhākirī.

While doing so they are not following any written commands, but it is culturally told to Shia youngsters, when to enchant and where to cry during majlis. They follow the sequence of the performance which an outsider cannot. Even if the outsider understands the script, they cannot follow it due to a different cultural training.

Therefore, the cultural script not only describes its involvement in the overall performance but also guides the participants, both the performer and audience, about the particularities attached with different steps of a performance. People are aware of these sectarian scripts due to their training from childhood. Even they know the scripts of the other sects, but their training does not allow them to easily become part

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<sup>353</sup> Romanticism allows the history to be read and written on some larger canvas. Where it gives the literary traditions a status of a source of History, at the same time it also allows the narration of a historical incident with a beautification. This beautification is by the poetry, by the music or any other artistic aspect. While doing so the historical purity of the incident can be affected at the cost of beautification.

<sup>354</sup> It is a kind of lamentation over a death. This is a genre in which not all, but a limited number of women are experts and they do it on a death. The purpose is to describe the bright aspects of the personality of the deceased and the extent of loss his or her death has caused. They not only weep themselves but at the same time they create a gloomy atmosphere which causes many attendees to weep.

<sup>355</sup> Dhākir Ghazanfar ‘abbas Gondal, *Dhākir Sayad Sabir Ḥussain Shāh of baehill ydagar majlis at kachhi bhakkar*, YouTube Video, Posted (May,2013), 04:30-08:53,

of another's performance. These scripts are not absolute but, due to their cultural position, are subject to vary. The variation in cultural script takes place gradually.

### 3.3.2. Āghā Nasīm 'Abbās' speech: Performance of namāz (obligatory prayers)

#### 3.3.2.1. Context

Āghā Nasīm 'Abbās, a renowned Shia scholar belonged to Aḥmadpur Sayyāl. He is one of the most significant religious scholars/orators in the Shia majālis. He delivered this speech on 1<sup>st</sup> of December. This date in Shia majālis in Jhang bears a ritualistic connotation. This annual gathering is organised by dhākir Sayyid Zarghām 'Abbās Shāh and is attended by an audience from different parts of Punjab province.<sup>356</sup> This gathering itself is a strong context because majority of the participants in this gathering directly or indirectly believe in a spiritual Shi'ism. Furthermore, they are critical towards highly sophisticated canonised Shi'ite interpretations by the Religious scholars. Zarghām Shāh himself when performs majlis delivers a remarkable praise to Sufi saints like Shāh Shams, Shahbāz Qalandar and Shair Shāh Jalāl Surkh Paush Bukhārī. This aspect of Shi'ism emerged especially after the Islamic revolution of Iran.

Secondly, the context of the speech can be understood from his own political content while describing the 'namāz'. He, in a way, supported the dictatorship of Perwaiz Musharraf which seems rational in the presence of certain facts. The Shi'ite community established a persona of Musharraf as a Shia. Although, Āghā Nasīm 'Abbās in this speech supported him indirectly yet at many times he showed respect for Musharraf in direct and focused expressions as well. His point of supporting Musharraf is that he belonged to the migrated class. Musharraf had been a famous figure in the migrated sections of society and specially in migrated sayyids. Presence

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<sup>356</sup> This majlis is observed at the annual death anniversary of Dhākir Sayyid Ghulām 'Abbās Shāh, father of Zarghām 'Abbās Shāh. Shia Majālis have three annual calendars. Following the Islamic calendar Majālis are commenced on 10<sup>th</sup> of Muḥarram to commemorate the martyrdom of Imām Ḥussain, 24<sup>th</sup> of Muḥarram for Imām Zain al-'Ābdīn, 12<sup>th</sup> of Safar for Sakīnāh, daughter of Ḥussain, 3<sup>rd</sup> of Jamādī al-Thānī for the remembrance of demise of Fāṭimā, daughter of Prophet, 25<sup>th</sup> of Rajab for Mūsā Kāzīm, seventh Imām. Annual Majālis on English calendar are also observed for *iṣāl thawāb* (reward of virtue) of departed souls. The fix annual dates in District Jhang include 25<sup>th</sup> of January, 22<sup>nd</sup> of February, 21<sup>st</sup> of March, 4<sup>th</sup> of August, 1<sup>st</sup> of October. The third category of Majālis is observed by following Daisī/Bikrimī calendar on 18<sup>th</sup> of Jaith and 10<sup>th</sup> of Hārr.

of Tanwīr Naqwī, Sayyid Ibn al-Ḥassan and General Mahdī supported the ethnic and sectarian claims against Musharraf.

### 3.3.2.2.Scene

This speech was delivered at Imām Bārgāh Panjtan Pāk alias Tabūtān Wālī Karrī. This place bears a symbolic impression. It is called Imām Bārgāh Panjtan Pāk on the presence of '*Shabīh-i-Mazār*' of Panjtan Pāk. The second version '*Tabūtān Wālī karrī*' connotes to its status as an ending place of *Ta'ziyya* (tābūt) procession of 10<sup>th</sup> Muḥarram. 'karrī' is the name of a plant which is commonly found in the graveyards. This space is also working as a Shia graveyard. It is highly symbolised in a discursive manner. The construction of a *shabīh*' shrine has been criticised and, in some cases, rejected by the Shia religious scholars. Secondly 'Tabūtān Wālī Karrī' is also very much socio-cultural orientation. So, the performer is acting on a highly symbolised stage which helps him to extend his meanings.

### 3.3.2.3.Performing the 'namāz'

The first case to analyse the Shia Faḍā'il is a critical discussion on the speech delivered by Āghā Nasīm 'Abbās Riḍwī at Jhang. This speech is delivered on 1<sup>st</sup> of December on the famous annual Majālis of Dhākir Sayyid Zarghām 'Abbās Shāh. The speech under discussion is interestingly diverse and is full of symbolism. The whole speech is narrated to describe the importance of namāz (Obligatory prayer) but using the symbols and while defining the epistemological position it gives some significant results. As it has been discussed in the earlier chapter (customary traditions) that the term 'mullā' bears a bad connotation in the culture and even some religious scholars try to separate themselves from the title, so is the case with this speech.<sup>357</sup>

The performer, through a self-created dialogue, criticises the behaviour of *Mullās* and blames them for pushing the people away from the religion. Although he himself

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<sup>357</sup> Mullā seems to a derogatory term in the local society. This argument is also supported from the language content of culture which bears a lot of criticism on the religious scholars.

is entitled as ‘Allāmā’ still he yearns to differentiate himself from this camp. He narrates that...

Hamain darā darā kar khud assambliyyūn main jā ghustay hain. Nām dīn kā hā hawas assembly kī. Aur agar assembly main kauī kām insānū wālā hautā tau kiyā ḍarūrat thī military kau dakhāl dainay kī. Assembly main ham nay yahī daikhā āik taraf Mistar hautā ha āik taraf maulānā. Mistar kī tie maulānā kay hāth main hautī hay aur maulānā kī (dārḥī) mistar kay hāth main. Aur āik jhagrā chal rahā hay aur sachā mujhay baichārā mistar hī lagtā hay. Wo kahtā hay maulānā tairā ghar hay masjid mairā ghar hay assembly. Jab main taray ghar nahī jātā tau mairay ghar kiūn ātā hay.

#### Translation

(The maulwīs who make us (people including the performer) afraid of God, themselves, seek a place in Assemblies. They utilise religion to access the parliament. If parliament have ever meant for some good business, there would have been no need of military interventions. We see that parliament is divided between religious scholars and modern man. They are entangled with each other. The modern individual is right when he clarifies to *mullās* that their place is in mosque instead of parliament. So, if we (modern) do not visit the mosque, why do you come here? )<sup>358</sup>

The next point is politically significant. He describes that, in his views, religion and religious scholars have nothing to do with politics and it is the business of the so-called modern people<sup>359</sup>. He is of the view that Maulwīs intrude in the liberal sphere

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<sup>358</sup> It was in the wake of establishment of Muttahidā Majlis-i-‘Amal, an alliance of the religious organizations of all sects which succeeded in the making of government in the then North West Frontier Province. See

<sup>359</sup> Here he mentions the modern man who is equipped with the modern education and has invested in himself the modern way of life. He maintains that as the parliament and such kind of things are the products of the modernity so it should be avoided by the religious people due to their anti-stand against modernity.

by claiming place in politics. He indirectly also justifies the martial law. His words are as mentioned below.

“Nām dīn kā hay hawas assembly kī hay”<sup>360</sup> (they aspire to be a parliamentarian by using the name of religion)

“If there has been any humanitarian business in the assemblies, army had no justification to take over. (He clearly says that assemblies are not doing good job that is why army comes to save the country.)”<sup>361</sup>

At another place, he says, “the only thing we witness in the assembly is the tussle between ‘mister’ and maulānā. Maulānā pushes the ‘mister’. from his tie and the ‘mister’ puts his hand in the beard (dārhī). In fact, ‘mister’. is true to establish that when he does not interfere in the house of mullā (mosque) then why mullā is intruding in his home (assembly).”

Apparently, it seems that performer is just trying to explain why people do not pay heed to the obligatory prayers or the other forms of worship. However, by attaching symbols like Tie, Dārhī and *fauj* (army) it has enlarged the canvas of his speech and indirectly advocated the dictatorship. He also connects political importance with the liberal representatives by identifying them with the title of ‘mr’ and by using “tie” as their dress symbol. His ‘Mr.’ is a worldly symbol and he follows the Sufi path of denouncing the worlds does not show affection with the Mr. However, it shows his sympathies when this *Mr.* is confronted with a mullā. This becomes clearer when, he, portrays an example from the Mu‘īn al-dīn Chishtī of Ajmair. Early Chishtī tradition held a clear demarcation between the Spirit and Matter<sup>362</sup>. Early Chishtī Sufis denounced the worldly affairs and kept themselves away from the politics. Āghā Nasīm ‘Abbās, at one end establishes his link with the Sufism but at the other end is losing his bonds with a considerable majority of Shia scholars of the period he lived in. When he criticises *mullā*’s entry in the parliament and regards it as an act of greed, he indirectly criticised the Scholars who emphasise

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<sup>360</sup> He mentions the political capitalization of religion that religious attachments are being translated erroneously into electoral followings.

<sup>361</sup> He blames the Assemblies and elected institutions and elected members as corrupt and links the enforcement of Martial Laws based on financial and moral corruption of modern elected representatives of the people.

<sup>362</sup> Al Haq, *A Forgotten Vision*, 234

the political role of religious scholars. He rejects the idea of ‘Wilāyat al-Faqīh’<sup>363</sup> and evaluates it as an intrusion in the worldly affairs.

The other main aspect of this speech is the use of Sufi epistemology to rationalise and justify the Shia way of performing namāz. He uses the term of ‘*qalb*’ to identify as divine place. He constructs a conversation between a human being and God.

Ham nay kahā Allah ham tujh say bāt karain tau kahān karain. Kahīn tairā  
ghar hay? Kahīn tairā makān hay? Allah nay kahā ya pūchnā ha tau sunū,  
nā main zamīn main rahtā hūn nā āsmān main balkay mairā ghar maumin  
kā dil hay.

Trnslation

(We asked! O God, where we should talk to you? Do you have any place  
to live? God replied, I do not live on the earth neither in the skies. I live in  
the heart of true Muslim.)

He explains the opening of hands in the namāz by Shias as a sign of freedom from the worldly desires. His human being in the conversation with God claims that, “my open arms are the evidence of my freedom from worldly affairs and even if I had some worldly desires (eating analogy) my arms would be wrested around the belly (Sunni way of namāz).” He not only justified the Shia way of praying but at the same time criticised Sunnis of bearing worldly desires while performing the prayer<sup>364</sup>. It also brings him close to the Sufi ideology which negates worldly affairs. He, while defining the ‘Dīn’ (religion), excavated from ‘*Yaum al-Dīn*’<sup>365</sup>, establishes that he was confused while translating it because religious scholars have confused the meanings by putting ridiculous references of Day of Judgment.

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<sup>363</sup> The Theory of *Wilāya al-Faqīh* (Governance of Religious scholar) propounded by Imām Khūmainī on the basis of which they brought so-called Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

See Ahmad Vaezi, *Shia Political Thought*, (London: Islamic Centre of England, 2004), 66

<sup>364</sup> He combines the Shia apparent structure of *namāz* and the early Sufi content and presents an amalgamation. While doing so he criticizes the Sunnite ways of holding the arms and equates it with the worldly desires.

<sup>365</sup> He translates *Dīn* (religion) on analgical basis by taking its meanings from the verses of Mu‘īn al-Dīn of Ajmair who says, *Dīn Ast Hussain*. So, the *Yaum al-Dīn* will in fact be *Yaum al-Ḥussain*, means Ḥussain will be the decisive power on the day of Judgement.

Main nay āik say pūchā Sunni Shia ‘Ulamā say, kisī nay kahā badlā kisī nay kahā jazā... itnī tashrīhain Dīn kī hau gaīn kay Dīn mairī samjh main hī nā āyā. Ākhir mainay darvaishaun kī bārgāah main jā kar iltmās kī ..... achānak Ajmair say āwāz āi sun.... Khawājā Mu‘īn al-dīn nay kahā ‘Dīn hast Ḥussain’.

#### Translation

(I asked, one by one, from Shia and sunni religious scholars, the answers were, ‘return’, ‘prize’ ..... I was unable to understand Dīn in the wake of many interpretation. At last, I asked the mystics and received an answer from Ajmair by Khawājā Mu‘īn al-Dīn that ‘Dīn means Ḥussain’.)

He is of the view that his problem was solved using the term ‘Dīn’ (religion) by Khawājā Mu‘īn al-Dīn Chishtī of Ajmair who in his famous verses said, ‘Dīn Hast Ḥussain, Ḥussain is Dīn’ so the *Yaum al-Dīn* (day of religion/day of judgment) would be the day when the whole humanity will have a consensus on the righteous position of Ḥussain.<sup>366</sup> It seems that he is not constructing a new vocabulary but is borrowing his syntax from the Chishtī Sufi order. The terms like *qalb* (heart), *faqīr* (a person with acquired poverty, yearning for spiritual uplift), *mullā* (religious expert), *darwaish* (a man with spiritual elevation) and dichotomies like *dīn-wa-duniyā* (religion and the world/spirit and matter/sacred and profane) are borrowed from the Chishtīs. Even he defines namāz in a Sufi way and neglects the theological narrations. It distinguishes him from many theological stands within Shia discourse. For example, he is taking an opposite position regarding the Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī’s point of views. Najafī rejects Sufism even if it is identified as *‘irfān* (spiritual understanding). *‘Irfān* was emphasized by Khumainī.<sup>367</sup> Najafī’s argument and narration totally negates the Sufism and regards it as an intrigue not only against

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<sup>366</sup> *Wa al-Asr Inna al-Insān fī khusr*

<sup>367</sup> Muḥammad Ḥussain, *Aḥsan al-Fawā'id fī Sharāḥ al-'Aqā'id*, (Sargodha: Maktaba al-Sibtāin, 1965), 230



Islam but specially an intrigue against the Shi‘ism.<sup>368</sup> He makes ridiculous remarks for the Mu‘īn al-Dīn Chishtī with whom Āghā Nasīm ‘Abbās shows affection.<sup>369</sup>

At the end of his description of the namāz he clarifies his position on the issue of *Shahādat al-thālthā* (Witnessing the three beliefs in daily obligatory prayers i.e. endorsement of belief in Allah, belief in Prophet and belief in the imamate of ‘Alī) that he endorses it from the core of his heart and has no doubt over its validation. He says that his justification behind *Shahādat al-thālthā* is not based on sentiments, but he takes it from the Quran is standard of the true namāz which contains ‘Shahādat’ which means more than two testimonies. Here, again, he distances himself from the majority of scholars who hold different position from him regarding *Shahādat-al-thālthā*.<sup>370</sup> It brought him closer to the Dhākirīn than the religious scholars.

#### 3.3.2.4. Strategy

His performance of namāz’ is focused on making certain benefits. At first, he is trying to establish a good will among the Shia audiences of the majlis for the new military regime. Secondly, he is also striving to tell the government about the loyalty of particular community among the Shias. Thirdly, he seems to create a divided line between the *muqqalid* and *ghair muqqalid* Shias. He openly sides with the *ghair muqqalid*. Although these terms are used to differentiate between Salafīs and rest of the Sunni sects, yet, they bear a different connotation in Shia intra-sectarian discourse.

#### 3.3.2.5. Blending the elements

Keeping in mind the broader framework in which the present study is embedded, it seems that as for as his contextualisation of the performance can take two positions.

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<sup>368</sup> Hussain, *Aṣlī Islām aur Rasmī Islām*, 165

<sup>369</sup> Ibid,

<sup>370</sup> If it is said that it has been a central point in Shia discourse will be justified. Especially, in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Although this issue had for long been the part of discourse but in this time, it was revitalised by the Dhākir ‘Alī Hussain Qumī of Bhakar, who within no time attracted many Dhākirīn in his camp. The issue of *Shahādat al-Thālthā* also gave rise to the intra sectarian process of othering. It also gave rise to intra sectarian excommunications. The people who followed it blamed the others of being illegitimate children and non-muslim based on interpretation of some Prophetic traditions. The others blame this group of being *Ghālīs*, the people who exaggerate. They blamed this group of committing *Shirk*.

In first instance, he contextualises his Sufi ideas in the Shia tradition and establishes a rationale. On the other hand, he seems to contextualise his Shia religious beliefs in the Chishtī Sufi tradition. His topic regarding namāz becomes marginalised in his own way of narration. He is extending his performance to an audience who, as per his understanding, accept the theological and religious products in Sufi raping. His strategy can be to bring the Barelwī and Shia community in one line which was at stake due to the emergence of Shia-Wahhābī cult. Although he is very much inclusive' while doing so. He bestows a superior position to Shia sect while including Barelwīs, Chishtīs, in the realm of Shia spirituality. His silent justification for the dictatorship can also be understood by keeping in mind the time frame of his performance. He was delivering the speech in 2000 just after one year of military rule in the country. If the rest of his speeches in that period are kept in record, it is clear that he had soft corner for the military and especially general Perwaiz Musharraf. He blends the context with creating an analogy of a tussle between a traditional mullā and modern man just like the equations of Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī. He applies apparently, a modern methodology and concepts to blend his act of speech with the context. However, for the extension of his message of acceptance of a military rule and sufite tools of religious justification he criticises the fallacy of Mullā. As Mullā, according to him, has left the mosque and has jumped into the parliament and by justifying the appropriateness of the Chishtī Sufi tradition.

### **3.4. Performative analysis of Sunni and Shia oral presentations**

Before going to analyse the above oral presentations based on social performance's framework, it is necessary to make some clarities. One must differentiate between a sect and sectarian. Sect is a particular structure whose recognition is uniform. Sectarian, is a process in which sects play their role in the display and conveyance of meanings. The overall impact of this process or performance either re-confirms the sect or gives birth to some new understandings. These new understandings are not immediately confirmed in the structure of sect but are kept aside until they get a qualified number of re-fusions in the society. Thus, sectarian is a social process which is affected culturally by the sect and, after going through this process, it either maintains itself or accommodates new developments. In this way, the whole process is purely socio-cultural. Sect along with other realities or

structures is present in the society. Sectarian, in any shape i.e. orality or text, combines it with other socio-cultural realities to display and convey particular meanings. These meanings, which the sectarian performance intends to convey, may or may not be sectarian.

Above oral presentations are briefly described on performative basis. This section intends to analyse them and draw some conclusions.

### **3.4.1. Structural borrowings and pragmatism**

As Mabel Berezin states that society consists of various realities and these realities are found in some structures which are identified as symbols, narratives, trends. The performer picks some of these to refuse for the display and conveyance of meanings.<sup>371</sup> Alexander declares,

In more loosely knit forms of complex social organization, authority becomes more open to challenge, the distribution of ideal and material resources more subject to contention, and contests for social power more open ended and contingent. Often, these dramatic contests unfold without any settled script.<sup>372</sup>

The above three oral presentations present this performative attitude which, not only confirms social epistemology of performance but also confirms the basic argument of the study that sectarian development is relative and reflexive. It will be better to analyse the above oral performances one by one.

The first '*bayān*' of Ṭāhir al-Qādirī' is the performance of *wilāya*. Although he performed in a Barelwī space he picked realities and symbols without any discrimination based on sect. He borrowed the concept of unity of political and religious unity in a single entity from Shia sect.<sup>373</sup> Shia adhere that Imamate means

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<sup>371</sup> Mabel Berezin, "review of Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual," 273

<sup>372</sup> Alexander, "Cultural pragmatics: social performance between ritual and strategy," 29-91

<sup>373</sup> This concept has been mentioned and referred as well above. Ṭāhir al-Qādirī has also been criticised by Ḥaq Nawāz because of his inclination towards Shia sect.

both the spiritual and temporal leadership. On the other hand, his own Barelwī scholars reject this Shi'ite concept and believe in the righteousness of Pious Caliphate which Shias do not. Normally Sunnis justification of the political role of religious scholars connects its historicity with Caliphate.<sup>374</sup> Qādirī is also deviating here from the mainstream sunnism and justifies his political claims in the name of Imamate. His methodology is also based on the use of Shia principles of inquiry i.e. the use of Shia version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain and the translation of *wilā* and *maulā* as both spiritual and temporal governor.<sup>375</sup>

He himself announced his strategy that if the audiences are satisfied with this reconstruction of wilāya and want it to be enacted then they should cast their vote to him in the coming elections. He, as mentioned above, got partial success and attracted many votes but could not win the seat in National Assembly. His performance borrowed very much from Shia ideological and methodological/operational structures and brought a new concept of wilāya in Barelwī discourse.<sup>376</sup>

The second speech of Ḥaq Nawāz is the oral performance of Shahādā. Shahādā is a wide topic and is a symbol shared by almost all the sects in Islam. Although it bears remarkably diverse interpretations in Islamic discourse, yet generally it contains some symbolic consensus as well. An example of consensus is the symbol of '*Sayyid al-Shuhdā*' (greatest Martyr). This symbol either means Ḥamzā, the paternal uncle of Muḥammad or Ḥussain, the grandson of Muḥammad.<sup>377</sup> Ḥaq Nawāz's re-fusion of Shahādā is challenging in this regard. He believes that there is no one great Shahādā but all martyrs in the history of Islam are equal and their sacrifices are inter-related with one another. He, by challenging the supremacy of Shahādā of Ḥussain,

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<sup>374</sup> Muḥammad Sa'ad Ullāh, *Tadhkirah Muḥammad Dhākir* (Chiniot: Muḥammad Dhākir Academy, 2010), 399

<sup>375</sup> See Ḥussain, *Tahqīqāt al-Farīqain fī Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*

See also, Nafa', *Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain* (Lahore: Dār al-Kitāb, 2012)

This book describes and verifies Sunni version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain which narrates the two sources of guidance as The Book (Quran) and Sunnah (Character) of Muḥammad

<sup>376</sup> The Wilāya with both political and religious connotations came for the first time in Barelwī discourse.

<sup>377</sup> A common connotation of the word *Sayyid al-Shuhdā*.

historically, links it with the Rifd. He borrows this concept from Salafism as many of his fellow Deobandi religious scholars oppose this reconstruction. He also borrowed the exclusion of socio-cultural patterns and practices from the religion by following Salafi lines.<sup>378</sup> He brought the dignity of companions of Muḥammad against the established dignity of the Family of Muḥammad. He also criticised his fellow Sunni religious scholar on their inclination towards Shia sect. He went beyond the Barelwī and even the Deobandi structures of belief and established a new trend based on some Salafi realities and structures.<sup>379</sup> He was successful as far as the political and social resonance of his performance was concerned. He attracted a considerable attention among the Deobandi and some Barelwī Sunnis.<sup>380</sup> This hatred towards Shia resulted in the violent clashes between the Shia and Deobandi sects of which he also became victim of.<sup>381</sup>

The Shia performance of ‘namāz’ is also structured on some considerably borrowed realities. He takes significant help from Chishtī Sufi ideas about politics and the methodologies which they employ to investigate socio-religious realities.<sup>382</sup> He, unlike mainstream Shia tradition, rejects the synthesis of religious and political authority. His next attempt is to favour dictatorship against the democratic governments. His reconstruction of Shia wilāya to reduce it just to the spiritual domain indirectly rejected the Shi‘ite Islamic revolution of Iran as well.<sup>383</sup> When he discusses the practical way of observing prayers he constructs a polemical supremacy of Shia ways of observance of prayers but he symbolised his justification again based on Sufi syntax by using the words like *qalb*, *ma‘rifat*, *faqr*.<sup>384</sup> So he reconstructed the Shia concept of wilāya which brought him close to the sufi tradition which the most of Shia religious scholars rejects<sup>385</sup> but in this way

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<sup>378</sup> Salafism rejects the inclusion of socio-cultural practices in Muslim cultures and regard them as Bid‘at (Unlawful innovations).

<sup>379</sup> Interview with Muḥammad Nāṣir, Head Jāmi‘a ‘Uthmāniyya, Main Bāzār Jhang, September, 2014

<sup>380</sup> Interview with Shaikh Ḥākim ‘Alī

<sup>381</sup> Ilyās, *Amīr-i-‘Azīmat: Maulānā Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī*, 186-188

<sup>382</sup> Alhaq, *A Forgotten Vision*, 728

See also Kishori Saran Lal, *Twilight of the Sultanate*, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House 1963), 1

<sup>383</sup> The Theory of Wilāya al-Faqīh (Governance of Religious scholar) propounded by Imām Khumainī on the basis of which they brought so-called Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

<sup>384</sup> Ja‘fir, *Taṣawwuf aur Tashī‘ main Farq*, 257

<sup>385</sup> Ibid, 372

he also paved a way for the praised of military dictatorship.

The above examples show a considerable borrowing from one another' in sectarian structures. It is here when pragmatism enters and re-defines the existing structures by borrowing and mixing their structural elements in different manner. It works more rigorously in multi or complex societies where different social groups have different cultural patterns. Pragmatism enters mostly in the name of immediate political and social necessities.

### 3.4.2. Emergence of neo patterns

The above section strengthens the argument that sectarian development is relative and reflexive. This section is going to analyse the way in which this relativity and reflexivity works. It concludes in the emergence of neo-sectarian trends based on continuous borrowing and sharing of the elements from and of the structures. This gives birth to new sectarian structures which present mixtures of different sectarian traditions. This part does not intend to go in detail but will focus on this issue briefly only based on the description of oral presentations and their performative analysis in a discursive manner. Ṭāhir al-Qādirī, is blamed to be inclined towards the Shia sect and is accused by many of his Barelwī school of thought. On the other hand, Muḥammad Nafa' is accused of being tilted towards Salafism. Thus, within a Barelwī sect two visible trends have emerged. Talking about Ḥaq Nawāz' performance of Shahādā, it should be kept in mind that his version of Shahādā could not attract the attention of many religious scholars from his own Deobandi sect. Performance of the 'Great Shahāda of Ḥussain by Ṭāriq Jamīl shows the division among Deobandi scholars in the expression of religiosity.<sup>386</sup> Same is the case with Shia performances. Nasīm 'Abbās's inclination towards Sufism and its rejection by Muḥammad Ḥussain opens a new door of intra-sectarian excommunications. This is evident from the alleged demarcation of Shia sect into *ghālīs*<sup>387</sup> (Exaggerators) and Muqaṣirīn<sup>388</sup> (The groups of people who deliberately discredit someone).

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<sup>386</sup> Guiders14, *Maulana Tariq Jameel crying on Imām Ḥussain - Be the follower of Imām Ḥussain and NOT of Yazeed*, You Tube Video, Posted (2011) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3cLsMLJM6NQ>

<sup>387</sup> *Ghālī* means exaggerator. It is a term used for the group of Shias who are termed as Mawālī Qalandrī in the previous chapter for their elevation of the stature of Imāms.

<sup>388</sup> Reductionists, who deliberately hide the attributes of Family of Prophet

### 3.5. Summary

The previous chapter concluded the discussion by identifying the clash of socio-cultural scripts and their influence on the sectarian discourse. It first identified the divisive social confusion and then located these confusions in the transformations in sectarian development. The chapter concluded itself by accepting the presence of diverse sectarian attitudes and emergence of some neo-sectarian trends in sectarian discourse. This chapter, which dealt with the performance of sectarianism in the medium of orality, performed two functions as far as its connection with the previous chapter is concerned. At first, it elaborates the presence and interaction of various sectarian scripts. Whilst at the same time confirms the development of neo-sectarian trends.

As far as the elaboration of the script-based confusions is concerned, it is evident from the structural borrowings, as explained in this chapter. The presence of different scripts allow the sectarian performance to borrow from the existing traditions and inadequacy of the traditional or existing cultural patterns provide them a justification for the construction of some popular trends. This elaboration, as is based on the performative analysis, does not ignore the presence of socio-economic and socio-political contexts in which the sectarian work is performed. It is narrated in detail how these oral sectarian performances bear the economic aspects. At the same the performance of *wilāya* and *namāz* by Barelwī and Shia speakers confirm the political background of the sectarian performance. This aspect extends the elaboration of the existence of the ‘sectarian’ in the socio-cultural patterns, to the extent of confirmation, by deducting that even an ‘apparently’ sectarian performance can be a socio-political performance. This confirms not only the structural borrowing among the various sects but also from the other semiotic models in a society as well.

The examination of oral traditions also confirms the development of neo-sectarian trends. The similar trend was explored in the previous chapter. The issue that distinguishes the analysis of neo-sectarian trends in this chapter is the intentional or conscious nature of the existence of neo-sectarian trends. The neo-sectarian groups that emerged as a result of discussion of the previous chapter are based on the unconscious semiotic reflexivity of socio-cultural development and sectarian development. However, in the present chapter, regarding oral tradition points, the conscious act of the sectarian performers is observed in the development of neo-

sectarian trends. They are normally committing these fusions in a more conscious and informed way. In some cases, and at some instances, they are aware of the fact that they know exactly they are doing.



## Textual Sectarian Performance: Reconstruction of the ‘Other’

### 4.1. Introduction

The first chapter detailed the socio-cultural patterns and the mechanism of diverse and complicated transitions occurring continuously in these patterns. It shows that social changes affect and impact cultural understandings which, exhibit themselves in practice when people interact at different levels and stages of social life. It affects politics and economy with religion not an exception in this regard. It ends by locating the neo-sectarian trends which were, to large extent, socio-culturally motivated. The second chapter concluded with the presence of structural borrowings and emergence of neo-sectarian trends after going through the oral traditions in the sectarian discourse. The first chapter deals with the subject by following concepts like culture, popular culture and by methodological application of cultural semiotics. The examination of oral traditions in the third chapter is based on social performance and on the methodological foundation of discourse analysis and hermeneutics. In the fourth and decisive part, textual traditions are going to be explored through a joint lens of social performance and textual performance. Both concepts are combined with methodological borrowing from the qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis.

As far as the argument is concerned, it is supported by some earlier studies. Kamran, for example, while locating the emergence of sectarianism in Jhang take the structural breaches into consideration. His point of view, according to which the new sectarianism is also getting its part from the *Chishtī Nizāmī Pīrs* of Sayyāl Sharīf, is not taken for granted but is extended and enforced.<sup>389</sup> This argument is supported with the performative analysis of two rival polemical ‘scriptings’ and textualities. This part

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<sup>389</sup> Kamran, “Shari‘a, Shi‘as and Chishtiya Revivalism: Contextualizing the growth of Sectarianism in the Tradition of Sayyālvi Saints of Punjab,” 455-77

is combined with an emergence of Wahhābī Shi'ism and it is studied as the reconstruction of 'Nāṣbiyya and 'Rāfḍiyya'.

This reconstruction not only confirms the results of the second chapter's debate but also justifies the claim of structural borrowings on the parts of different sects in the third chapter. It differs from the first chapters' debate as the third chapter deals with the borrowing of content, 'de- and re-contextualisation by the established and revered actors and performers. This chapter identifies two actors who themselves are considered heretic in their respective sects. Before going in a detailed performative examination of the scripting and performance of sectarian texts, this chapter first describes a brief introduction of the concepts of 'Nāṣbiyya' and 'Rāfḍiyya', proceeded by the description of theoretical and methodological explanations.

#### **4.2. Rāfḍiyya and Nāṣbiyya**

Rāfḍiyya and Nāṣbiyya are very old concepts in the sectarian discourse. These terms are derogatively used for the Shias and Sunnis. Rāfḍiyya denotes to the whole Shia sect irrespective of its sub-denominations. On the other hand, 'Nāṣbiyya' is not denoted to all the Sunnis but is denoted mostly to a particular portion of Sunni Islam which is either 'Salafīs' or is inclined towards Salafism. Rāfḍiyya is only used by the Sunnis on the other hand Nāṣbiyya, as an allegation, can be both utilised by the Shia and Sunni equally. Both terms are to exclude a portion of Muslim community from the mainstream on the basis of their particular understanding. The proceeding part defines the both terms and gives reference to their current re-constructions.

Rāfḍī literally means that a soldier deserts his army. It further denotes to disloyalty on the part of soldier. It connotes to an act of an individual who is not only disloyal but at the same time has left the mainstream.<sup>390</sup> This is a derogatory term used by the Sunnis for the Shias on the accusation of leaving the main stream Sunni Islam and forming a different way. This refers to the extermination of Shias from the main fold of Islam but as per the definition of the term it accuses the Shias of self-imposed excommunication. This term has been generously used in the Sunni-Shia

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<sup>390</sup> Muḥammad Ilyās, *Maḍhhab al-Rawāfiḍ: āik 'ilmī wa Taḥqīqī Ja'izā*, (Sargodha: Aḥnāf Media Service, 1992), 2-17

discourse throughout the history of Islam. This accusation is mostly constructed on two major levels.

### I. Shi'ite concept of Imamate

### II. Shi'ite distance from the Pious Caliphs of Islam

At first, they are accused of being Rāfḍī because of their divine definitions of the office of Imamate and combination of political and spiritual powers in the same office.<sup>391</sup> Sunni discourse identifies these beliefs as a false construction by ‘Abdullāh bin Sabā, a disguised Jew. They say that ‘Abdullāh bin Sabā introduced these kinds of beliefs in the divinity of Imamate to create a gulf in the Muslim Ummah.<sup>392</sup> They also do so because of the institution of *tabbarā* in the Shia sect.<sup>393</sup> Shias show reservations regarding the stature of first three caliphs in Islam. They believe that Caliphate, in worldly and spiritual sense, belongs to divinely appointed and guided Imāms. These are brief explanations behind the definition of Rāfḍiyya.

Nāṣbiyya, on the other hand is an opposite term. If Rāfḍiyya is the belief in divine definition of Imamate, the Nāṣbiyya is an absolute disrespect for the Imāms or the descendant of Prophet Muḥammad.<sup>394</sup> It is not applied to the whole of Sunni Islam by the Shias but is referred to those who, in their view, disregard the pious status of the Imāms or the Family of Prophet Muḥammad. Mostly these are the Salafīs who are referred to by this term but with the passage of time this term has different contexts.<sup>395</sup> As discussed above, this term has mostly been assigned to the Salafīs or Wahhābī school of thought. It does not mean that it was exclusive to Salafīs but was allotted to all those trends which were inclined towards the Salafism. In a

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<sup>391</sup> Hussain Haider, *Rad al-Rawāfiq: ‘Aqā’id al-Shia*, (Badāyūn: Tāj al-Faḥūl Academy, 2009), 46-48

See also *Rad al-Rawāfiq* by Aḥmad Sirhindī published by Madnī kutab Khanā, Lahore

Publisher claims this book to be written by Shaikh Aḥmad Sirhindī (1564-1624). He was an Islamic scholar, expert in Ḥanafī jurisprudence and a prominent member of Naqshbandī sufi order in India. He is also entitled as ‘reviver of religion’.

<sup>392</sup> Qāsim, Nānūtwī, *Ajwabā al-‘Arba‘īn*, Maṭba‘ Hāshimī

<sup>393</sup> Aḥmad Raḍā, *Rawāfiq kay Idāfay*, (Mumbai: Al-Raḍā Publications, 1998), 1-2

<sup>394</sup> Muḥammad A. Nu‘mānī, *Nāṣbiyya Taḥqīq kay Bhais Main*, (Karachi: Al-Raḥīm Academy, 1995), i

<sup>395</sup> Ja‘far Subḥānī, *Aīn al-Wahhābiyyat*, (Karachi: Dār al-Thaqāfā al-Islāmiyya, 1988), 33

subcontinental context, it is usually traced back to the personality of Shaikh Aḥmad of Sirhind alias Mujaddid Alf Thānī which was further transcended through Shāh Walī Ullāh, Shāh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and was inherited by some dignitaries at Deoband.<sup>396</sup> As far as Sufis are concerned, they were normally exempted from the allegation of being Nāṣbī.

The current chapter contains two significant aspects through which the reconstructions of Rāfḍiyya and Nāṣbiyya are studied. At first is the reconstruction of Rāfḍiyya by a Barelwī and specially a Chishtī Nizāmī Barelwī. This can be regarded as a new trend because of the actor involved. Secondly, is the reconstruction of Nāṣbiyya by a Shia who himself is alleged to be a ‘Wahhābī’ Shia. He identifies the Nāṣbiyya for the first time in Chishtī Nizāmī Sufi tradition. The whole chapter is devised to understand these two neo-constructions. The first part deals with the detailed examination of the scripting of the neo-reconstructions and the second part deals with the examination of the textual performance of the neo-reconstructions.

#### **4.2.1. Introducing the performers**

As discussed above, the concepts of Nāṣbiyya and Rāfḍiyya have been reconstructed in the recent times. This reconstruction involves some new directions. One of the dimensions is discussed above that in one case ‘actor’ is new and in second case ‘subject sect’ is new. Before going to the deep description and analysis of the text and their new impressions, it is necessary here to introduce both authors who wrote the rival texts. This introduction also contains their intra-sectarian position which is necessary before going to investigate their writings.

##### **4.2.1.1. Muḥammad Nafa‘**

Muḥammad Nafa‘ was born at Muḥammadī Sharīf, in the house of Miyān ‘Abd al-Ghafūr. Miyān ‘Abd al-Ghafūr was the descendent of Miyān Imām Dīn who was a famous religious personality, enunciated in Suhrāwardī Sufi order. The town Muḥammadī sharīf was first inhabited by the father of Miyān Imām Dīn. This family

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<sup>396</sup> Kamran, “Sharī‘a, Shi‘as and Chishtiya Revivalism: Contextualizing the growth of Sectarianism in the Tradition of Sayyālvi Saints of Punjab,” 455-77

belonged to the Quṭab Shāhī Khaukhars, who claim to be the descendant of ‘Alī. Miyān ‘Abd al-Ghafūr was the seventh descendant of Miyān Imām Dīn. Unlike Imām Dīn Miyān, ‘Abd al-Ghafūr was enunciated in Chishtī order. He was under the spiritual auspices of Pīr Khawājā Shams al-Dīn Sayyālwī. This conveys that the religious and spiritual traditions were present in the family for generations. Nafa‘’s forefathers have been leading figures for the religious guidance of the Sunnite population of the area. Nafa‘ was the youngest among three brothers after Muḥammad Dhākir and Ṣālih Muḥammad.<sup>397</sup>

Spirituality, that exhibited itself sometime in Suhrāwardī and sometime in Chishtī way, culminated in the religio-political services of Muḥammad Nafa‘ and Muḥammad Dhākir. Muḥammad Dhākir has been a pillar of Sunni-Barelwī politics in the district Jhang.<sup>398</sup> Nafa‘ did a significant amount of work and most of this work is in the shape of texts. These texts are strived to perform two functions i.e. the safeguards of the borders of Sunni Islam and exposing the reality of Shias.<sup>399</sup> The mixture of these two intensions led a Barelwī scholar to some coinciding spaces with Deobandi Islam. As mentioned in the second chapter and endorsed in the previous chapter that his trend can be identified as ‘Deo-Barelwiyyat’, this chapter will explain it in detail. This section will identify his position in the intra sectarian discourse and in the coming part it will be explained in the light of performative analysis of the texts he performed.

Firstly, Muḥammad Nafa‘ challenged the Barelwī belief in the concepts of wilāya.<sup>400</sup> As, explained in the previous chapter, Ṭāhir al-Qādirī tilted towards the Shi‘ite concept of wilāya,’ from a sufite position.<sup>401</sup> This wilāya’ both in Shi‘ite and Sufite concepts revolve around the family of the Prophet. The significant example of the Sufi Barelwī stance of wilāya is the point of view of Sayyid Hāshmī Miyān, a contemporary Indian Barelwī scholar who used to visit Pakistan as well.<sup>402</sup> Muḥammad Nafa‘ challenged this view in his detailed work, comprised of four volumes, *Ruḥamā Baināhum* and established the point that, in fact, both connotations

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<sup>397</sup> Athīr, *Dhikr al-Dhākir*, 28-33

<sup>398</sup> Ibid, 187-214

<sup>399</sup> Nafa‘, *Ruḥamā Baināhum*, 7

<sup>400</sup> Ibid

<sup>401</sup> As explained in the previous chapter.

<sup>402</sup> Mohaddise Azam Mission, *Sayad Hashmi Miyan 2015 Speech Jhang Pakistan*, You Tube Video, Posted (Dec 26, 2015), 01:09:31, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a\\_G6vQAVLgA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_G6vQAVLgA)

of wilāya' are false.<sup>403</sup> While doing so, he creates a distance from the Sunnite section of society and maintains that a layman Sunni is not well equipped with the arguments and knowledge so he easily becomes prey to the Shi'ite intrigues. By pronouncing these words, he is rectifying the argument of Deobandi scholar Ḥaq Nawāz. Ḥaq Nawāz also blames certain Sunnis to have fallen prey to the Shi'ite intrigues.<sup>404</sup> Muḥammad Nafā' accepted the Deobandi claim of the ignorance of majority of Sunnis.<sup>405</sup> He also distances himself from the Barelwī stock by labelling the Intrigues to be of Persian and Jewish origins. These Persian origins are very much revered in Sufi Barelwī tradition. Pīr Naṣīr al-Dīn of Gaulrā Sharīf criticised the Sunni scholars of their lacklustre attention towards the Persian in the words,

“Nā ham nay gulistān parhī, nā būstān parhī, fārsī adab kau chaur diyā.  
Nā ham nay Sunāi kau parhā nā Rūmī wa ‘Attār kau parhā, nā Jāmī kau  
parhā nā Asjadī kau parhā nā Farrukhī kau parhā nā Baidil kau  
parhā”.<sup>406</sup>

Translation,

(Neither had we studied Gulistān, Nor Būstān. We abandoned the  
Persian Literature. We did not study Sanāi, Rūmī, ‘attar, Jāmī, Asjadī,  
Farrukhī and Baidil.)

Muḥammad Nafā' also maintained a distance from the established concept of History in Barelwī sect. These aspects deal with the characterisation of individual personalities in the different periods of Islamic history and with the historicity of different beliefs in the Barelwī sect<sup>407</sup>. The first example can be taken as his

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<sup>403</sup> Nafā', *Ruḥamā Baināhum*, 68

<sup>404</sup> Mentioned in his speech in previous chapter.

<sup>405</sup> Few initial prologetic Explanations by Nafā'.

<sup>406</sup> Trab UIḤassan, 'AlīMaula Mushkil Khusha (Bahoo-E-Sharīf) Pīr Sayad NATHīrudDīn nAthīr R.A - Episode 68 Part 1 of 2, You Tube Video, Posted (May 25, 2015), 01:07:19<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s8uEtUTe5ME> (8-9)

<sup>407</sup> A significant portion of Barelwīs, for example, believe in the sacrality of time and because of this belief, have narrated some event in the light of divine will. They share this aspect with Shias in the narration of incident of Karbalā. They also imply this while historicizing the Family of Prophet.

reconstruction of historicising the belief pattern. As mentioned above, he was distracted from the mainstream Barelwī belief in the wilāya of the family of the Prophet. In this case, he is not only distracted from the Barelwī belief but reconstructed an episode of Islamic history as well. This is evident from the different texts he wrote on the explanation of belief and other issues. He mentioned it time and again that he was unsatisfied with the Islamic history available. He complained about the Sunnite sense of history, especially in case of belief. His works also established that he was a historian.

He challenged the Barelwī narration of history of wilāya' and Caliphate. Although this aspect has been discussed in previous chapter in detail, further examples other than Ṭāhir al-Qādirī can also be discussed. This example can be quoted again from Naṣīr al-Dīn of Gaulrā Sharīf. He believes in the spiritual wilāya'.<sup>408</sup>

The second aspect of the reconstruction of history is the characterisation of some historical personalities in early history of Islam. He wrote for the sacralisation of companions of the Prophet in which the context and period of this research is a groundbreaking aspect of Nafa'. *Ruḥamā Baināhum* bears a divine argument around which the history of friendly relations between companions of the Prophet is written.<sup>409</sup> Nafa', while writing these works, gives an equal place to both the family and the friends. Although the rest of Barelwī discourse does not ignore this aspect but they do not place so much emphasis on the issue. Even if they do, they try to maintain a spiritual supremacy of the family of the Prophet. The issues and equalities described collectively in *Ruḥamā Baināhum* are separately discussed in two works by Ṭāhir al-Qādirī. He wrote '*Ghāyat al-Ijābā fī Manāqib al-Qurābā*'<sup>410</sup> in the praise of the Family and '*Kinz al-anābā fī manāqib al-Ṣaḥāba*'<sup>411</sup> for the companions of prophet. His separate dealings with the issue also show, to an extent, the spiritual and political division in wilāya' and caliphate which most of the Sunnis adhere. Muḥammad Nafa'

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Muḥammad Nafa' deviated from this view to an extent that he falsified 'exaggerated' sacrality of Family of Prophet and at the same time brought Family of Abū Sufyān in the fold of sacred.

<sup>408</sup> Nafa', *Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 32

<sup>409</sup> Nafa', *Ruḥamā Baināhum*, 5-12

<sup>410</sup> Ṭāhir Qādirī, *Ghāyat al-Ijābā fī Manāqib al-Qurābā*, (Lahore: Minhāj al-Quran Publisher, 2004), 34

<sup>411</sup> Ṭāhir Qādirī, *Kinz al-anābā fī manāqib al-Ṣaḥāba*, (Lahore: Minhāj al-Quran Publisher, 2005), 78

also wrote a text in the praise of Abū Sufyān and his wife Hindā.<sup>412</sup> This work is termed as a ‘sīrat’ besides a text in praise of Mu‘āwiyya.<sup>413</sup> These texts were basically new innovations in Barelwī discourse which mostly ignores these personalities and if they must discuss, they discuss them without giving so much sacrality<sup>414</sup>. Ḥanīf Quraishī says,

Jab Mu‘āwiyya aur ‘Alī Kī Jang hū’i hum ‘Alī kay sāth Thay. Şafīn main bhī ‘Alī kay sāth, Shām main bhī ‘Alī kay sāth, Yaman main bhī ‘Alī kay sāth, Madīnay main bhī ‘Alī kay sāth, āj bhī ‘Alī kay sāth qayāmat main bhī ‘Alī kay sāth haun gay. (02:22-02:46)

Translation,

(We were with ‘Alī in the battlefields against Mu‘āwiyya. We were following ‘Alī in Safīn, Syria, Yemen, Madīnā and till now we are his followers and will be remaining so till the day of judgement.)

#### 4.2.1.2. Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī

Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī was born in Jahāniyyān Shāh in April 1932, in the house of Rānā Tāj Dīn. His two paternal uncles, Imām Baksh and Suhrāb ‘Alī were religious scholars. He got his earlier religious education from Jāmi‘a Muḥammadiyya at Jalālpūr Nangiyāna.<sup>415</sup> He was taught by some prominent scholars. The list of his teachers includes the names of Ḥussain Baksh Najafī<sup>416</sup>, Maulānā Muḥammad Yār

<sup>412</sup> Muḥammad Nafa‘, *Ḥaḍrat Abū Sufyān aur Unkī Ahliyya*, (Lahore: Dār al-Kitāb, 2005), 45.

<sup>413</sup> Muḥammad Nafa‘, *Sīrat Ḥaḍrat Amīr Mu‘āwiyya*, (Lahore: Dār al-Kitāb, 2011), 12

<sup>414</sup> zahidbaloch007, *Hanif Quraishī against Ameer Mu‘āwiyya*, You Tube Video, Posted (June 04, 2010)

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vepyavQRu8U><https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ThX0S8wvalg>

Muftī Ḥanīf Quraishī is a leading religious scholar from Barelwī sect. he belongs to Rawalpindi. He is the head of an organization *Shabāb al-Islami*. His name rose to prominence in the wake of controversy that emerged after the murder of Salmān Tāthīr, Governor of Punjab. Muftī was blamed to instigate Mumtāz Qādirī to shoot Tāthīr for his unconventional stand on blasphemy laws.

<sup>415</sup> Biography, *The Official Website of Grand AyatUllāh Shaikh Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī*, <http://www.Sibtain.com/en/Biography.aspx>

<sup>416</sup> Ibid



Shāh<sup>417</sup>, ‘Allāmā Bāqir Naqwī alias Bāqir Hindī.<sup>418</sup> He passed the examination of Maulwī Fāḍil from Punjab University in 1952 and went to Najaf, Iraq. He returned from Iraq in 1960 after becoming a ‘*Mujtahid*’. Currently, he is running a religious seminary in Sargodha and supervising some seminaries in neighbouring districts e.g. in Jhang, he runs Madrasā Walī al-asr (seminary of Governor/Imam of this Age). He has a significant following, especially in Sargodha and Jhang districts. He, if his claim is accepted, is the only Mujtahid in Pakistan. His opponents deny his status of ‘Mujtahid’. His followers are termed as ‘Wahhābī-Shias’ or ‘*Dhakhwāna*’ (follower of dhaku). He has been very much involved in both oral and textual performances. Besides his large number of followers, he is also a controversial personality in sectarian discourse. His entry is bycotted in the spiritual space of Imām Bārgāhs in many parts of the Punjab.

Like Muḥammad Nafa‘, Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī has also distanced himself from the mainstream trends in his parent Shia sect. The most significant aspect area of difference appears in the matters of belief. He criticises the Shi‘ite concept of ‘nūr being’ of Imāms and the concept of ‘*wilāya al-takwīnī*.’ (Authorised governance)<sup>419</sup> He views that the Prophet and Imām are not constituted by the *nūr*. For him, belief in the ‘nūr being’ means the divinity of Imāms and this contradicts with the concept of unity of God.<sup>420</sup> He also disowns the idea of *wilāya al-takwīnī*, which means the presence of an absolute divinely, powered Imamate. He criticises it in strong words and repeats his views in many of his textual works and oral performances. Interestingly, his texts have been under strong criticism from the rest of Shia scholars and dhākirīn due to the above-mentioned differences on the beliefs. All this criticism exhibits itself in the medium of orality and no considerable text has been produced by any scholar. His critiques include religious scholars like Āghā Nasīm ‘Abbās, ‘Allāmā Rājā Nāṣir ‘Abbās, ‘Allāmā Ḥassan Zafar Naqwī, ‘Allāmā Fāḍil ‘Alwī. Among the dhākirīn, it is almost impossible to trace anyone who is not against his ideas. It is also a result of his decree. He issued a decree which forbids the dhākirīn to fix cash

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<sup>417</sup> Ibid

<sup>418</sup> Interview with Faḍal ‘Abbās, August 2015

<sup>419</sup> Shia belief in the divine authority of Imamate.

<sup>420</sup> Muḥammad Ḥussain, *Uṣūl al-Sharī‘a fī ‘Aqā’id al-Shia*. (Sargodha: Maktaba al-Sibtāin, 2012), 23

payment in lieu of their performance of majlis. He considered it illegal and qualifies this act as a sin.<sup>421</sup>

Going beyond belief, his argument about the history and especially sacred history is constructed on a different approach than the Shi'ite traditional training in the sub-continent. His major work of history of tragedy of Karbalā, entitled as *Sa'adat al-Dārain fī Maqatal al-Ḥussain* is rejected by his opponents as they blame him of being an intriguer.<sup>422</sup> He, besides criticising the material and symbolic aspects of the remembrance of Karbalā, also changed some characters going beyond the existing structure or the scripts.<sup>423</sup> He challenged the authenticity of the traditions narrated from the stage of oral performances. It is interesting that he did not leave the mainstream Shia narrative while rewriting the history of 'tragedy' of Karbalā. The alterations were only in the shape of some slight changes in the sequel of Shahādat of some family members of Ḥussain and at some points he changed the story of one particular Shahādat. For example, he established this by challenging the rest of Shia historians that 'Alī Akbar, instead of 'Alī Zain al-'Ābdīn, was the elder son of Ḥussain<sup>424</sup>. Sometimes he challenged the narration of a particular incident of Shahādat. It is commonly narrated by the Shia scholars and dhākirīn that the body of Qāsim, the eldest son of Ḥassan was tormented into pieces. Najafī views that Qāsim was not the eldest son of Ḥassan and the corpus that got tormented belonged to 'Alī Akbar ibn al-Ḥussain<sup>425</sup>. These are the slight differences apparently, but these faced a substantial antagonism from the rest of scholarship. In fact, these slight changes challenge the romantic history of Karbalā in this area, which is narrated mostly through oral traditions like *band*, *Qaṣīdah*, *nauḥā*, and *marthiyya*.<sup>426</sup>

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<sup>421</sup> Muḥammad Ḥussain, *Iṣlāh al-Majālis wa al-Mahāfil*, (Sargodha: Maktaba al-Sibtain, 2010), 25-40

<sup>422</sup> Bayngan, Fazil Alvi, Muḥammad Ḥussain Dhakoo, You Tube Video, Posted (May 3, 2011): 51:58 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XiHv6N3YmM4>

<sup>423</sup> Muḥammad Ḥussain, *Sa'adat al-Dārain Fī Maqatal al-Ḥussain*, (Sargodha: Maktaba al-Sibtain, 2013)

<sup>424</sup> Ibid, 386-393

<sup>425</sup> Ibid, 399-408

<sup>426</sup> Qāsim is a unique participant in the battle of Karbalā. His commemoration is romanticised with a construction of some rituals and poetry regarding his marriage in Karbalā. With the challenge of Muḥammad Ḥussain of the historicity of Qāsim, all these romanticism vanishes.

See G. A. Shaukat Bhatti, Aa Amir Qasim meda veer Qasim, You Tube Video, Posted (May 28, 2011), 05:40,

Thirdly, he is also very much critical to the inclusion of the cultural aspects of the local culture in the sectarian or religious structure. He is of the view that this cultural relativity is fatal for the maintenance of true Islamic values.<sup>427</sup> He took two steps in this regard. First, he identified and decreed upon the *bid'at* present in the Shia tradition. Secondly, he rejected the intrusion of socio-cultural patterns in religious development. Thirdly, he opposed the whole Sufi tradition labelling it antagonistic to the true spirit of Islam. In the first sphere, he identifies some worldly intentions behind the observance of religious or sectarian traditions. In the case of majālis, he views that most of the people conduct these majālis to show off their financial position. He hints the bad worldly intentions in the commencement of religious ceremonies. He also blamed the religious scholars for getting financial benefits in the name of religion. This debate is presented in his text named as, *Iṣlāh al-Majālis wa al-Maḥāfil*<sup>428</sup>. The second debate, which connected the internal critic to the critic of external inclusion, is summarised in another text which is entitled as *Aṣlī Islam aur Rasmī Islam*.<sup>429</sup> He extended his antagonism to Sufism and even rejected the Shi'ite 'irfān introduced by Khumainī.<sup>430</sup> He is of the view that Sufism has corrupted the religion with the introduction of un-Islamic belief and practices. He wrote a small booklet, *Aqāmat al-Burhān alā Baṭlān al-Taṣawwuf wa al-'irfān*. His position in Shia discursivity is very much controversial and is evident from the speeches of Fāḍil 'Alwī, Āghā Nasīm 'Abbās and almost majority of the Shia dhākirīn<sup>431</sup>. Nāṣir 'Abbās of Multan said,

Ya Muqasharīn kau Barā a'trād hay kay ya gānaun kī tarz par qaṣīday  
parhatay hain. Main kahtā hūn baighairat mullā kūi āik 'Alī wālā dikhā  
jau gānā sun kay na'rā mār day.... Agar hum tarz kay 'āshiq hautay tau  
gānū par bhī na'ray lagātay. Tujhay dushmanī tarz say nahī 'Alī kay faḍāil  
say hay.

<sup>427</sup> Hussain, *Aṣlī Islām aur Rasmī Islām*, 67-75

<sup>428</sup> Hussain, *Iṣlāh al-Majālis wa al-Maḥāfil*, 32-38

<sup>429</sup> Hussain, *Aṣlī Islām aur Rasmī Islām*, 97-99

<sup>430</sup> Hussain, *Aqāmat al-Burhān alā Baṭlān al-Taṣawwuf wa al-'irfān*, 132

<sup>431</sup> Shāhbaz Ḥassan, *Bar muqasar lanat beshumaaaaar*, You Tube Video, Posted (June 12, 2016), 00:37, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jzeXwakHPrk>

Translation,

(These reductionists (in the matter of belief) criticise (us) that they recite Qaṣīdahs on the pattern of songs. I ask them (reductionists), give me one example in which a follower of ‘Alī enchant slogan after listening songs. If we have been habitual of listening to music, we definitely enchant that but he (reductionist) is not the enemy of musical patterns but his animosity is with the attributes of ‘Alī.)

He has been abused and cursed upon in the majālis and all his points of view have been taken as an intrigue against the Shi‘ite tradition in Pakistan. He has been entitled as Muqaṣir, Wahhābī. As mentioned in the second chapter even his status as a Jatt Dhakū is challenged and most of dhākirīn call him ‘*Sargodhay dā Muṣallī*’ (sweeper of Sargodha) and ‘Chūrhā’.<sup>432</sup>

The above discussion establishes that both Muḥammad Nafa‘ and Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī are considered as heretics from the mainstream Barelwī and Shi‘ite tradition in Punjab. This discussion will be extended to the description and performative analysis of their text regarding Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain for the evaluation of the argument about the reconstruction of Nāṣbiyya and Rāfḍiyya in recent times.

#### 4.2.2. Selection of the texts

The understanding of reconstruction of Nāṣbiyya and Rāfḍiyya came into mind after going through the texts of Muḥammad Nafa‘ and Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī. Identification of this emerging trend led to the desire to further explore and deal with different questions which immediately come into mind. These questions can be enumerated as, ‘how it happens?’ and ‘why it happens?’ The second question has been dealt with in the second chapter - that these reconstructions owe their existence due to the socio-cultural changes and in the wake of some new scriptural confusions

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<sup>432</sup> It seems that he himself is unaware of the caste-based complexities as ‘*Rānā*’ is specifically a *Rājput* title of grace and a *Jatt* cannot use this title.

and re-adjustments. This chapter deals with the first question that how this reconstruction is formulated. It deals with the methodologies and techniques employed to create a new discourse. As mentioned above, this idea took its birth after going through the texts of Muḥammad Nafā' and Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī, so this chapter is also conducting a comparative analysis of two texts involved in these reconstructions. Both scholars have several texts to their credit, and it becomes difficult to choose only one from both lists. Again, reconstruction of the above narratives can also be found in a majority of their works. Another point in this regard is that their works can be polemically analogised at different levels as well. Below are some examples from their works that can be comparatively discussed. This description will help to justify the choice of final selection of text.

Muḥammad Nafā's most popular work, which became his identity, is *Ruḥamā Baināhum*. This consists of four volumes each volume of which describes the friendly relations of 'Alī and the family of the Prophet with the rest of caliphs and companions of the Prophet respectively. This work not only creates equality between the family and friends of the Prophet but also negates the Shi'ite concept of Imamate. This work was polemically countered by the *Kitāb Mustāb: Tanziyya Imāmiyya (Jadīd) Dar Jawāb Risālā al-Madhab al-Shia wa Tuhfā al-Hussainiyya* by Muḥammad Ḥussain which contradicts and challenges the textual works of Ashraf Sayyālwī and Pīr Dīa al-Dīn Sayyālwī.<sup>433</sup> Muḥammad Nafā' also has spiritual links with these two Sunni authors. Nafā' negates the supremacy of 'Alī and the office of the Imamate, whilst on the other hand Najafī argues for its necessity. The similar analogy can also be established between *Ruḥamā Baināhum* and '*Aḥsan al-Fawā'id fī Sharah al-'Aqā'id*' by Najafī.

Muḥammad Nafā', as discussed above, reconstructed some historical narratives as well and brought some personalities in the fold of sacrality. His works like *Ḥaḍrat Abu Sufyān aur unkī Ahliyya* and *Sīrat Ḥaḍrat Amīr Mu'āwiyya* not only are historical reconstructions but in some respect, strengthen the argument of *Ruḥamā Baināhum*. These sources collectively negate the divinity of Shi'ite Imamate and stress on equal respect for 'family and companions. These can be analogically discussed under the narratives established in the beginning with Najafī's *Ithbāt al-Imāmat*. This work by Najafī extends the argument of the above-mentioned work for Imamate and held some

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<sup>433</sup> See Ashraf Sayyālwī, *Tuhfā Ḥussainiyya*, (Sargodha: Aḥnāf Publishers, 1980)

detailed historical accounts of twelve Imāms. He narrates the life events and lives of the Imāms in chronological manner.

Both above examples of analogical position of polemical texts of Muḥammad Nafa' and Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī lay a reasonably strong basis for them to be performatively treated in this chapter. Both set of texts directly or indirectly discuss the basic beliefs of the Shia and Barelwī sects, which is enough for their credibility as a choice for a comparative analysis. The remaining set of texts of both authors which can be dealt in a comparative polemical analysis is about the famous Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain. The rival text of Nafa' and Najafī are preferred over the sources discussed above. The above sources deal with the polemical justification and negation of the Imamate and caliphate and some characterisations in history. The preference of sources regarding Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain is made on the basis that this Prophetic tradition is the real epistemological standard on which both Imamate and caliphate are constructed. It can be established that in one respect Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain lays the basis of Shi'ite and Sunni narratives and maintains their boundaries apart.

Before going to the description and analysis of the polemical books of both authors, it is necessary to formulate a conceptual model in which comparative analysis will be made and results of that analysis would be comprehended. The following section explains basic theoretical and methodological aspects with which the analysis of two books will be arranged.

#### **4.2.3. Theoretical explanations**

Text, for a long time has been considered as a script, containing the linguistic symbols. Thus, the text is thought to be static devoid of any meaningful practice and performance. Its position, in this way, is restricted to a depository of linguistic symbols describing an event or guiding a particular performance. Here it stands apart from the performance, in the sense of dramatic or theatrical expressions of the term, performance. It is static, in the sense, that it fixes the narration and contains a decisiveness that makes it different from a performance with altogether different characteristics. Leo Howe mentions the inscribed nature of the text. Inscription, being

a necessary aspect of the text makes it a fixed entity.<sup>434</sup> Ric Allsopp also point outs the same problem of understanding of the text by confining it to the space of a page.<sup>435</sup> Text in its different forms is considered as a routine way of collecting linguistic symbols or in an advanced sense communication that represents language through the inscription of signs and symbols. Thus, this view of the text reduces it to a static object and denies it a stature of performance.

#### **4.2.3.1. Performative text**

The ensuing debate regarding the relation between the text and performance took a turn, wherein different models of co-relation between the text and performance emerged and tried to rationalise their respective position. Thus, the concept of the performative text emerged.

Entry of the term “performative text” bridged the conceptual gap between the two ostensibly different positions taken by the text and performance. This concept born out of the written scripts of theatrical and dramatic performances. The written scripts for the theatrical performances not only contained the linguistic symbols for the verbal expressions but also contained symbols of physical movements of the body. Ric Allsopp explains,

Performance writing is the continuing and transforming relationship between the two terms of its discourse, proposed both as boundary markers and as two terminal points in an open circuit across which the luminous arc of performance writings take form.<sup>436</sup>

At a time when this perspective cobbles together the text and performance yet it ensures a distance between the two. As it stresses upon that text is still something that

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<sup>434</sup> Leo Howe, “Risk, Ritual and Performance,” *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 6, no. 1 (Mar. 2000): 63-79

<sup>435</sup> Ric Allsopp, “Performance Writing,” *A Journal of Performance and Art*, 21, no. 1 (Jan, 1999): 76-80

<sup>436</sup> Ibid

is external to performance. It either initiates or directs an act or records a performance and in both cases, it is not a pure performance in itself.

#### **4.2.3.2. Text as a performance**

The next step in this regard is the critical analysis of the basic characteristics of the text and performance, to rationalise the concept that text by complying with all the aspects that make a phenomenon a performance, should be regarded as a performance. It is next step of the concept of the performative text. It implies that the text itself is a performance rather than an entity devoid of performance. This chapter intends to explain the sectarian texts within the framework of a performance; therefore, it is imperative here to construct a rationale for the performative nature of the text. This model is derived from the works of Karin Barber, David M. Bergerson, Deborah A. Kapchan, Ric Allsopp and Leo Howe who held the performative perspective of the text. The ensuing discussion not only explores the performative nature of the text but also tries to extract some characteristic features of the textual performance for their application on the sectarian texts to elaborate its performative aspect.

Text in the post-modernist explanations is a performance. It is regarded as a performance based on its various aspects that make it suitable with the phenomenon of performance. First of all, text is regarded as a performance for being an action performed by an author, when inscribed. The second level of being a performance under this notion is the performance by a reader when one reads it under particular situations of time and space. There are different explanatory models in this regard. Some regard it a performance due to its ability of “entextualisation”.<sup>437</sup> Some are of the view that it is performance due to its capacity as a carrier of symbols and their cultural extension.<sup>438</sup> It is also regarded as a performance on the basis of its characteristics of evanescence, involvement of risk factor and on the basis of strategy behind a text.<sup>439</sup> Text is created in a particular context that is provided by the contemporary environment of the time when it is created. Also, when it represents a context, it also contains some ambitions. These ambitions are located by the concept

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<sup>437</sup> Barber, “Text and Performance in Africa,” 324-333

<sup>438</sup> Ric Allsopp, “Performance Writing,” 76-80

<sup>439</sup> Leo Howe, “Risk, Ritual and Performance,” 63-79



of social performance as the message that it contains to extend to the cultural memory of its possible and particular audience.

At the first level a text is a performance, even, when it is created by an author. It is performed in the sense that every author tries to convey some message through the medium of text. This intention of conveying a certain message is fulfilled by the fabrication of different lingual symbols. These symbols like, theatrical performance, are arranged in a pre-determined way for the specification of intended strategy. A text, in its different shapes, always focuses its audience. It needs an audience and is performed keeping in view the cultural capacity of the audience. The second stage of textual performance comes when it is read by the reader. It cannot be considered as absolute by the reader because the performance of reading constructs meaning as per their own understanding. He may understand it according to the intentions of the writer but at the same time his understanding can also divert him from the strategy of the writer. It is also a time bound phenomenon. An understanding of the text may change with change of time and space<sup>440</sup>. It also depends upon the variability of the background knowledge of the reader. Therefore, in this sense, the text is considered as a performance because it does not have the capacity to be understood homogeneously at different times and places. Karin Barber observes, “we can only assume that at the time of their composition and circulation, they were embedded in conventions, now lost, which enable their readers to interpret them<sup>441</sup>.” The same was the view of David M. Bergerson when he writes, “...readers will respond in a variety of ways to a printed text in ways that the author cannot possibly control.<sup>442</sup>

Karin Barber again identifies text as a performance based on its capacity of entextualisation. He defines entextualisation as a “process of rendering a given instance of discourse as text, detachable from its local context”.<sup>443</sup> This characteristic of entextualisation appears in various ways in a text. It depends upon the level of detachability of a text.<sup>444</sup> It means that a text should possess a capacity to be

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<sup>440</sup> Deborah A. Kapchan, “Performance,” *The Journal of American Folklore*, 108, no. 430, Common Ground: Keywords for the Study of Expressive Culture (Autumn, 1995): 479-508

<sup>441</sup> Barber, “Text and Performance in Africa,” 324-333

<sup>442</sup> David M. Bergeron, “Stuart Civic Pageants and Textual Performance,” *Renaissance Quarterly*, 51, no. 1 (Spring, 1998): 163-183

<sup>443</sup> Barber, “Text and Performance in Africa,” 324-333

<sup>444</sup> Ibid

understood in different conditions of time and can be contextualised as per the changing circumstances. Karin again explains the features based on the capacity which is created in the text. It is the reflexivity attached with the text that enables it to entexualise. Exegesis, mimicry, polemic responses are different reflexive measures that can be noted in this matter.<sup>445</sup> Kapchan A. Deborah explains that how a text contains the ability to be entexualised in different frames of time and reference.

... amidst a plethora of possible interpretive worlds, there exist indices that connect an utterance to a specific field of discourse; these indices, which he called "contextualisation cues," are embedded within the discourse itself.<sup>446</sup>

So according to him, these are the indices or the gaps that are present in a narrative or discursive text that enhances its ability to be entexualised. These indices are the spaces where it can relate to the past narratives to contextualise the text and this process is relative. It depends upon the readers on how they fill these indices and thus contextualise the whole text. The more these 'contextualisation cues' are present in a text, the more it is detachable from its immediate or local context. Cultural extension of the text depends upon the fact that how audiences contextualise it.

Leo Howe, while explaining the relationship between text and performance, develops his argument in favour of status of text as performance. He challenges the authoritative, legitimate and obligatory position of the text, which makes it contradictory to the phenomenon of performance. He narrates it as...

The appearance of textual stability derives from the fact that inscription involves the elimination of alternatives, or their inscription in inferior forms (such as in the vernacular instead of in a sacred language, or in memory rather than in writing). By excluding alternatives, what is inscribed becomes authoritative, legitimate and even obligatory; but not

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<sup>445</sup> Kapchan, "Performance," 479-508

<sup>446</sup> Ibid

permanently so, because established texts are always open to subversion and revision.<sup>447</sup>

He examined the relationship between the performance and text based on the main features that are considered necessary components of a performance and then relates these features with the text. These performances contain, according to him, the ideas of risk, stake, claim, strategy, and competition. He further explains that the inscription of the text that is criticised by the opponents of textual performance is basically a process that continues and its products are provisional and subject to change.<sup>448</sup> The above discussion establishes that text is not only an inscription but is also a performance that encompasses different practices in it and enlivens itself through an ongoing process of its understanding and contains relativity instead of uniformity and fixity.

The next sections deal with the application of the above extracted features of the textual performance on the sectarian text present in the sectarian discourse in Jhang. The concepts derived from the above discussion will guide the explanation of the sectarian texts as performance. The key concepts are entextualisation, detachability, contextualisation cues, scene, cultural extension, strategy and risk, and the audiences.

#### **4.3. Polemical texts on Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain**

As discussed above, it is a difficult task to enumerate the textual performances in the sectarian discourse in Jhang. A considerable number of religious scholars have written on the sectarian issues. Sectarian textual performances have variety of expressions. It includes books, booklets, pamphlets, articles etc. This section contains the examination of two sectarian texts and their brief evaluation based on the main features of the social performance, as abstracted in the above section.

- Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain written by Muḥammad Nafa‘

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<sup>447</sup> Howe, Risk, “Ritual and Performance,” 63-79

<sup>448</sup> Ibid

- Tahqīqāt al-Farīqain fī Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain written by Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī

Texts described in the introductory part are selected to conduct an introductory investigation of the phenomenon of the sectarian texts as performance. The basic point of the selection of these two sources out of many texts is their relative reflexive positions. These are the sectarian performances regarding the famous ‘Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain’ and are constructed by following different narratives. The theme is same but the contextualisation in the texts is different. They differ either in the selection of different symbols or in the different placement of similar symbols.

**The Shi‘ite version: Innī tārikau fikum al-Thaqlain Kitāb Allah wā ‘Itratī Ahl Baitī Mā ann Tamassakum baihimā lann taḍalūwa Ba‘dī**

Translation:

Urdu:

Main tumhāray darmiyān dau bhārī chīzain chauṛ kar jā rahā hūn. Allah kī kitāb aur mairī ‘Itrat, mairay ghar wālay. Jau mairay ba‘ad in say tamassuk rakhay gā hargiz gumrah nā hau gā.

English:

(I am leaving behind two formidable things among you, Book of Allah (Quran) and my progeny (family) if you will seek guidance from them, you will be not be distracted from the right path,).<sup>449</sup>

**Sunnite version: Taraktau fikum amarain lann taḍalūw mā tamassaktumū baihimā Kitāb Allah wā Sunnat al-Nabīaihī**

Translation:

Urdu:

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<sup>449</sup> This tradition is quoted from Muḥammad Ḥussain’s text. The same tradition is narrated in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Timadhī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Muslim, Mustadrak al-Ṣaḥīyān, Masnad al-Ḥanbal and many other Ḥadīth sources.

Main tum main dau chīzain chauṛay jā rahā hūn. Jab tak tum inkā sahārā  
laitay rahū gāy hargiz gumrāh nā hau gāy, Allah kī Kitāb aur us kay Nabī  
kī sunnat.

English:

I am leaving behind two precious things among you, if you will hold  
them, you will be on right path, Book of Allah (Quran) and Sunnah  
(Prophets Way of life).<sup>450</sup>

This difference of narrative, strategy and symbols led these performances towards some particularities as far as the respective audiences are concerned. The selection of texts is also significant because they refer to a basic divide among the Muslims. It contains the issue of post-Prophet lines of actions of which this sectarian phenomenon emerged. It deals with the problem of choice of allegiance after the demise of the Prophet. The different versions describe the Quran, Sunnah and Ahl al-Bait as the pioneers of guidance for the Muslims. Sunnis prefer the version mentioning the Sunnah and Shias speak for the validity of version with the Ahl al-Bait (Family of Prophet). Therefore, the selection of texts rationalises itself on the choice of an issue that is prominent throughout the Islamic history and has gone through various interpretations. The next section deals with a brief review of these texts by determining their respective models of the narration, the utilisation of symbols, not only to enhance the credibility of their grand narrative but also to attract specific audiences.

#### **4.3.1. Building the polemical arguments**

This part deals with the introductory discussions of the polemical texts. It explains the performative building of the arguments by the rival authors.

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<sup>450</sup> This tradition is quoted from Muḥammad Nafa'ī's text. Like the Shi'ite version, Sunni tradition is also narrated in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Timadhī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Muslim, Mustadrak al-Ṣaḥīyān, Masnad al-Ḥanbal and many other Ḥadīth sources.

#### 4.3.1.1. Nafa's argument

This text was written by Muḥammad Nafa' which got published in 1984. This text maintains a Sunnite version of the tradition of the Prophet. Its position regarding the issue is more inclined towards Deobandi and Salafis narratives, which stresses on the following of Quran and Sunnah.<sup>451</sup> Barelwīs keep adherence with family of the Prophet. The text comprises a prolegomenon and two main parts. The prolegomenon define the context and strategy of the performance, the second part creates the main scene by the collection of symbols of narration of Ḥadīth and the manifestation of the criterion for the criticism in the study of Ḥadīth. The third part again contains the strategy and an effort to communicate its cultural meanings to the audience.

The first part which deals with the provision of context for the performance is further divided into three portions. First, an argument is built for the connection of the stance, Sunnite version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain, with the basic Islamic principles. It starts the debate by arguing that the acceptance of the Shi'ite version means,

- **Negation of the Ḥadīth as a source of legislation**

The text starts with the Taqadumā by Maulānā Khālīd Maḥmūd Sayyālkautī, he starts the debate by quoting the first 'kalimā' which is based on the testimony of the oneness of God and Prophethood of Muḥammad.<sup>452</sup> He states,

Kalmā Islām main pihlā Juzw 'Lā Illāhā ilallāh' hamāray Dīn kā bayān hā  
aur dūsayr juzw 'Muḥammad al Rasūl Allah' hamārī Sharī'at kā 'unwān  
hā.<sup>453</sup>

Translation:

The first part of Kalima is the testimony of oneness of God and describes our religion. Second part is the testimony of Prophet Muḥammad and is the title of our constitution/law.

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<sup>451</sup> Qādirī position

<sup>452</sup> Maulānā Khālīd Maḥmūd Sayyālkautī is a prominent Deobandi scholar. He has been engaged with teaching and also has served as a member of Sharī'a Appellate court. He did his PhD from Birmingham. His name is also mentioned in the list of 'Mutakalīmīn and manāẓirīn' at the official website of Dār al-'ulūm Deoband.

<sup>453</sup> Nafa', *Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 6

He equates the first testimony with the word of God, the Quran. In the second section, he builds a bridge between the second testimony and the word of the Prophet, the Ḥadīth. He explains further that negation of any one of these two pillars expels the individual out of the fold of Islam. He presents the example of Mr. Parwaiz who replaces the second pillar of following with the ‘*Markaz-i-Millat*’ (centrality of Muslims).<sup>454</sup> According to Sayyālkautī, Parwaiz negated the word of God on the basis of the age old Shi‘ite version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqalain.<sup>455</sup> The real version of the tradition is that of Sunnis and Shi‘ite rejection of the Prophetic tradition as source of Sharī‘a.

- **Replacement of Sunnah with the following of an Imām**

Sayyālkautī termed this trend as *Fitnā Inkār al-Hujjiyyat al-Rasūl*.<sup>456</sup> It means that the acceptance of the Shi‘ite version completely rejects the authority of the Prophet after the demise of the Prophet. It replaces the authority of the Prophet with the authority of markaz al-millat of Parwaiz or the Imām of Shias. Interpretation of Quran becomes a sole prerogative of the Imām in this regard which is repugnant to the status of the Prophet and his religious authoritative legacy after his demise.<sup>457</sup> He further narrates that, “ham jamhūr ahl al-Islam apnay aur khudā kay mābain ḥaḍūr-i-Akram kī zāt kau ab bhī hujjatt samjhtay hain”.<sup>458</sup> (We, the representative of majority of religious scholars, still believe in the Prophet as final authority)

He challenged the authority of Shi‘ite version and equated it with the neglect of the authority of the Prophet. He also explained his position as a representative of jamhūr ahl al-Islam (majority of Muslims).

- **The rejection of finality of the Prophet**

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<sup>454</sup> Ghulām Ahmad Parwaiz (1903-85) has been a prominent religious scholar. He tried to understand Islam in the context of scientific rationality and modernity. He is exterminated by traditional scholars on the basis of his explanations of Quran and Shariah. He is labeled as Quranist. He also had an active career in politics and civil bureaucracy.

<sup>455</sup> Ibid, 7

<sup>456</sup> Ibid, 7-15

<sup>457</sup> Ibid

<sup>458</sup> Ibid

The third connotation of the Shi'ite version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain, according to Sayyālkautī, rejects the idea of finality of the Prophet Muḥammad. The Shi'ite version tells that there is someone after the Prophet who can interpret Quran. According to the Shi'ite concept of Imamate, he adds, the Imām is appointed by God. He argued that the appointment of a divinely guided Imām is a big question mark on the concept of finality of Prophethood. He defends the concept of Caliphate against the Shi'ite concept of Imamate in these words.

Jamhūr Ahl al-Islam ya 'aqīdā rakhtay hain kay Ḥaḍūr Khātīm al-Nabī'īn kay bād kauī āsmānī hudā nahī aur āp kay ba'd paidā haunay wālā kauī fard muftariz al-iṭā'at nahī. Khilāfat aik intzāmī manṣab hay kauī darjā-i-ma'mūriyyat nahī. Khalīfā wuhī hay jau muhimāt-i-salṭanat shūwrāī ṭarīq say anjām day. Ḥaḍūr-i-Akram kay ba'ad aur kisī āsmānī hidāyat kā nazūl nahī aur nā uskā intzār hay.<sup>459</sup>

**Translation:**

Majority of religious scholars believe that the transmission of divine message has been closed after the Muḥammad and believe that no one can claim infallibility after Prophet. Caliphate is an administrative office instead of being a divine appointment. Caliphate is bound to serve the state system with consultation. The door of revelation is closed, and none is awaited after the finality of Prophethood.

In this way, he clearly narrated the Sunnite version and its religious implications against the Shi'ite version and the critical position of that view.

#### **4.3.1.2. Najafī's counter argument**

Tahqīqāt al-farīqain fī Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain not only contains a Shi'ite account of the status of the tradition but also a reply to the text of Muḥammad Nafa'. Najafī

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<sup>459</sup> Ibid, 12



devotes a complete section of the book for answering the criticism of Muḥammad Nafa‘<sup>460</sup>.

This text contains, a prolegomenon, six chapters and the last part answers the question raised by Nafa‘. The introductory part of the book is divided into two i.e. foreword and *muqqadima*. He narrates the circumstances in which he wrote this text in the foreword. He stated that Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain (Shi‘ite version) is one of the most ‘continuous and authentic Prophetic traditions that was narrated by the Ḥadīth scholar and religious scholar throughout the history. However, at the advent of fourteenth century (Islamic calendar) new problems and anarchies emerged. It opened a new chapter of lies and negation of established authorities in Prophetic traditions and Quranic interpretations. Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain, narration is not an exception in this regard, and it has been made controversial. He narrated that phenomenon of negation of authorities is general but Pakistan’s case in this regard is more specific than the rest.<sup>461</sup> Here, this negation is being politically managed and is creating a gulf among the Muslims. He pointed out here that...

Āy din ya mushahidā kiyā jā rhā hay kay sawād al-a‘ẓam kay ba‘aḍ jarāid  
wa akhbār ba‘aḍ farsūdā ikhtalāfi masā’il aur bīsiūn martaba kay  
mustaradd dalāil kau shā’a’ kar kay musalmānau kay andar iftrāq wa  
inshiqāq paidā karnay kī mazmūm khwāhish kar rahay hain.<sup>462</sup>

Translation:

It is noticed that some Barelwī magazines are trying to create hatred and distance among the Muslim by publishing worthless issues and repeatedly rejected arguments.

The term sawād al-a‘ẓam is used normally for the Barelwī sect.<sup>463</sup> He mentioned his target sect in the foreword to make it easier for the reader to understand his further arguments. He shows this is happening under the auspices of state as all the counter

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<sup>460</sup> Muḥammad Ḥussain, *Tahqiqāt al-Farīqain fī Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 337-390

<sup>461</sup> Ibid, 8

<sup>462</sup> Ibid

<sup>463</sup> Ibid, 9-10

narratives presented in the shape of polemical texts by the Shias are being outlawed. He was complaining about this issue in 1959. This makes the issue interesting as he was pointing out the intervention of state in the internal affairs of minority sect in the earlier period of history of Pakistan. He also mentioned that the text is basically a polemical response to the series of essays of Maulānā Allah Yār Chakrālī with the title of *Tahqīq Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain* in the magazine *Al-Farūq*.<sup>464</sup>

The foreword proceeded by the *muqqadima* in which he based his argument in favour of his quotations of Ḥadīth from the Sunnite sources have been accepted by Sunnis. He mentioned that if he would be quoting a tradition from the Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ al-Muslim, this quotation should be accepted by the Sunni scholars because of Sunnite consensus on the authenticity of these two books as the source of Prophetic traditions. He strengthened his argument again by putting reference to the political conditions of the time when Ḥadīth was going to be compiled. He said that it was the period when governments banned the narration of such Ḥadīth that contains some praise for the family of the Prophet. The people were killed on account of their connection with the family of the Prophet. So, a tradition that even survived this political victimisation should be given more respect. It speaks for its strong authenticity. As narrated above his text contains a specific part which is written in response to the text of Muḥammad Nafā'. Here he gave the responses to the questions raised by Maulānā Sayyālkautī in the text of Nafā'. This part was included in the text in 1989.

He gave a response to the *muqqadima* of Nafā's text by the Sayyālkautī. He narrated that this work was the effect of Sayyālkautī's Nāṣbiyya. He used the term *Khamā al-Nāṣbiyya al-shamāma*. He mentioned that there is a significant difference between the argument of *muqqadima* and the main text of Nafā'. In *muqqadima*, he added, Sayyālkautī falsified the presence of Shi'ite version and in the main text Nafā' accepted the presence of Shi'ite version but only challenged the interpretations of that version. He ridiculed Sayyālkautī as 'main kiya kahta hūn mairā ṭanbūrā kiya kahta

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<sup>464</sup> Ibid

See also, Saadi Sumbal, "Grounding Sectarianism: The end of syncretic traditions," *Journal of Research Society of Pakistan*, 55, no. 2 (2018): 131-138

Allah Yār Chakrālī is a prominent Deobandi scholar of 1960s. He led a strong resistance to Shia Proselytization activities in Mianwali District. Above mention article details his works and contribution in this regard, in detail.

hay' (What I (Nafā') say and what my instrument (Sayyālkautī) says).<sup>465</sup> He answered the challenges raised by Sayyālkautī.

He complained against the analogy established by the Sayyālkautī between the markaz al-millat of Perwaiz and Imām of Shi'ite tradition. He described that there existed a difference in meaning between the two terms and Shi'ite concept, neither meant for the replacement of Prophetic authority by the Imamate authority nor it meant the negation of finality of Prophethood. He explained that the Shi'ite version only adds the authority of Imām in the chain of following instead of replacing the Quran and Sunnah. He referred to the verse of Quran which narrates, "*ay imān wālū iṭā'at karū Allah kī aur iṭā'at karū Rasūl kī aur Awlil amar kī jau tum main say hau*" (O believers: follow Allah, His messenger and the authorised people amongst you).<sup>466</sup>

Secondly, he clarifies that it is wrong to equate the status of Shi'ite Imām with Prophethood by the Sayyālkautī. There exists no comparison among the two statuses and Shi'ite version did not allow doing so. The only similarity between the two offices is the infallibility of both Prophethood and Shi'ite Imamate. He narrates...

Sayyālkautī nay..... ya ghalt tā'athur dainay kī kaushish kī hay kay shī'ūn kay nazdīk 'uhdā-i-Nabūwat aur Imāmat main kū'i farq nahī. Hālān kay ya bāt sarāsar ghalt aur sarāsar dhūkā dahī aur āblā faraibī hā. Anbiyyā wa Rusal kau wahī-i-Sharī'at hautī hay jab kay āima kay mut'Alīq is qisam kā 'aqīdā rakhnay kau hamāray 'Ulamā-i-a'lām nay kufr qarār diya hay.<sup>467</sup>

Transaltion:

Sayyālkautī' has tried to deliberately misrepresent that Shia equate the office of Imamate with Prophet Hood. The construction of this image is a deceit and is a lie. Prophets receive revelation on the other hand our scholars have decreed against such belief regarding Imamate and termed it as infidelity.

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<sup>465</sup> Ibid

<sup>466</sup> Ibid

<sup>467</sup> Ibid, 342

Thirdly he rejected the accusation of Sayyālkautī on the establishment of whole sect just based on two traditions which include the tradition of Ghadīr-i-Khum and Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain. Najafī adds that it is just blame and has nothing to do with the original Shia argument that is based on many of directions from the Quran and Sunnah. So, the Shi‘ite argument of the Imamate is proved through a significant number of references from the Ḥadīth sources, Sunnah of Prophet and Quranic injunctions.

#### **4.3.2. Contesting the contents**

The main scene of this textual performance is embedded in the second part of the both texts. Both Nafa‘ and Najafī create the main scene of their performances following the introduction. Nafa‘’s main contents of the text are divided into two parts which are further divided into 85 headings. Najafī’s main performance is divided into six chapters and an addition *ḍamīmā*. This part of the chapter is focused on the comparative description of the polemical texts. It is divided into two parts and this division is based on the detailed study of both these texts. These texts contain three trends of which one has been discussed in the above section. The remaining two trends deal with the following,

- Historicity of the tradition
- Meaning of the tradition

The first trend involves two ways to prove the historicity of one’s version and rejection of the other. This is achieved by challenging the sources of the traditions and by challenging the chain of carriers of Prophetic tradition. The second trend deals with the aspects that accept the rival meanings and its implications on the religion. This part deals with these two stages discursively. Firstly, the point of view of Nafa‘ will be explained and then the Najafis response will be evaluated.

#### 4.3.2.1. Parallel histories of the Prophetic tradition

Muḥammad Nafa‘ started the debate with the argument that Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain is the foundation stone on which the whole building of Shi‘ite belief was founded. The rejection of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain or the Shi‘ite version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain meant the destruction of whole building of Shia beliefs. He based this argument on the statements and text of Maulwī Amīr Dīn and quoted a statement from him stating.

Muḥibīn al-thalāthā nay agarchay thalāthā kī shān main airī chautī kā zaur lagā kar aḥādīth waḍa‘ kar kay apnay salāṭīn al-zamānā kau khush kiya magar phir bhī Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain aur Ḥadīth al-Wilāyat, aḥādīth al-Ṣaḥīḥa aur mutwātīrā kay brābar kū‘ī Ḥadīth nahī banā sakay<sup>468</sup>

Translation:

The followers of the Thalatha (First three Caliphs) have tried their best to devise some fake traditions for the appeasement of their rulers but they could not construct a tradition that could compete the historicity and validity of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain and Ḥadīth al-Wilāya.

Muḥammad Nafa‘ took it as an argument of Shia sect and divided this argument into two parts. He said that it means at first that Shi‘ism is based on the foundation of these two traditions and secondly their continuity has been stressed by the Shia scholars. He viewed that although similar wording to the Shi‘ite version are present in the sources of traditions, yet they cannot be regarded as continuous and authentic. He challenges the historicity of this Prophetic tradition by challenging the authenticity of the sources in which it has been mentioned and secondly the authenticity and continuity of the narrators or carrier of Ḥadīth. Some examples can be drawn below in this regard.

Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī responded polemically to the argument of Muḥammad Nafa‘ which stated Shi‘ism as based on the foundation stone of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain. Muḥammad Ḥussain rejected this view of Muḥammad Nafa‘ and

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<sup>468</sup> Nafa‘, *Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 33

narrated that the Shia sect is not based on Prophetic tradition but is based on Quranic injunctions. He presented his view in the words that...

Makhfī nā rahay kay Quran Majīd main Ṣīghā Amr Aṭī'ū kay sāth das maqāmāt par khudā kay sāth Rasūl kī iṭā'at wajīb qarār dī gaī hay aur aik jagā sirf Rasūl kī iṭā'at wajīb qarār dī gai aur aik jagā Khudā wa Rasūl kay sāth Awlil amr kī iṭā'at kā ḥukam bhī diyā gayā hay.<sup>469</sup>

Translation:

It is obvious and clear that the term 'Command' has been used for the following of Prophet besides the following of God at ten places in Quran. At one place it was only the following of Prophet which was commanded and at another place the following of 'Awlil Amr' besides God and Prophet is ordered.<sup>470</sup>

Muḥammad Ḥussain said that the presence of *awlil amr* and the divine command of his following also meant that there exists no contradiction in the following of the Prophet and Imām and Imamate did not mean the replacement of Prophethood.

#### 4.3.2.2. Contesting the sources

The first step of Muḥammad Nafa' as per his own word was to collect the whole sixty-six *asnād* (verifications) of the Ḥadīth.<sup>471</sup> Then he enumerated the Sunni sources from which Shia version had been quoted by the Shia religious scholars. He first evaluated the authenticity of these sources and established that some of these were not authentic or valid to be regarded as a source of Prophetic traditions. Here are some examples where he rejected the authenticity of the sources.

<sup>469</sup> Ḥussain, *Taḥqiqāt al-Farīqain fī Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 347

<sup>470</sup> *Awlil Amr* bears an essential value in, both, Shia and Sunni sects. Shias believe that this term is specific for the Twelve Imāms of which last one is living a life of occultation. They believe that Imām bear both the religious and wordly authorities after the demise of Holy Prophet. Khumainī decentralised the authority to the level of a jurist and presented the idea of Wilāyat al-Faqīh. In Sunni school of thought, *Awlil Amr* is defined differently in different periods of time. The most common orientation of the term is that it is applied on the caliphs, monarchs and rulers for most of the time. *Awlil Amr* exhibits the centrality of power and authority in Muslim community.

<sup>471</sup> Nafa', *Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 40-52

- **Şahīfā Imām ‘Alī Raḍa ibn Mūsā Kāẓim**

He rejected the authenticity of this source which contained the Shi‘ite version by quoting some scholars of Ḥadīth and rijāl (knowledge of men/narrators).<sup>472</sup> Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Hajr ‘Asqalānī, according to Nafa‘ considered this text as a construction of either ‘Abdullāh bin Aḥmad or his father. ‘Asqalānī is of the view that ‘Abdullāh bin Aḥmad falsely attached this text with Imām ‘Alī Raḍa. Nafa‘ also clarified that this ‘Abdullāh bin Aḥmad is not the son of famous Imām Aḥmad bin Ḥanbal. Nafa‘ extended his argument on the rejection of this text based on opinions of Imām Mullā ‘Alī Qārī, ‘Allāmā Shukānī, and Ḥasan bin ‘Alī Zāhrī.

- **Nawādir al-uṣūl Ḥākim Tirmadhī**

Muḥammad Nafa‘ rejected the quotations from this source on the basis of it being extinct. He is of the view that this source was detected from the references of it was quoted by the Yanābī‘ al-mawwadat<sup>473</sup>. Yanābī‘ al-mawwadat is a Shia source that was published from Syria and is based on the critic of Sunni Ḥadīth. Thus, the only existence of Nawādir al-uṣūl in the Shia text minimises its worth as a reliable source of Prophetic tradition.

- **Mithnad al-Abī A‘wānā**

The third source from which the Ḥadīth is quoted is rejected by Muḥammad Nafa‘ because of unavailability of the complete source due to the partial publication of the book.<sup>474</sup> He viewed that the available and published part of this sources did not mentioned the Shi‘ite version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain which relates to it.

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<sup>472</sup> Ibid, 39-61

<sup>473</sup> Ibid, 183

<sup>474</sup> Ibid, 92

Muḥammad Nafa‘ rejected the validity of the above-mentioned sources either on the basis of being constructed or on account of being incomplete. Muḥammad Hussain Najafī, in response to the Nafa’s rejection of the sources writes that it is basically the defeat of Nafa’s own sect because none of the sources mentioned by Nafa‘ or rejected by him belonged to the Shi‘ite list of sources of Prophetic tradition.<sup>475</sup> The rejection of their own sources and admitting the shortcomings in the authenticity of Sunni sources paves way for the strength of Shi‘ite arguments regarding the validity of Sunnite traditions. He added, that labelling some sources to be of Shi‘ite origin on behalf of the authors beliefs means that a plenty of Sunni Ḥadīth tradition contains a penetration of Shias which raised a remarkable question on the institutional capacity of Sunnite Sunnah and Ḥadīth.<sup>476</sup>

#### 4.3.2.3. Contesting the Rijāl

As, it is evident that a bulk of Islamic history and Ḥadīth is fundamentally consisted of oral traditions that were collected and published at a later stage of Islamic history. Earlier, the narrator, a human individual, was the authority and the authenticity of any historical fact or Ḥadīth. This was based on the continuity of the tradition or the credibility of the narrators/carriers of the Prophetic traditions. For this reason, when the Ḥadīth and history was compiled, the knowledge of the narrators of Ḥadīth became institutionalised and was entitled as *Ilm al-rijāl*.<sup>477</sup> With the passage of time owing to the gulf between Shia and Sunni histories and Prophetic tradition, Shia and Sunni rijāl were segregated and both schools of thought maintained their distinct personalities for the credibility of the traditions. Muḥammad Nafa‘, while rejecting the Shi‘ite version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain in the Sunni sources, rejected some

<sup>475</sup> Hussain, *Tahqīqāt al-Farīqain fī Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 354-355

<sup>476</sup> Ibid

<sup>477</sup> Study of the men. Refers to study of the people who transmitted Ḥadīth reports, manifested in the production of biographical dictionaries (Ṭabqāt). Aimed to demonstrate their moral character as a means of validating the reliability of those reports. The details of the geographical and historical events in a person's life allowed a judgment to be made on the likelihood of a given transmitter having received a report from another transmitter. When this was combined with assessments of the transmitter's character, theological affiliation, and mental capacity, rankings of reliability were established. Chains of transmission (*asnāds*) containing “weak links” were, in theory, eliminated. Assessments were codified starting in the tenth century in a specific genre often called *al-iarh wal-ta’ḍīl* (rejecting and admitting).

Source

<http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1010>



quotations due to the non-credibility of some narrators or the transmitters of Ḥadīth. Some of them are mentioned below.

**i. ‘Atiyā ‘ūfi**

He rejected this individual because of his belonging to the Shia sect.<sup>478</sup> He quoted various authorities regarding the Sunni rijāl proving the Shi‘ite background of ‘Atiyā ‘ūfi. According to Nafa‘, he was either considered as a weak transmitter of the traditions or his identification as a Shia is stressed by the Sunni scholars. Therefore, in both cases his reliability as a carrier of Ḥadīth becomes questionable and non-reliable.

**ii. Sharīk bin ‘Abdullāh**

He has been rejected by Nafa‘ on account of his personal profile. He quotes Ṭāhir al-Fitnī that Sharīk bin ‘Abdullāh is a weak carrier. ‘Abdullāh bin Idrīs regarded him a Shia and Ḥāfiẓ ibn Hajar considered him a deceit and Shia as well<sup>479</sup>.

**iii. Yaḥyā bin Ḥamānī**

Yaḥyā bin Ḥamānī has been exempted by Muḥammad Nafa‘ as a credible source of Prophetic tradition, because of his popularity as a liar.<sup>480</sup> Muḥammad Nafa‘ stated that he was not only a liar but he also showed disrespect to Mu‘āwiyya which makes him unreliable for a neutral transmitter of Prophetic tradition.

Muḥammad Ḥussain focused more on replying this part of Nafa‘ and added to the Uṣūl al-Ḥadīth. His polemical reply, although is scattered throughout the whole text, can be divided into the following headings.

**i. Status of ‘Atiyā ‘ūfi and Sharīk bin ‘Abdullāh**

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<sup>478</sup> Nafa‘, *Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 43-45

<sup>479</sup> Ibid, 48

<sup>480</sup> Ibid, 56

Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī responded to the rejection of ‘Atiyā ‘ūfī and Sharīk bin ‘Abdullāh that Nafa‘ unnecessarily went through the detailed account of Shia Rijāl to prove the belief of these two narrators of Ḥadīth. Even after doing that, Nafa‘ cannot reject the above mentioned two narrators of Ḥadīth because although in Sunni rijāl both of them were considered *ḍa‘īf* yet they were not *matrūk*.<sup>481</sup> So, rejection of the above mentioned two carriers is the negation of Uṣūl al-Ḥadīth set forward by the early Sunni elders.

## ii. The term of Shia

Muḥammad Ḥussain pointed out that the time when Ḥadīth was collected; many among the Sunnis were identified as Shia and *tafḍīlī*.<sup>482</sup> He proved with some examples that their connotation was not based on the Shi‘ite concept of Shia but they were, in fact, Sunnis. Therefore, Muḥammad Nafa‘ must be conscious and careful about expelling every Shia out of the list of narrators because while doing so he might lose some Sunni carriers of tradition.

## iii. Shi‘ite presence in Sunni rijāl

Najafī argued that the mentioning of multiple Shia names in the chain of narrators of Sunni Ḥadīth by Nafa‘ shows that the building of Sunnite Ḥadīth is largely based on the narrations of Shia transmitters of Ḥadīth.<sup>483</sup> It challenged the authenticity of Sunni traditions because no doubt Nafa‘ is rejecting the narrators in the case of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain but uses many other Prophetic traditions which contain one of them in the chain of transmitters. So, it not only challenges the Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain but challenges the whole Sunni Tradition of collecting Ḥadīth.

## iv. Is being Shia a disqualification?

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<sup>481</sup> Ḥussain, *Tahqiqāt al-Farīqain fī Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 359-361

<sup>482</sup> Ibid

<sup>483</sup> Ibid, 101

Muḥammad Hussain Najafī argued that according to the *Ilm al-Rijāl* it is an injustice to reject the status of an individual as Shia.<sup>484</sup> It is against the very spirit of Islam that someone is just denied on the basis of his or her belonging to a particular school of thought.

#### 4.3.2.4. Debating the meanings of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain

The second aspect, around which debate of authenticity and validity of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain is centred, is the discursivity of its meanings. This meaning debate is based on semantics of the Ḥadīth and hermeneutical diversity of Thaqlain.<sup>485</sup> Semantics of the tradition is different in different versions and uses more than one term in replacing Thaqlain lead towards different dimensions. The semantical discussion of the terms like Thaqlain, amarain, shay will be conducted in the first section. This debate will be preceded by the hermeneutical discursivity of the Thaqlain and Itrat between Nafa‘ and Najafī.

Muḥammad Nafa‘, first, focussed on the sole authenticity of the Sunnite version of Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain but also admitted the presence of Shi‘ite version in some Sunni sources. He stated that even the presence of the Shi‘ite version could not prove its authenticity because of it being, *ghair mutwātar* (non-repeated).<sup>486</sup> He extended his debate against the falsification of the Shi‘ite version in its meanings by applying a hermeneutical model to contextualise the terms like Thaqlain, tamassak (agreement), ‘ītrat (relatives), and Ahl al-Bait in their linguistic, Quranic (divine) and historical background. He presented his argument regarding the meaning as follows.

Justifying Sunnite meaning:

Thaqlain kī riwāyat kā jau ma‘nī wa mafhūm paish kiyā gayā hay ya hum nay apnī jānib say tassarruf aur taghayyur kar kay paidā nahī kiyā balkay jamhūr ‘Ulamā Ahl al-Sunnat kā maslak yahī hay. agar ya (Shia) riwāyat Ṣaḥīḥ hay tau is main kitāb Allah kay sāth tamasuk karnay kā ḥukam diyā gayā hay aur kitāb Allah kī iṭā‘at wājib qarār dī gaī hay. Aur Ḥaḍūr kī bīwiyyān aur Aulād (jinkau Ahl al-Bait say ta‘bīr kiyā gayā hay) kay

<sup>484</sup> Hussain, *Tahqiqāt al-Farīqain fī Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 357-371

<sup>485</sup> Ibid

<sup>486</sup> Nafa‘, *Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 37

muṭa‘alliq ya waṣiyyat farmāi gaī hay kay unkay sāth Mawwadat wa Muḥabat wa ‘umdā salūk wa ḥusn mu‘āmlā kiyā jāy.<sup>487</sup>

Translation:

The presentation of meaning of Thaqlain is not falsely constructed by ourselves but it represents the majority of Sunni scholars. Even if the Shi‘ite version is proved authentic it only means the following and submission to Quran and a lovable respect for the family of Prophet including His wives and Children.

He argues that this connotes to the love of the family of the Prophet instead of following them just the same way as submission to God and Prophet. Three testimonies from *Kashf al-Ghamā*, *Tafsīr al-Qumī* and *al-Aḥtajāj* were quoted by Nafa‘ to prove his meaning from the words of Shi‘ite Imāms.

### **Nafa‘’s negation of Shi‘ite meaning**

Muḥammad Nafa‘ criticised the Shi‘ite version in that it is ahistorical as far as its meanings are concerned. He argued that if Allah commanded the Muslims to follow the Prophet then the Prophet will not follow another individual. He viewed that similarly, if the Shia version is correct and the family of the Prophet is one of the foundation stones of Islam and its following was obligatory. Then why the people who comprised this family enunciated at the hands of others (companions). He raised questions on the...

- ‘Abbās, ‘Aqīl and ‘Alī’s enunciation of Abu Bakr
- Ḥassan and Ḥussain’s enunciation of Mu‘āwiyya
- Zain al-‘Ābdīn’s rejection of Ḥassan Muthanna.<sup>488</sup>

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<sup>487</sup> Ibid, 200

<sup>488</sup> Ibid, 206

In the presence of these examples, Nafa' argued, one can easily conclude that even those personalities, in the favour of whom Shias had constructed Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain, were unaware of their being Imāms.

### **Nafa' defining the Family of the Prophet**

Muḥammad Nafa' proceeds towards concluding his debate, against the meaning of Shi'ite version, by questioning the validity of definition of family of the Prophet. He pointed out that if all the above discussed things favoured the Shi'ite version, even then, it would be ridiculous to accept the Shi'ite definition of the family of the Prophet. According to him, Shia scholars have defined this family only as twelve Imāms and have included no one else in the definition. He explained that the acceptance of this meaning would be leading towards the following,<sup>489</sup>

- I. Expulsion of Fāṭimā from the Family of the Prophet
- II. Expulsion of the rest of daughter totally from the Family
- III. Expulsion of wives of Prophet from the Family

The acceptance of the Shi'ite version and its proper definition gathers so many personalities that leave no space for the unanimity.

Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī responded to the debate on the meanings of the Ḥadīth al Thaqlain and replied to the whole set of questions narrated above.

### **Najafī's rejection of the Sunnite meaning**

Najafī challenged the Sunnite version and its use in the 'Thaqlain discourse' as a competitor of the Shi'ite version. He stated that there is no single evidence of the

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<sup>489</sup> Ibid, 210

presence of the word *Thaqlain* in the Sunnite versions quoted by Nafa'.<sup>490</sup> The absence of the major term 'Thaqlain' in the traditions focusing on the following of the book (Quran) and Sunnah make these traditions unsuitable for their inclusion in the banner of *Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*.<sup>491</sup> Secondly he mentioned that Nafa' had deliberately neglected the views of some prominent Sunni scholars regarding the *Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain* and its connection with the obligatory following of the Family of the Prophet. He added that even if, as narrated by Muḥammad Nafa' this version means only a respect and love for the Family of the Prophet, it was not accomplished by many rulers whom Nafa' gives prestige and these rulers created a lot of hardships for the Family of Prophet.

### **Najafi's proofs of Shi'ite meanings**

Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafi, negated the Sunnite meanings and tried to prove the truthful position of Shi'ite version. Najafi stressed the falsification of historical evidence put forward by Muḥammad Nafa'. He rejected the claim of Nafa' about the enunciation of 'Abbās, 'Aqīl and 'Alī at the hands of Abu Bakr by quoting 'Umar, the second caliph, "*Banī Hāshim hamāray khilāf thay*" (Banī Hāshim were against us). If 'Umar himself negated the enunciation of these personalities, Nafa' had no authority to claim it, Najafi added. Similarly, he accused Nafa' of equating the *maṣliḥat* (expediency) and peace of Ḥassan and Ḥussain with Mu'āwiyya with enunciation.<sup>492</sup>

### **Najafi defining the Family of the Prophet**

Najafi claimed that the meaning of the family of the Prophet had not been reduced by the Shi'ite *Ḥadīth*. However, even if they are reduced to the twelve Imāms, it still did not oppose the principles of defining *Ḥadīth* and Quranic injunctions. He used the term 'ītrat Ahl al-Bait' from the *Ḥadīth* and claimed that the presence of 'ītrat automatically excluded the wives of the Prophet.<sup>493</sup> Same is the case with Fāṭimā. This *Ḥadīth* connoted to the leaders of Muslims after the demise of the

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<sup>490</sup> Ḥussain, *Taḥqiqāt al-Farīqain fī Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain*, 357

<sup>491</sup> Ibid

<sup>492</sup> Ibid, 257-261

<sup>493</sup> Ibid, 201

Prophet and as per Islamic rules a woman cannot be an Imām. He added that the number twelve and even the names of these Imāms have been mentioned into different traditions so it would be an injustice to neglect it.

#### **4.4. Critical evaluation of Thaqlain texts**

This section of the study analyses the abstracted concept from the above two texts in the light of the variables of this performance theory. In other words, the main features of textual performance that were explored in the first part are going to be applied on the findings of the texts. It will help to understand how a textual sectarian performance exists in a society, and how its multi-dimensional aspects are created and recreated.

##### **4.4.1 Contextualisation and entextualisation**

The theory of social performance stresses the point that each performance is performed in a particular context.<sup>494</sup> The phenomenon of the textual performance further enhances the issue of contextualisation in a textual performance by arguing that the mere presence or identification of context is not sufficient. Rather it is ‘entextualisation’ that is important. This entextualisation is a property of the text which makes it available for contextualisation in different conditions of time and space.<sup>495</sup> It is also explained by another term namely, detachability, which means that it should not be essential in its context. Above described two texts contain certain aspect, based on which, one can infer that they possess this capacity of entextualisation. It is easy to understand their relative context. There are two categories of the contexts in which these two performances are embedded. Historically both of the above textual performances are contextualised in the mainstream Sunni and Shia narratives, which are the part of main sectarian discourse in Islam. The immediate context of the performances is defined by both authors. Muḥammad Nafā‘ mentioned that he wrote this text to reflect or counter the Shi‘ite discursivity especially on behalf of the writer of *Fulk al-Nijāt*, Shaikh ‘Alī Muḥammad and his disciple Maulwī Amīr Dīn. On the other hand, Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī, as mentioned above, wrote it against a series

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<sup>494</sup> Alexander, “Cultural pragmatics: social performance between ritual and strategy,” 29-91

<sup>495</sup> Barber, “Text and Performance in Africa,” 324-333

of essays on Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain in al-Farūq. He also mentioned that this Nāṣbiyya was age old phenomenon but this time it was emerging out of ‘Sawād al-a‘ẓam’ (Barelwī). At the same time, they also contain certain ‘contextualisation cues’ that leave different meanings unsettled and pave the way for a further reflexive performance. These ‘silent spaces’ are located by the reader or the critics. Both Nafa‘ and Najafi, while locating the shortcomings of each other’s performance, identified ‘contextualisation cues’. Nafa‘ rejected some sources and the carriers of the tradition and created a gap in the conceptuality of the Shia narrative. On the other hand, Najafi filled these gaps, according to his own point of view that the principles applied by Nafa‘ were against the spirit of justice. He filled this gap and reversed the blame to Nafa‘ that rejection of these narrators and the sources of Ḥadīth problematise the credibility of other Prophetic traditions narrated by these sources and narrators. Another contextualisation que analysed by Nafa‘ was the absence of an enough prophetic traditions and Quranic verses for the justification of Shia faith. Najafi replied by putting the Quranic verse of *Awlil Amr* as a base for Shi‘ite belief in Imamate and reflexively pointed out to the text of Nafa‘ that he had not mentioned this debate of following of *Awlil Amr*. The main contextualisation ques in the above texts are, the status of the carriers of tradition, meaning of the symbols like, Thaqlain, Ahl al-Bait, Sunnah. Another category of the contextualisation que which can be learnt from the study of these texts relates to the historical context of the Ḥadīth al-Thaqlain. Sayyālkautī and Nafa‘, both of these texts argued that the acceptance of Shi‘ite version meant exclusion or rejection of Ḥadīth as a source of guidance and was against the concept of finality of Prophethood. Historical contextualisations are mostly embedded in the main competing narratives. It is interesting to note that they play a major role in the identity marking or the improvement of the authority behind a textual performance. The main scene, especially in the above described two sources seems to be based on contemporary discourse or some neutral methodologies. These contextualisation ques or the spaces create a ‘risk’ of detachment of the subject being discussed.

#### **4.4.2. Risk**

As described earlier, every performance is based on some purpose and accordingly constructs a strategy for the achievement of that purpose. The performer



wants to convey a particular message to the audiences. According to one notion, text is a performance at two levels, when it is written, and when it is read.<sup>496</sup> Therefore, here comes the risk factor that distinguishes a textual performance from an inscription.<sup>497</sup> Even the most careful and refined arrangement of symbols for the conveying of message to the audience cannot guarantee the extension of the same message as the performer intended to extend. It is also described in the performance itself when one author blames the other of misunderstanding of his earlier performance. Risk exists at different levels of a performance. The most apparent forms of risk appear in the main scene of an oral or a textual performance but the most important are still found latent inside the texts. These can be located with the contextualisation ques at the points where two parts of a performance are seamed or blended.<sup>498</sup> This risk factor is evaluated mostly in the analysis and reviews of a performance. Performers, especially in sectarian discourse, are aware of the risks involved in the meaning production process of their performance but they pose as if they are ignorant of that and the one (opponent) who is pointing that out is doing it intentionally to blame the author. There are many examples regarding these texts with which one can evaluate the risk management of the rival authors. Among the plethora of evidences, this issue can be understood by taking the example of the mutual personal attacks of authors upon each other. Both authors at many places during the text accuse each other of lying, deceiving the reader, and of stealing the argument and references from other sources. Najafi's performance under discussion is accepted by majority of the Shia, irrespective of his controversial position. On the other hand, Nafa's performance has a variety of responses. It is accepted by the majority of Deobandi and Salafis, but as far as Barelwīs are concerned, they are divided on this issue. Tāhir al-Qādirī, a Sunni scholar, gives preference to Shi'ite version than Sunnite in this regard. Risk also owes its existence to the various levels of background knowledge of the audiences. When readers, as the audience, perform a text they contextualise it according to their own background knowledge of the issue. It also implies that any change in the background knowledge of the reader can lead them towards different conclusions. In case of sectarian discourse, this phenomenon can lead one towards inter-sectarian conversions. The risk that comes out of the

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<sup>496</sup> Howe, "Risk, Ritual and Performance," 63-79

<sup>497</sup> Ibid

<sup>498</sup> Kapchan, "Performance," 479-508

contextualisation ques creates a capacity of detachability of the performance, subject of the performance and the narrative in which it is performed.

#### **4.4.3 Detachability**

The theoretical position of detachability, as narrated by Karin Barber confirms the basic argument on which this comparative analysis of two texts is based.<sup>499</sup> The argument is based on the detachability of two concepts i.e. Rāfḍiyya and Nāṣbiyya from their historical context and their application in the recent discourse. The Rāfḍiyya concept was detached from the Salafīs Deobandi performers by a Barelwī performer. Whilst on the other hand Nāṣbiyya was detached out of Deobandi and Salafīs circles and was applied on a Barelwī Sunni target. This detachability involves various issues. It can be better understood by combining it with the semiotic relationship between culture and religion as described in the second chapter and can also be justified based on location of structural borrowings between the sects discussed in the third chapter. This detachability, as described above, can be located at different levels. The above example works in a broader context. By narrowing it down to the constituent words and symbols of these two performances, detachability can be easily defined. Muḥammad Nafa‘ for example detached the concept of Imamate by Shi‘ite and placed it in his own setting or arrangement where it appears antagonistic to the finality of Prophethood. The same is the case with the rest of readers that after some time it becomes difficult for them to follow the lines set by the author. They understand the performance at the basis of their own knowledge and training which, thus, changes the performance itself.

#### **4.4.4. Strategy**

Keeping in mind the risk of detachability of the text or any other medium of performance the author devises his or her strategy.<sup>500</sup> A performance always contains a strategy to fulfil a specific purpose. This purpose defines the way in which strategy is involved. Nafa‘ purpose is to explain the Sunnite view on the status of Thaqlain and his strategy is focused not only on the explanation of his own belief but also to oppose

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<sup>499</sup> Barber, “Text and Performance in Africa,” 324-333

<sup>500</sup> Ibid

and reject the Shi‘ite point of view. The rejectionist strategy becomes sometimes necessary for the cultural extension of one’s own agenda. The same is the case with Najafī as his purpose is twofold. He not only has to explain the Shi‘ite version but at the same time has to reply to the challenges posed by Nafa‘ in his text. His strategy contains the same levels as were of the Nafa‘. Both have not only to prove their point of view but also must prove the falsehood of the opponent. Whatever is planned here is applied to connect the constituents’ factors of the performance. Another aspect of the strategy can be identified as attempt of ‘othering’ on behalf of the rival authors. As discussed, while introducing the authors that both are considered as dissidents in their parent sects and are labelled as ‘Wahhābī’. Their distance from the parent sect is based on some factors. Muḥammad Nafa‘ while criticising some aspects of Shi‘ite belief and socio-cultural practices, equates these with the influence of Barelwī neighborhood. Muḥammad Nafa‘ also complains about the penetration of ‘Rāfḍī’ ideas in his parent sect. Therefore, it can be inferred that Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī wants to clean out Barelwīsm from the Shia sect and Muḥammad Nafa‘ is doing the vice versa. Performers try their best to invest their strategies while extending their performance to their audiences. The next heading deals with the performative angle of cultural extension in the case of the polemical text being studied.

#### 4.4.5. Cultural extension

The extension of the textual performances and the strategies employed in the efforts to materialise it cannot be generalised or reduced to certain particularities. The text containing the generalised or reduced mechanism of cultural extension loses its value soon after its availability to the audiences. Remembering the words of Berezin that a social performance’s success can be gauged from the resonances it creates.<sup>501</sup> Certain resonances are also arranged by the performer himself. He employs different methods to extend it into different ranks of audiences. Both writers in this discussion, Nafa‘ and Najafī, created multiple sets of the cultural extension of their textual performance. They seem to keep in mind that their works are meant for the audience from the religious scholarship community and from the common people in the society. Nafa‘’s text appeals the common people in the introductory part where

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<sup>501</sup> Berezin, “review of Social Performance,” 1695-1697

Sayyālkautī blames the Shi‘ite version of exclusion of Ḥadīth and Prophethood from the foundations of religious authority. This simply attracts a common man who is least interested in the academic or even the religious basis of these issues. He needs some surface knowledge to defend his belief and to reject the others. Similarly, Najafī rejects this view by putting references from the famous verse of *Awlil Amr* to keep his common audience intact with his performance before going to conduct an extensive polemical act. It is here that the audiences are linked with their background knowledge which they have acquired through their training at home, in the neighbourhood and rest of basic institutionalised trainings.

The performances extension to the academia and religious scholarship is handled in the main part of the scene or act. It is through rationality instead of rhetoric that the textual performance is placed in a religious or academic discourse. Performers take extensive care in the language they employ while proving their argument. That is why the main content of the textual performances of Nafa‘ and Najafī deal with the discussion over the Uṣūl al-Ḥadīth, Ilm al-rijāl and hermeneutics of the Islamic syntax. Nafa‘ challenges the historicity of the Shi‘ite version by proving the weaknesses in the transmitters or carriers of the tradition. On the other hand, Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī tried to revalidate the authorities of these narrators who are challenged by the Nafa‘. Muḥammad Nafa‘ extends the debate of historicity to challenging the Shi‘ite hermeneutical understanding of the terms like *Thaqlain*, *Ahl al-Bait*, *Awlil Amr*. Najafī replies that Shi‘ite hermeneutics are equally connected with history and divine source (Quran) and cannot be disregarded as Nafa‘ had done. The third aspect is philosophical in which both performers dealt with the tradition in the rationality of justice.

Thus, above are the various levels of cultural extension of the two performances and their impacts. It seems that the debate started with the rhetoric and continues with the help of some modern epistemological tools which define reality to be historical and objective. Interestingly this part of both texts did not base their arguments on stressing their divine justification but kept them busy in proving themselves in historical and lingual frameworks existing outside divinity.

#### 4.5. Summary

This chapter dealt with the detailed description and analysis of the reconstructions of Nāṣbiyya and Rāfḍiyya. The discussion in this chapter endorsed the findings of the previous chapters about the structural borrowing and existence of reflexivity in the sectarian development. It also affirmed the creation of neo-sectarian trends that was first explored in this study in second chapter. The argument of the emergence of neo-sectarian trends in sectarian development was discussed based on semiotic analysis of socio-cultural patterns and religious development. Current chapter proved it by going through some established religious/sectarian material, texts. Besides the affirmation of structural borrowings and emergence of neo-sectarian trends, this chapter gave a clue to the overall picture of sectarian development and its relativism.

Going back to the definition of social performance which creates a differentiation between social situation and expression of its meaning, this discussion approves this differentiation based on the findings by following this theoretical model. It finds that ‘sectarian’ exists in the sphere of meaning that is expressed to represent a social situation. These meanings are argued and accepted by the performer and audiences and are based on consensus of a number of people. It also expresses how these meanings come into existence. Focusing on the above discussion, it can be inferred that these performances involved a mechanism which is divided at two levels.

- Different Elements of Performances
- Blending points of the elements.

The whole discussion of the texts blended its different parts based on some divine sources like Quran, Prophethood, and Imamate (in case of Shias). The discussion under the headings of entextualisation, risk and detachability confirm the divine blending of the sectarian performances. These are the places where situation is negotiated.

All the symbolised divinity acts in the background and at blending spaces, meanings are derived only because of a historical, human and rational basis which

both rival texts establish. Nafa' challenged the Shi'ism by challenging the 'meanings' established according to him in ahistorical manner. His critic is on the historical validation of the Shi'ite meaning. It means if the similar meanings are proved because of authenticity of sources and carriers of tradition, Nafa' will be submitting to the Shi'ite meanings. On the other hand, Muḥammad Ḥussain is also holding much of his performance by proving the historicity and human credibility. Thus, the generation of meaning is more historical than divine. It becomes social when both these texts are opened to the society. It confirms the historical and socio-cultural position of the sectarian development. One can infer that keeping religious divinity in the background, sectarian development is the historical and socio-cultural expressions in which that divinity expresses its meanings.

## Chapter 5

### Conclusion

This dissertation initiated the discussion by explaining the influence of socio-cultural patterns on the development of sectarian traditions. This research took some methodological and theoretical turns to analyse sectarian matrix in the annals of oral and text based sectarian performances. The gradual evolution of the discussion is borrowed from the sequence of hypothesis and three main questions raised in the introduction. A considerable focus has been maintained throughout the length of thesis on the significance and symbolic sustainability of the selected socio-cultural, oral and textual traditions. It was also a difficult task to analyse these traditions in a performative way. The choice of performances from the plethora of sectarian topics and issues was not an easy task. Sectarian discourse in Pakistan encompasses various issues around which socio-cultural, oral and textual performativity offers diverse displays. These manifestations are different on various grounds. One of the differences is the fact that they attract different people with different opinions, attitudes and aptitudes. Author has tried his best to introduce common man's sectarian attitude in the first part of research. In second part the oral performativity of Shahāda and Namāz shift the discussion from common man's level of understanding to the level of an aware or educated individual both in capacity of performer and in the capacity of the audiences of that performance. Third part academically deconstructs a polemical and pure scholarly textual tradition. This selection and sequence of narration makes the discussion comprehensible. It also helps to maintain a methodological clarity as well. In a nutshell the thesis starts from *ma'mūlāt* in the first parts, passes through *mu'āmlāt* in the second parts and concludes in *'Aqā'id*s in the third part.

This part concludes the thesis. This concluding part describes, at first, the confirmation of the hypothesis and then discusses the authenticity of the answers excavated from the previous discussions in the chapters. By explaining the present intensity of the sectarian issue, it ends by analysing the future possibilities of sustainability of the current patterns of sectarian discourse.

## **5.1 Concluding and comprehending the discussion in the last three chapters**

As mentioned above, first part of conclusion deals with the comprehension of the product of the whole thesis. The discussion started with describing a need for the socio-cultural examination of sectarianism and proceeded with the basic argument of the research that “sectarian discourse in a plural society reflects to the complex socio-cultural realities by de-forming and re-forming the existing sectarian boundaries and also gives birth to certain new discursive consensuses which result in the emergence of neo-sectarian developments.” After going through the whole discussion divided into three parts, it finds that socio-cultural examination of sectarian discourse has enhanced the understanding of sectarianism as a phenomenon. It not only gives an inside glimpse of the sectarian development in society but also has found some clues to initiate some further discussions as well. This part describes only the concluding inside glimpse of the sectarianism in District Jhang.

### **5.1.1 Sectarianism as a product: Shifting the Agency**

Sectarianism is considered as a hinderance in the way of social unity. It is regretted for disturbing the social order and for its negative impact on the social development. It is claimed that people bear exclusive tendencies owing to their sectarian affiliations. This argument is supported by many examples that show the exclusive social tendencies of sectarian approaches and opinions. It is noted that the people prefer to marry inside their sects and intra sectarian marriages are discouraged. Mosque is another example of sectarian exclusivity. It is argued by the Islamic clergy that mosques are meant for the socio-religious gathering of people to construct a strong sense of neighbourhood. Sectarianism destructs this social neighbourhood by gathering people belonging to distant geographical spaces leaving their immediate neighbours just on the basis of their sectarian affiliation. Sectarianism encourages the people to differ from the festivities related to birth till the observance of funeral rituals. This kind of orientation of sects prevails in the society to maintain the religious sanctity of the sectarian tendencies. It is noted that the people avoid blaming the role of social and cultural tendencies in the religious development. They avoid stating that sectarian tendencies also owe to the social and cultural realities because it might be translated in terms of de-sacralisation of religious content of sectarian point of views. Sectarian point of view claims the divine agency refuting the socio-cultural



influences. It is also due to the presence of strong structural religious surveillance which in case of socio-cultural patterns is not that much visible. The non-visibility of the socio-cultural surveillance is also due to the emergence of various popular cultures.

Even, the studies which maintain sectarianism as a socio-cultural product remain conscious and restrict themselves to social influences of politics and economy and do not relate it to the cultural basis at all. They maintain a distance to the epistemological interferences of the socio-cultural patterns in the development of sectarian trends. Second chapter of this thesis extends the social understandings of the existing orientations of the sectarian phenomenon to the cultural investigation. It sufficiently proves that not only sectarian tendencies affect the social growth, but socio-cultural realities also give birth to certain sectarian epistemologies. It gives sufficient examples from the socio-cultural depositories to clearly show their influences in the shaping and reshaping of sectarian tendencies. The emergence of various neo-sectarian trends shows the reflection of socio-cultural inferences as compared to the intervention of religious jurisprudential aspects.

### **5.1.2 Sectarian Reflexivity:**

As described above, one aspect of sectarianism is that it is a socio-cultural product and reflects the socio-cultural trends prevailing in the society. Sectarian development is affected by the existing or changing social and cultural makeup. It can be regarded as a dominant trend as it initiates a discourse. The second significant aspect of the sectarian development found in the study is sectarian reflections in the shape of negotiation, compromise and borrowing. Sects in their development not only reflect the socio-cultural patterns but also reflect other sects as well. The second significant finding of the thesis is the sectarian reflexivity. It shows that sects while living in a society reflect each other. It also has been proved that while reflecting each other sects also exhibit structural changes. Performative examination of oral sectarian traditions of Shia, Barelwī and Deobandi sects confirm the reflexivity and structural borrowing among the sects. Sectarian reflexivity creates a social dichotomy. At one end, it is a positive aspect which shows flexibility by the sects. The other thing it shows is that it adds to the social complexities and confusions. Normally, it is

believed that sectarian denominations are absolute, and they have nothing to share with each other. It is also assumed that they only remain at rival ends giving no way to conciliation, compromise and negotiation. Present research has exposed the myth of sectarian exclusiveness by finding certain spaces of sectarian coexistence. It finds that sects reflect each other while sharing a social context. The oral performance of Ṭāhir al-Qādirī identifies some structural borrowings from Shi‘ite tradition and textual performances of Muḥammad Nafa‘ exhibit inclinations towards Deobandis. Both Qādirī and Nafa‘ belong to Barelwī sect yet they are poles apart. Āghā Nasīm ‘Abbās of oral Shi‘ite tradition is altogether different from the Najafī of the textual performance. One borrows from sufi ideas on the other hand other considers it a heresy to consult sufi ideas. People differ even by living inside the boundaries of same sect. Although, in some respects, it is a positive sign, yet, it is still arguable to declare and establish its positivity. It is difficult to announce it a manifestation of social flexibility by turning a deaf ear to its consequences. This aspect is confusing the social identities of people. It has become difficult to generalize social life. Socially it is still difficult to identify a Barelwī, for example, that whether he is inclined towards Qādirī or is attached with Muḥammad Nafa‘. Similarly, Shia and Deobandi are also differently contextualized internally.

### **5.1.3 Scripting the Sectarian ‘other’**

The emergence of neo-sectarian denominations has confirmed the hypothesis of socio-cultural and sectarian reflexivity. Fourth chapter details the performative analysis of textual traditions and investigate the changing script and roles of former sectarian actors in new circumstances. Former generalizations of sectarian affiliations are dissolved giving way to new complex realities. Sectarian ‘othering’ is a one angle from which this transition can be checked and observed. Traditional sectarian discourse contains simple identifications of sectarian other. Traditionally Barelwīs and Deobandis are ‘others’ for Shias. Shias and Barelwīs are ‘others’ for Deobandis and Deobandis and Shias are ‘other’ for Barelwīs. For long, Shias have been entitling Sunnis as munāfiqs (imposters) while they have been entitled as Rāfdis by Barelwīs and Kāfirs by a limited circle of Deobandi and Salafī sects. Currently, performative investigation of sectarian discourse suggests that the former generalizations of sectarian ‘othering’ have been changed. This change has devastating impacts on the

simplicity of the issue. Othering, now, has become a complex issue with sectarian as well as social consequences. Later period of this study (first decade of current century) shows a remarkable trend of deconstruction of sectarian other which resulted in intra sectarian excommunications. Following are the new patterns are sectarian excommunications.

Mushrik, is a term which has been used against a portion of Barelwīs, Sufīs and Shias on the basis of their practices at Sufi shrines and rituals related to Shia commemorations of Muḥarrām. Now this term has not only reduced its space inside the Barelwī and Shia sects but at the same time has been adopted by the followers of these sects as well. Wahhābī Shia, for example, announces the Qalandarī Mawālī as *Mushriks*. Same is the case with Barelwīs who are also divided on Salafī and traditional lines. Salafī-lined Barelwīs use this title for the traditional followers of Barelwī sect. The reciprocal term of *Mushrik* is *Gustākh*. *Gustākh* is one who disregards the traditional divine respect of Holy Prophet and Family of Prophet. This term is used for the Barelwīs and Deobandīs who have a Salafī inclination. Similarly, Shi‘ite othering has also gone through a change. They also show an internal discourse of ‘othering’. Shias with a slight inclination towards a Salafī methodology are entitled as ‘*Muqaṣir*’. Other group characterized with some popular Sufi cum spiritual inclinations is entitled as ‘*Ghālī*’. *Ghālīs* claim that *Muqaṣirs* are worse than *munāfiqs* and will be punished forever in hell. *Muqaṣir*’s claim that *Ghālīs* commit ‘shirk’ and by doing so they have nothing to share with the Shi‘ite faith. These are few examples from a wide range of titles of othering i.e. *La ‘īn*, *ḥarāmī*, *kādhīb*. It simply shows that society has diverse standards of exclusion. This aspect creates social problems and cultural confusion which can be proved disastrous.

Above results depict the gravity of the current religious-sectarian trends in District Jhang in particular and in Pakistani society as a general. People are divided into sects and further divided into sub-sects. Although sectarian diversity has been discovered and explored in this research, yet it needs a careful handling on the part of audiences. Audiences must be aware of the fact that this diversity is highly contextualized and there may exist certain other factors in the process which have not been the part of this discussion. Following section details this current position by describing the possibilities of sustainability of the current divisions in the future.

## 5.2 Current Scenario

The discussion in above concluding section confirms the argument and verifies the hypothesis of the study. It confirms that traditional sectarian boundaries in District Jhang have gone through change and now the sectarian phenomenon has become complex and meaningfully diverse. At one end, it is optimistic aspect which shows internal borrowing and reflexivity among sects that, usually, is rejected by absolute sectarian claims. On the other hand, this situation has added to the social problems. It adds to the number of social scripts with divisive impacts on society. It becomes difficult for a society to comprehend complications and devise scripts responding the complexities. This complexity invites a mechanism of social selection to shortlist the scripts. This shortlisting is done to simplify the understanding. Mechanism of social selection and shortlisting of scripts involves variety of things and it differs from the difference of social conditions. As the diversity comes out of a social process, mechanism of selection also comes from the society. Questions regarding the understanding of the process of social selection and performative sustainability arise at this stage. Tools of understanding can be borrowed from different fields of study, but this study restricts itself to the guidelines provided by theory of social performance in this regard. This part implies the variables offered by the theory of social performance besides taking ‘juridification’ as a base of analyzing the capacity of social sustainability of emerging neo-sectarian trends. As described in the earlier chapter that success and sustainability of a new social performance depends upon the social and political resonances it creates.<sup>502</sup> Another approach offers that a performance is sustainable if it generates emotional arousal and psychological identifications.<sup>503</sup> Other parameter which is applied to gauge the sustainability of a sectarian performance is the juridification. Following part discusses the status of neo-sectarian developments on the basis of social and political resonances, emotional arousal and psychological identifications and juridification. This theoretical selection will help not only to maintain the continuity, but it also presents a clear picture of present with a foresight of future development of sectarian discourse. It will help to

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<sup>502</sup> Mabel Berezin, “review of Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual,” 273-75

<sup>503</sup> Jonathan H. Turner, “review of Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual,” 1695- 1697

guage the extent of maturity and sustainability of these emerging neo-sectarian developments.

Second chapter concludes the discussion by pointing out the emergence of possible new sectarian denominations. These denominations include sufi-hia, Deo-Barelwī, Wāhhābī-Shia and Wāhhābī-Deobandi. After going through the whole discussion in the previous four chapters, it is not difficult to analyze the emerging sub or neo-sects under the above detailed variables of sustainability. It is also noted that the emerging sects have one major inclination in this regard besides partial observance of rest of variables. Following part describes the futuristic sustainability of these sectarian developments by marking these with their major variable of strength.

### 5.2.1 Emotional arousal and Barelwī-Shia

The first group that is identified in the research is termed as Barelwī-Shia. This group can be further divided into two categories of followers. First category comprises of Shias with Sufi-Sunni inclinations and second category is comprised of Barelwī Sunnis inclined towards Shia sect. The discussion in earlier part identified this trend in the cults like qalandarī mawālīs. Later the performative analysis of speeches of Ṭāhir al-Qādirī and Nasīm ‘Abbās also brought the two scholars in the fold of this sub-sectarian development. Available literature and results of field works, conducted by the researcher, show that this group meets the qualification of four variables of sustainability. It is juridified, contains political and social resonances and possesses certain qualities of psychological identification. The most significant aspect of this group, noted by the researcher, is its potential of creating an emotional arousal. Taking the jurisprudential strength of this group, one cannot miss the contribution of Ṭāhir al-Qādirī. He has written on the topics that combine the history, faith and practices of Barelwīs and Shias.<sup>504</sup> He gives Sunni voice to Shi‘ite concepts. He combines the Shi‘ite and Sunnite concept of caliphate by deciphering caliphate into worldly and religio-spiritual domains. He accepts the Twelve Imāms of Shias on the basis of their justified religio-spiritual authority and justifies the Sunni caliphate in the name of governance of world.<sup>505</sup> This performance, immediately, attracted a

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<sup>504</sup> Ṭāhir Qādirī, *The Minhāj al-Quran Movemnet: The concept of Din*, (Lahore: Minhāj al-Quran Publisher, 2009), 80-90

<sup>505</sup> Ibid, 1-10

significant audience by creating an effect of psychological identification but in a long run it dissatisfied both the Shia and Sunni followers. Shia Twelvers cannot compromise the political claims of Imāms on the issue of caliphate on the other hand Sunni cannot accept the title of worldly caliphate to already established concept of 'pious caliphate'. Same is the case with the creation of social and political resonances of the practices linked with this group. They attract the audiences for a short span of time just to leave after a while. A strong sense of 'situationality' is linked with the social and political influences of this group. It is evident from the history of electoral results of the district Jhang as well that the political influences of this trend are short-lived.<sup>506</sup> The strongest area of this group where its performances get maximum success is the arousal of emotions. The religio-spiritual emotions of Barelwī and Shia audiences are aroused in the performances of this group. People belonging to different sects experience the similar emotions of spiritual affiliations and this situation is created time and again.

### 5.2.2 Political resonance and Deo-Barelwīyyat

This group also exhibits the presence of all the four variables of performative sustainability, but the fact is that this trend gets strengthened more on the basis of political resonances and influences that is creates by its social presence. The politics of district Jhang has witnessed several occasions when Braelwis and Deobandis came close to each other against the mutual enemy.<sup>507</sup> The elections of Maulānā Muḥammad Dhākir, Ghulām Ḥaider Bharwāna show a remarkable togetherness of Deobandis and Barelwīs.<sup>508</sup> An overall political dominance of Deobandi school of thought is also a reason that attracts the Barelwī audiences towards them. On the other hand, those Barelwīs who exclude Shias also make common political cause with the Barelwīs. The second aspect which combines the rival sects is based on mutual jurisprudential performance. Muḥammad Nafa', the textual performer of Barelwī sect brings many topics of Deobandi sect in the jurisprudential fold of Barelwīs. The list of

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<sup>506</sup> Ṭāhir al-Qādirī tried his best to attract the Shia audiences before 2002 elections. His oral performance discussed in chapter three was also performed before elction but he was unable to translate this into electoral terms. For detailed result, follow the link below, <https://www.ecp.gov.pk/Documents/General%20Election%202002/National.pdf>

<sup>507</sup> Athīr, *Dhikr al-Dhākir*, 110

<sup>508</sup> Ibid

these topics and content is discussed in detail in fourth chapter of this dissertation. Although he has done a lot, but his work could not attract audiences from his own Barelwī sect. His textual and oral performance pleased Deobandis rather than attracting Barelwīs.

Another strong area of this sub-sectarian development is psychological identification. In the recent times, efforts of scholars like Maulānā Ṭāriq Jamīl have created many spaces where both Barelwīs and Deobandis feel a psychological togetherness.<sup>509</sup> The common title ‘Sunni’ also plays a vital role in bringing the fractions of both sects close to one another. It might appear interesting that even finding the psychological identification and having a common political cause deo-Barelwī social interaction and influences are less common. Both sects are socio-culturally (in a particular meaning of socio-cultural) antagonistic to each other. Plenty of Deobandi-Barelwī polemics have also played their role in the socio-cultural animosity of these sects.

### **5.2.3 Wahhābī-Shia’s Jurisprudential Strength**

The case of Wahhābī-Shia is comparatively strong from the rest of neo-sectarian developments on the basis of this group’s jurisprudential status. This jurisprudential strength has coincided with the psychological identification. They do not require a social interaction between wahabis and shias. This group has nothing in common with salafī-Wahhābī. Their nomenclature contains ‘Wahhābī’ on the basis of salafī ideals this group has acquired. This group does not own any Wahhābī follower inclined towards Shia sect unlike the other neo-sectarian developments. This group exists within Shias and its followers are identified with their anti-Sufī and rigid stance against the socio-cultural presences in the religion. Methodologically, they justify their claims with the application of jurisprudential approach. They claim that the vices they have pointed out in Shia community could not be brought in the jurisprudential fold of Shia Fiqh. One of the most significant personality who is blamed as Wahhābī-Shia is Muḥammad Ḥussain Najafī. His profile and contributions in this regard have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter. His textual contributions depicting the juridification of his particular ideas are also from the number of books he has

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<sup>509</sup> Proselytization has been a source of Barelwī-Deobandi unity untill the Barelwīs devised their own platform to endorse their identity.

written, translated and edited. The political influences, this group creates, are also acceptable to many. This group, although connects the followers with clergy but still they are not advised to be politically affiliated with Shi'ite clergy in Iran and Iraq.<sup>510</sup> Their leadership resides inside Pakistan and requires nothing in political field. This behavior gives a political liberty to the followers who in return pay deep heed to the recommended faith and practices of the group.

#### **5.2.4 Psychological Identification and Deo-Wahhābiyyat**

The group which, according to the findings of this research, owes its existence to psychological identification is Deo-Wahābiyyat. This group got existence more on the basis of psychological identification rather than methodological and epistemological affiliations between Deobandi and Wahhābīs. After the creation of Pakistan, Deobandis involved themselves in two kinds of polemics i.e. Shia-Deobandi and Deobandi-Barelwī polemics. Ḥaq Nawāz Jhangwī, a Deobandi cleric, initiated polemical debates both with the Shias and Barelwīs at the same time. In this atmosphere of animosity, they bent towards the Salafīs who were also critical to Barelwīs and Shias. They made common cause with each other, forgetting, for instance, their own differences. One can infer that this psychological identification laid the bases of this group which resulted in the large number of conversions from Deobandi to Wahhābī sect. This group also had a political resonance and it is observed that Wahhābīs have, mostly, favored the Deobandi political claims as they themselves do not have that much strength to have a political movement.

#### **5.3 Way Forward**

Neo-sectarian developments, as described above, possess certain characteristics which can lead these developments to a mature end. The four new developments qualify sustainability on the basis of one or two of the variables of sustainability applied in the above discussion. Some create a strong political resonance but are weak in social influences, psychological assimilation and in the jurisprudential criterion. The sub-sectarian group which qualifies the jurisprudential credibility lacks in the rest

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<sup>510</sup> They remain silent regarding the political stand of Shia community. It facilitates the local Shias to avoid any political interference from Iran. That is why this trend has attracted good number of Shias from political Elite.



of variables. One can infer that all the four new groups possess the qualities of subsistence but in varying way. They differ on the basis of potential and number of present variables of sustainability. They are all struggling but none is completely developed in a mature form. At this stage, their appearance is more solid than the authentic proof of their sustainability. This thesis was intended to locate their presence and appearance to academically grasp a socio-cultural identity of sectarian development. It was not intended to find the authenticity or to verify the future existence of the new emerging sectarian trends, but it is better to conclude the discussion with the question of future of these sectarian developments.

The first question which emerges out of the discussion is about the ways and means of struggle and contesting the authority in complex society by these groups. Question is extended further to know the structural formation of presentation of group in a common socio-cultural background. It will be interesting to know that how these groups while sharing the socio-cultural space are attracting the audiences and are trying to meet the conditions and merits of the four variables of sustainability. The second aspect which can be investigated in future is the question of maintenance of shape of these new sectarian groups. The basic question is that whether these new developments will become denominations, or they will become the dominant language within their parent sect. For example, one can question that either Barelwī-Shias will constitute a new group, or they will engulf the rest of contesters within Shia or Barelwī sect. So, this research concludes itself by raising the questions about the future shape of its resultant sectarian patterns.

## Glossary

**Ahl al-Bait:** Family of Prophet

**Aḥmadur Sayyāl:** Name of a Tehsil Head quarter in District Jhang

**Akhānr:** Proverb

**Akrūrī:** Name of a shrub

**‘Alwī:** Descendent or Follower of ‘Alī

**Anhay:** Blind

**Anṣār:** Companions, referred to the inhabitants of Madina

**Athāra Hazārī:** Name of a Sufi saint burried in Jhang. Pir Tajuddin is popular as Athāra Hazārī. It denotes that he recited the Holy Quran Eighteen Thousand times while standing inside river water

**Ithnā ‘asharī:** Twelver Shias

**Badmu‘āshiyān:** Extortions, a Punjabi word denoted to the people who commit extortions

**Bānh:** Arm, Punjabi word with multiple connotations. It is used in the meanings of power and is also denoted to the unmarried female.

**Baqā:** Subsistence, a Sufi concept that means a particular state of life with God

**Bayān:** Speech, a religious narration

**Bhairay:** wrong doers, a Punjabi word refers to both wrong doers and wrong doings

**Bid‘at:** unpleasant Innovation in religion

**Birādarī:** Caste-hood

**Chanāb:** A river in Pakistan

**Changiyyān:** Good deeds, also used to point out good people

**Chillā:** A forty days long Sufi practice

**Chishtiyya:** A sufi order

**Chūrā:** knife

**Dānay:** Wheat particles, wheat is major crop in Punjab. Accumulation of wheat ‘Dānay’ is a sign of wealth

**Dārḥī:** Beard

**Daryā:** River

**Zakāt:** Religious tax

**Dhamāl:** Sufi dance

**Dhī:** Daughter

**Dauhrā:** a poetical genre

**Faḍā’il:** A genre in Shia Majālis based on the narration of the Superiority of Family of Prophet

**Fanā:** Annihilation, a Sufi concept referred to the final destination of a sufi believing in Wahdat-al wujud.

**Fataḥ al-Mubīn:** A clear Victory: entitling a polemic held in District Jhang Barelwī and Deobandi scholars

**Gaddh:** Ceremony of fixation of marriage date

**Gādhī:** A part of water-well

**Gaddī:** Spiritual place

**Ghar:** House

**Gharīb:** Poor

**Ḥalūl:** Indwelling, a Sufi concept which means the indwelling of divine into human body

**Hamshīr:** Sister

**Hanj:** Tear

‘**Irfān:** Understanding, also refers to the Shi‘ite understanding of Sufi ideas

**Jalūs:** Procession

**Jantarī:** A booklet containing the astronomical description of days and zodiac conditions

**Jarh:** Root

**Jehlam:** A river in Pakistan

**Jhūla:** Cradle

**Kachhī:** A geographical area stretched along the eastern bank of river Indus throughout the length of river in Punjab Province.

**Kadhī:** Riverbank

**Kamlay:** Insane

**Karāmā’:** Miracle

**Kāthiyya:** A caste group in Punjab

**Khalq:** Creation

**Khiṭāb:** Speech,

**Kirāna Bār:** Land between river Jehlum and Chanab

**Lahndā:** West, it also refers to a Punjabi dialect prevalent in the western districts of Punjab Province.

**Langar:** Spiritual food offerings

**Lashkar:** Army

**Laurī:** Lullaby, sleeping song, it also means a sub-caste group of bards in Punjab

**Mājhi:** A dialect of Punjabi language prevalent in Eastern parts of Punjab

**Majlis:** Shi‘ite religious gathering

**Maikans:** A caste group in District Sargodha

**Mang:** Fiancé

**Maṣā’ib:** Narration of grief of Prophet’s Family in Majlis

**Masīt:** Mosque

**Mawn:** Mother

**Maidhī:** A marriage ritual in South Punjab

**Milād:** Celebration of Birth

**Mirāthan:** A bard woman

**Muhājir:** Migrant

**Muqaṣir:** A person who deliberately hides something. This derogatory term is referred to the Shias with Salafī inclinations.

**Murīds:** Spiritual followers

**Naqshbandiyya:** A sufi order

**Nāṣbiyya:** This term is used by the Shias to identify defenders of Yazid in Sunnite camp

**Nauḥā:** A lament expressing the griefs of Family of Prophet

**Nūr:** Light

**Panwār:** A Rājput caste

**Panchī:** Bird

**Pīr:** A spiritual elder

**Pīw:** Father

**Putr:** Son

**Qādiriyya:** A sufi order

**Qaṣīdah:** A poetic genre containing praise.

**Qudsī:** Angels/ Heavenly beings

**Qul khawānī:** Concluding ceremony of death rituals

**Rāfḍiyya:** A deserted group (term used for Shias)

**Rāh:** Way

**Ra'isiyyān:** Extravagancies

**Sādāt:** Plural of Sayyad

**Ṣaḥāba:** Companions of Prophet

**Sajanṛ:** Friends

**Sāndal Bār:** part of land stretched between River Ravi and Chanab in Punjab

**Sānjhā:** Shared

**Shabīh-i-Janāzā:** Portrayal of Funeral

**Shahādat:** Martyrdom

**Sipāh:** Army

**Siyānay:** Wise men

**Sūyyam:** Third day of death rituals

**Suhrāwardiyya:** A sufi order

**Tabbarā:** Arabic term. This is part of Shi‘ite Farū‘-i-Dīn. Virtually, it means a state of keeping oneself at a distance from sin and wrong doers. In practice it is termed as an act of condemnation of opponents of Shi‘ite Imams.

**Tablīgh:** Proselytization

**Tahārā:** Cleanliness/Purity

**Takfir’:** Excommunication

**Taliān:** Shisham tree

**Tāndlā:** Name of a shrub

**Tarkhān:** Carpenter

**Ta‘ziyya:** Portrayal or model of Shrine of Imam Hussain

**Thal:** Name of a desert in Punjab, Pakistan

**‘Urs:** Annual celebration at a sufi shrine

**Wadkiyyān:** Punjabi word referred to the elders and forefathers

**Wagti:** Dexterity in making someone laughs

**Wāh:** A Punjabi word which means a social Connection, Interaction

**Wajad:** State of ecstasy

**Wāris:** Heir

**Wilāya:** Spiritual Governance

**Wilāyat al-Faqīh:** Governance of the Jurist/ Theologian. This theory was presented by Āyatullāh Khumainī in Iran. It works as a base of Iranian Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

**Wilāyat al-Takwīnī:** Authorised Governance. A belief in the divine authority of Imam

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## II. List of Interviews

Dhākir Ghulām Shabīr ‘Imrānī, August, 2015

Faḍal ‘Abbās, Agriculturist, Shorkot, August, 2015

Gulzār Jatt, Civil Contractor. September 2015

Makhdūm Ḥāmid Raḍā, Sajādā Nashīn, Darbār Shair Shāh, August, 2014

Mazhar Bukhārī, Poet, Uch Gul Imām, September 2015

Muḥammad Nāṣir, Head Jāmi‘a ‘Uthmāniyya, Main Bāzār Jhang, September, 2014

Muḥammad ‘Abbās Shāh, Ex. Vice Chairman District Council Jhang, Rattā Mattā, September 2013

Na‘īm Khān Lashārī, Educationist, August 2016

Najam al-Ḥassan, Principle Jāmi‘a Imām Sajjād, Jhang Saddar, September 2013

Nawwāb Fakhar ‘Abbās Sayyāl, Member of Nawwāb family in Jhang, currently serving as Sub Inspector Punjab Police Department, September, 2014

Professor Muḥammad Shafīq Bhatti, Chairman Department of History, Bahauddin Zakariya University Multan, August 2015

Qaisar A‘wān, Member of A‘wān Family (migrated), Garh Mahārājā, August 2013

Rānā Muḥammad ‘Alī, Social worker, September 2015

Sāḥir Rangpūrī, a Sarā’ikī Nationalist poet serving as Lecturer at University of Education Okara, August 2015

Salīm ‘Abbas Quraishī, Former Member District Council Jhang, September 2015

Sayyid ‘Adnān Ḥaider Advocate, Agriculturist and Lawyer, September 2015

Shaikh Ḥākim ‘Alī, Former Provincial Minister Fisheries, September, 2016

Ṭāriq Purbāna, Advoacte High Court, August 2014

